Walker v. Jastremski

• Decision Date: 15 November 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 04-3671-PR.
• Parties: Jeffrey A. WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David JASTREMSKI, Charles Buerer, Frank Halloran, and Tedja Tjandra, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

430 F.3d 560

Jeffrey A. WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David JASTREMSKI, Charles Buerer, Frank Halloran, and Tedja Tjandra, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 04-3671-PR.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: September 1, 2005.

Decided: November 15, 2005.

Alfred U. Pavlis, Daly & Pavlis, LLC (Brendan J. LeMoult, on the brief), Southport, Conn., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert B. Fiske, Assistant Attorney General, State of Connecticut, Hartford, Conn. (Michael P. Farrell, Corporation Counsel, City of West Haven, and Jerome A. Lacobelle, Jr., Deputy Corporation Counsel, City of West Haven, West Haven, Conn., on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: NEWMAN, CALABRESI and STRAUB, Circuit Judges.

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge.

This case comes to us for the third time in its seesawing history. It concerns the application of the "prison mailbox" rule of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), to a pro se prisoner's request from a state court for records pertinent to a prosecution against him that forms the basis for his civil rights suit against law enforcement officials. The prisoner, plaintiff-appellant Jeffrey A. Walker, argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint as barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to tort claims brought in Connecticut under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We conclude that Walker's untimely filing was not attributable to mail in the prison system, and therefore that the prison mailbox rule is inapplicable to his case. Moreover, the circumstances of Walker's case do not warrant equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

Background

We assume familiarity with the procedural history of this case, much of which is summarized at Walker v. Jastremski, 159 F.3d 117 (2d Cir.1998), and Walker v. Jastremski, 274 F.3d 652 (2d Cir.2001). The case arises from a criminal prosecution brought against Walker in Milford Superior Court that was dismissed on April 16, 1991 for insufficient evidence. It is undisputed that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 suit arising from that prosecution ran from that date until three years thereafter, or April 16, 1994. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577 ("No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of."); Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that actions brought under § 1983 must "borrow" the "most appropriate or most analogous" state statute of limitations).

On February 8, 1994, Walker delivered to prison officials, for mailing to Milford Superior Court, what he terms a Motion for the Production of Records. The "motion" requested from the court copies of the information and arrest warrant application from his 1991 prosecution, as well as a transcript of the April 16, 1991 hearing and a fee waiver application. As evidenced by a postal receipt, the court received Walker's document request three days later, on February 11, 1994. The state court clerk testified in the district court that such document requests generally are processed within three days of receipt. The court did not, however, mail the documents to Walker until May 5, 1994. He received the documents four days later, and, acting pro se, delivered his § 1983 complaint to prison officials for mailing to the district court on June 8, 1994, fifty-three days after the statute of limitations had run.¹

Discussion

1. The Houston Prison Mailbox Rule

In Houston, a prisoner delivered a notice of appeal from a district court's dismissal of his pro se habeas corpus petition to prison officials within the applicable filing limit. The notice of appeal was not filed with the court, however, until one day after the time limit. The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1), a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal is deemed "filed" at the moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court.² Houston, 487 U.S. at 270, 108 S.Ct. 2379. Our court has since extended the so-called "prison mailbox" rule of Houston to a number of other federal filing requirements. See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (civil complaints), modified on other grounds, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.1994); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam) (administrative complaints); Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir.2001) (habeas petitions).

Walker argues that Houston requires that the delay between his record request and his receipt of the records not apply against the three-year statute of limitations. Alternatively, he argues that "Houston-like" principles of equitable tolling entitle him to relief from the statute of limitations.

In order to accept Walker's argument as to the scope of the prison mailbox rule, we would have to extend Houston and its progeny in three ways. First, we would have to conclude that Houston may, in certain instances, apply to delays in filing that are traceable to parties other than prison officials; in this case, the state court clerk's office. Second, we would have to hold that the prison mailbox rule controls delays that do not concern the mail. And, third, we would have to find that Houston does not merely deal with "filing" requirements, but may apply as well to a request for documents from a third party.

Because we conclude that the prison mailbox rule does not apply to delays that implicate neither prison officials nor the mails, we need not reach the question of whether it applies only to filings. In holding that the requirements of Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1) should permit a prisoner to deem his notice of appeal "filed" at the moment of delivery to prison authorities, the Houston Court emphasized that pro se prison litigants, unlike others, cannot control when documents are delivered to the court for processing. "Unlike other litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that the notice is stamped `filed' or to establish the date on which the court received the notice. Other litigants may choose to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail and the clerk's process for stamping incoming papers, but only the pro se prisoner is forced to do so by his situation." Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 2379.

As indicated by the postal receipt that Walker submitted, which the State does not challenge, his request was delivered to the court clerk on February 11, 1994, three days after Walker handed it to prison officials. That is, the date on which the court "received the notice" was just as "establish[ed]" in this case as it would have been for "other litigants." Thus, and most significantly, the crucial delay in the instant case was attributable not to the vagaries of the mails, nor to prison bureaucracy, but to the idiosyncracies of the clerk's office. In other words, literally, the "prison mailbox" rule was not implicated.³

Our cases cast considerable doubt on the proposition that Houston applies to delays other than those that derive directly from the fact of incarceration and from problems involving prison mail. In Knickerbocker v. Artuz, 271 F.3d 35 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam), we declined to apply the prison mailbox rule to the late filing of a notice of appeal that a pro se prisoner had given to his sister for mailing, rather than to prison officials. Adopting the rule of several other circuits, we reasoned that "unlike the situation addressed in Houston, the delay in this case is not attributable to prison officials." Id. at 37. In Dory, which extended the prison mailbox rule to the filing of civil complaints within the applicable statute of limitations, we stated that "[t]he foundation of Houston is the inherent disadvantage suffered by the pro se litigant in his inability to monitor the course of his litigation." Dory, 999 F.2d at 682. Since the delay that Walker complains of would be substantially outside the control of even an unincarcerated litigant, his "inherent disadvantage" pretty much disappeared upon delivery of his document request to the state court. Accordingly, Houston does not apply to the facts of this case.⁴

2. Equitable Tolling

Since Walker cannot avail himself of Houston's mailbox rule, we are left with his argument that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to the circumstances of his case. We have applied equitable tolling only in "rare and exceptional circumstances," where we found that "extraordinary circumstances" prevented a party from timely performing a required act, and that the party "acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he [sought] to toll." Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In order for "extraordinary circumstances" to have prevented Walker from timely filing his complaint, the information he sought from the state court must have been necessary for that complaint to have been legally sufficient. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's finding that, at the time of his hearing in April 1991, Walker "knew the facts supporting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, false arrest, submission of a false affidavit in support of his arrest warrant, improper identification procedures, and malicious prosecution." Walker v. Jastremski, No. 94-cv-2018, 2004 WL 825808 at 7, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6380, at * 23-24 (D.Conn. Mar. 12, 2004). Walker had a copy of the arrest warrant and was aware of its contents; he had identified all of the parties he would name as defendants; and in a letter to the state court judge, he had specified the issues he intended to raise. Id. 2004 WL 825808 at 5, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *16.

Walker does not appear to dispute these factual findings. Nor does he at any point assert that he believed that he needed more data in order to file his suit. He contends, instead, that as a pro se litigant, he could not have been expected...