Breland v. Ritter

• Decision Date: 28 March 1903
• Parties: BRELAND. v. RITTER et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

43 S.E. 960

65 S. C. 480

BRELAND.

v.RITTER et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 28, 1903.

TRIAL—INSTRUCTIONS—MISAPPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY.

1. In an action for willful seizure and appropriation by defendants of certain crops on which plaintiff had an agricultural lien, statements by the judge in his charge that the complaint claims that defendants wrongfully seized the property in question, and that stealing consists in taking and carrying away property that belongs to another, and while the complaint does not in terms charge larceny, it does charge taking property with intent to defraud and that the complaint, if there had been no answer, would have looked altogether like a charge of stealing, although language not strictly appropriate to a civil action is not harmful, where it is hardly stronger than the language of the complaint, and where the court further states that he does not intend to say that the complaint charges defendants with larceny.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Barnwell County; Benet, Judge.

Action by J. S. Breland against L. W. Rit-ter and J. C. Breland. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Davis & Best, for appellant.

Jno. R. Bellinger, for respondents.

JONES, J. This was an action for actual and punitive damages for alleged willful and malicious seizure and appropriation by de-fendants of the crops of William Harris, upon which plaintiff had an agricultural lien for supplies, with intent to defraud plaintiff. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendants, and from the judgment thereon plaintiff appeals upon exceptions to the charge of the presiding judge to the jury. As the charge to which exception is taken relates to the third paragraph of the complaint, that portion of the complaint is here stated as follows: "(3) That on or about the 1st day of September, A. D. 1900, and at divers times thereafter, the defendants herein wrongfully took into their possession the entire crops grown on said lands, and in direct collusion with each other carelessly, willfully, maliciously, and wantonly disposed of the same, and appropriated the proceeds thereof to their own use and benefit, and that all the while said crops were being gathered and being so disposed of the defendants had full knowledge of the existence of said lien, and that their conduct, in view of this fact, was for the sole and express purpose of defrauding the plaintiff herein of his claim on said crops by virtue of said lien." We may as well state here the answer of defendants, which, in addition to a general denial, was as follows: "(2) They allege that at the times mentioned in the complaint the defendant J. C. Breland was a magistrate in and for the county of Bamberg, and that on the 10th day of September, 1900, the defendant L. W. Ritter, before him as such magistrate, swore out a warrant of attachment against the crops of the said William Harris, mentioned in said complaint, under which warrant the said crops were seized and sold by the constable of said J. C. Breland, as magistrate, to satisfy a lien thereon held by said L. W. Ritter for the rent of the lands upon which said crops were raised, and the proceeds thereof were applied to the costs and expenses of said proceedings, and the balance to the payment of the lien of said L. W. Ritter, but that the same was not paid in full; that there was at the same time pending before said J. C. Breland, as magistrate, a warrant of attachment against said crops, sworn out by the plaintiff herein, to enforce his lien mentioned in said complaint; and that upon all the facts before him the said J. C. Breland, as such magistrate, decided that the lien of the said L. W. Ritter for rent had priority over that of the plaintiff, and that the proceeds of said sale should be applied accordingly, and that from that decision no appeal was taken or further proceedings had, and the proceeds were applied as above stated. That these defendants had no other connection with said crops." In the charge to the jury the presiding judge used the language, in describing the allegations of the complaint, of which appellant complains in these exceptions.

With reference to the sixth exception, we have carefully examined the charge, and do not find that it violates the constitutional inhibition against charging in respect to matters of fact.

With reference to the remaining exceptions, we have considered the same, and have concluded that they do not present matters which justify a reversal of the judgment in this case. The charge was very full and clear upon the law bearing on the Issues raised by the pleadings. The language used in referring to the allegation of the complaint was not strictly appropriate for a civil proceeding, but the language of the judge in describing the complaint was hardly stronger than the language of the complaint in alleging the wrongs committed by defendant. It is true that these words of the judge seem to have impressed the jury, and perhaps caused them to return to the courtroom and make the inquiry referred to in the fifth exception; but, after the explanation made by the court in answer to this inquiry, we do not think any harmful result could have followed. We quote all that was said in connection with this incident: "The jury returned to the courtroom, and the foreman stated: 'We find we have a very complicated case. The jury wish to know whether, should we decide in favor of the plaintiff, it would incriminate the others as having stolen.' The Court: Gentlemen, it would hardly be proper for me. as presiding judge, to intimate what would be the meaning of your verdict, because the verdict is supposed to reflect the testimony— to be the effect of the testimony—and a judge is not allowed to intimate what would be the meaning or effect of the testimony; but I can say this: That the allegations of the complaint, as I said to you before—I tried to make it plain to you—did not say anything at all of Ritter or Breland, the defendants, having made any claim...