State v. Vick

Citation43 S.E. 626,132 N.C. 995
PartiesSTATE v. VICK.
Decision Date24 March 1903
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Appeal from Superior Court, Wayne County; Robinson, Judge.

Fred Vick, alias Frank Vick, was convicted of rape, and he appeals. Affirmed.

W. C Munroe, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for the State.

MONTGOMERY J.

The prisoner was convicted of a capital felony--rape. The only question brought up by the appeal for decision relates to the competency of one of the jurors. It appears from the record that the juror J. B. Cox, one of the special venire, had been asked by the solicitor for the state whether he had formed and expressed the opinion that the prisoner was not guilty and was passed to the prisoner. The juror then, of his own accord, stated to the court that he did not think he was competent to sit upon the case, for the reason that he was opposed to capital punishment; that he had religious scruples against serving as a juror in a capital case; that it was contrary to the doctrine and rules of the religious denomination of which he was a member for any of its members to act as jurors in capital cases; that his own opposition to and scruples against, and the doctrines and rules of his church against any of its members acting as jurors in capital cases, were founded upon opposition to capital punishment solely. His honor, against the protest of the prisoner, decided, as a matter of law, that the juror J. B. Cox was not a competent juror, and ordered him to stand aside. The prisoner excepted. He exhausted all his challenges, and was compelled to accept a juror to whom he objected.

It is ordained by section 13, art. 1, of the constitution, that "no person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court. The Legislature may however provide other means of trial for petty misdemeanors with the right of appeal." Good and lawful men, within the meaning of the constitutional provision, are such as have been found by the commissioners of the several counties to have paid taxes for the preceding year, and are of good moral character and sufficient intelligence. Code 1883, § 1722. Of course, that statutory provision has reference to the qualifications of jurors in the general sense. It cannot mean that every person who has paid his tax for the preceding year, and is of good moral character and sufficient intelligence, can be a competent juror in the trial of each and every particular action. If that could be so, then kinship, interest, partiality, prejudice, nonresidence, etc., would not disqualify a man for jury service, provided he possessed the statutory qualifications. The great object of trial by jury is to secure a fair and impartial trial, and, to exclude the classes above referred to from jury service in particular cases, a system of challenges for principal cause or to favor has grown up. The matters which constitute challenges are not prescribed by statute in our state, except in one instance, and that is the provision of section 1728 of the Code of 1883: "If any of the jurors drawn have a suit pending and at issue in the superior court, the scrolls with their names must be returned into partition number 1 of the jury box." By our law, the competency or incompetency of jurors is left to the decision of the courts. Under section 1199 of the Code of 1883, it is provided, among other things, that "in all trials, whether for capital or inferior offences, the defendant may have the aid and assistance of counsel in making challenges to the jury, and the judge or other presiding officer of the court shall decide all questions as to the competency of jurors." And in section 405 of the Code of 1883, amongst other things, it is declared that the judge or other presiding officer of the court shall decide all questions as to the competency of jurors in both civil and criminal actions. The rulings of law by the judges of the superior courts, however, on challenges for cause, are subject to review by this court. Their findings of fact, though, are conclusive; so, also, are their findings of fact and law upon challenges to the favor.

In State v. Green, 95 N.C. 611, Ashe, J., for the court, said: "But the challenge in these cases [ State v. Jones, 80 N.C. 415; State v. Boon Id. 461] was not strictly a challenge for cause, but a challenge to the favor, when the party has no particular cause to challenge, but objects that the juror is not indifferent, on account of some suspicion of partiality, prejudice, or the like. In such cases the validity of the objection was left at common law to the determination of triers, whose office was to try whether the juror was favorable or unfavorable. The method of which proceeding was, if the first man called be...

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