United States v. Karigiannis, 18056.

Decision Date09 November 1970
Docket NumberNo. 18056.,18056.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter KARIGIANNIS, Christ Panagiotopoulos and Arthur Panagiotopoulos, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Julius Lucius Echeles, Edward J. Calihan, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.

Thomas A. Foran, U. S. Atty., Richard Ciecka, Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee; John Peter Lulinski, Jeffrey Cole, Michael Siavelis, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel.

Before CLARK, Associate Justice, Retired,1 and CUMMINGS and KERNER, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied November 9, 1970. See 91 S.Ct. 143.

CLARK, Associate Justice, Retired.

Appellants stand convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 19522 which makes it an offense to travel in interstate commerce to promote extortion. The jury found appellants guilty of travelling from Chicago, Illinois, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with intent to extort $2000 from Steve Latson in violation of Ch. 38 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 16-1. The gist of the offense was that the appellants would refrain from having Latson's "Hollywood Restaurant" in Chicago bombed and burned on payment of the money. On this appeal appellants raise various questions;3 however, we have concluded that none have merit and affirm the judgments.

I.

We will first describe the parties involved. The principal witness and the victim of the extortionate conduct is Steve Latson who owns the Hollywood Restaurant in Chicago. Appellant Arthur Panagiotopoulos, also known as Panos, is the owner of the Forest Glen Restauarant in Chicago and was for 6½ years a partner of Latson in the restaurant business. Appellant Christ Panagiotopoulos is a brother of Arthur and owns the Medium Rare Steak House in Milwaukee. Appellant Peter Karigiannis owns Pete's Snack Shop in Chicago.

II.

The facts are bizarre. Christ Panos called Latson, who was in Chicago, by telephone from Milwaukee. He told him that he was Arthur Panos' brother and Latson's friend; that Latson's life was in danger; that his Hollywood Restaurant was going to be blown to pieces before ten o'clock that night unless he came to his restaurant in Milwaukee by six p. m.; and that Latson had something to do with burning down a competing restaurant in Chicago, known as Mitchell's, some time previously. Latson told Christ that he could not come because he had no one to take care of his restaurant in his absence.

Upon completion of the call, however, Latson called Arthur Panos at his restaurant in Chicago. He told Arthur of his brother's call, adding: "they think, you know, that I had something to do with the bombing of Mitchell's place." Arthur then told Latson that he had heard something about it in Milwaukee the week previous but did not believe it. He said he would call his brother in Milwaukee and find out "what it is all about." Later Arthur called Latson back and advised that he had called his brother, Christ, and "you had better get ready, we are going to go up there." Latson replied that "he was afraid, I can't go up there and I don't have anybody to leave here." Arthur then told Latson: "If you are not going to go that is your job. I am going to come over and if you desire to go there we will go together."

About 4:30 on the same day, Arthur Panos came by Latson's restaurant and they drove to Christ Panos' restaurant in Milwaukee. Conversations then took place between Latson, the Panos brothers and Peter Karigiannis, during which Karigiannis accused Latson of having had Mitchell's restaurant bombed and burned; that Mitchell's owner had offered "them" $7000 to bomb and burn Latson's place. The first demand of Peter was for $7000 which later was reduced to $5000 and finally the $2000 payment was agreed upon to prevent the destruction of the restaurant. The money was to be paid to Peter Karigiannis on the following Friday at Arthur Panos' restaurant in Chicago. Nine agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation carried on a surveillance of the restaurant and surroundings before, during and after this meeting.

After the meeting Arthur Panos and Latson returned to Chicago. On the following day Latson obtained the $2000 from a bank and took it to the FBI where it was identified, marked and placed in a white envelope for delivery by Latson to Peter on the next day. The payment was made on schedule and Peter was arrested by the agents, who were on hand at the time and seized the envelope before it was opened.

III.

The Panos brothers are represented by separate counsel and raise different questions from those raised by Peter Karigiannis. However, we shall consider the questions as if raised together:

1. At the outset appellants contend that Illinois does not have a statute prohibiting extortion. It is true that Chapter 38, § 16-14 is written in terms of "theft" which is committed where one (c) obtains by threat control over property of the owner. But the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, has foreclosed appellants' claim. In United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969), the Chief Justice laid down the test under § 1952 to be "whether the particular State involved prohibits the extortionate activity charged." At 295, 89 S.Ct. at 539. The Congress, the Court held, did not intend to restrict the coverage of the "Travel Act" by defining extortion with reference to state labels. It is sufficient if the act complained of is "prohibited by state law which would be generically classified as extortion * * *", at 290, 89 S.Ct. at 536, and, therefore, encompassed in § 1952. We hold that Illinois Ch. 38, § 16-1 is such a law. Also see United States v. Hughes, 411 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1969).

2. It is further claimed that the indictment is insufficient because it failed to distinguish the unlawful extortion as being either a felony or a misdemeanor. However, the gravamen of a charge under § 1952 is the violation of federal law and "reference to state law is necessary only to identify the type of unlawful activity in which the defendants intended to engage." United States v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71, 74 (7th Cir. 1969). The offense, as the court pointed out, "is the use of an interstate facility, with intent to promote or further an unlawful activity in violation of state law." Id. Indeed, the court held that proof that a state law had actually been violated was not a necessary element of the offense. Id. at 80. Appellants confuse the offense with those where the value of the property stolen is an essential element of the crime, a requirement not necessary here since the amount of money involved is irrelevant. Cf. United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318, 324 (7th Cir. 1960), and United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1958).

3. Appellant Arthur Panos urges that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his conviction. He did not testify at the trial; however, he made sworn statements to Special Agents of the FBI which were before the jury. On careful review of all of the evidence considered in a light more favorable to the government, United States v. Pinna, 229 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1956), we have concluded that it was sufficient. The evidence against Arthur was largely circumstantial and created credibility problems for the jury to resolve. It believed the government's witnesses. Questions of credibility have no bearing on the insufficiency of the evidence as a whole. United States v. Wroblewski, 105 F.2d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 1939), and are not for the reviewing court's decision. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Miles, 401 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464, 466 (7th Cir. 1960).

In addition to the evidence heretofore related, other testimony involved Arthur Panos directly in the extortion plot. It was he to whom Christ Panos referred on his initial call to Latson that initiated the extortion conference; it was he who suggested and arranged that Latson go with him to Milwaukee to the conference; once there and in the presence of his brother and Peter Karigiannis, it was he who heard threats made again and again to Latson; however, he...

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