St. Clair v. State, CAAP-16-0000053
| Decision Date | 19 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. CAAP-16-0000053,CAAP-16-0000053 |
| Citation | 430 P.3d 890 (Table) |
| Parties | Stephen Keith ST. CLAIR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Hawaii Court of Appeals |
On the briefs:
Jeffrey A. Hawk (Hawk Sing & Ignacio), Honolulu, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Diane K. Taira and Richard W. Stacey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent-Appellee.
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Petitioner-Appellant Stephen St. Clair (St. Clair) appeals from (1) the "Order Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or to Release Petitioner from Custody; Habeas Corpus," filed on April 27, 2015 (Order Denying Petition) and (2) the "Order Denying ‘Motion for Reconsideration of Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or to Release Petitioner from Custody; Habeas Corpus,’ " (Order Denying Reconsideration) filed on December 31, 2015 in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (Circuit Court).1
St. Clair was convicted after a jury trial of manslaughter, operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, and driving without no-fault insurance.2 See State v. St. Clair, 101 Hawai‘i 280, 283-86, 67 P.3d 779, 782-85 (2003) (St. Clair I). These convictions arose out of St. Clair's driving while intoxicated and striking and killing a pedestrian, Jane O'Brien, on February 23, 2002. At trial, St. Clair admitted that he had consumed at least twelve beers before the accident, and the State showed that his blood alcohol content was .211 grams per one hundred milliliters of blood immediately following the accident. As relevant to this appeal, St. Clair was sentenced to a twenty year term of incarceration.
In this appeal, St. Clair challenges the Circuit Court's Order Denying Petition and Order Denying Reconsideration, which had denied St. Clair's petition filed under Hawai‘i Rule of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 (Petition). St. Clair's Petition challenged the Hawai‘i Paroling Authority's (HPA) order, following a hearing in April of 2014, determining that St. Clair merited a Level III punishment classification and that his minimum term of imprisonment (MTI) should be thirteen years (2014 MTI Order). After St. Clair filed his Petition but before the Circuit Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration, the HPA entered a new order following a new MTI hearing in May of 2015 which affirmed St. Clair's Level III classification and an MTI of thirteen years (2015 MTI Order).
St. Clair raises four points of error. In Point One, St. Clair argues that the decision by the HPA to base its MTI decision in the 2015 MTI Order on the sole factor of "Nature of Offense" resulted in an illegal sentence because the finding that he acted "callously" implicates an intent or knowing state of mind but he was convicted for acting recklessly. In Point Two, St. Clair argues that the Circuit Court erred in finding that his claims were moot. In Point Three, St. Clair argues the Circuit Court erred in not finding that his claims, if moot, qualified for an exception to the mootness doctrine and they should be decided. Finally, in Point Four, St. Clair argues the Circuit Court erred in finding his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law were moot.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, as well as the relevant statutory and case law, we resolve St. Clair's points of error as follows:
(1) This court does not have jurisdiction to consider the Circuit Court's Order Denying Petition as the Notice of Appeal was untimely filed. This court has an obligation to determine sua sponte whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal. See State v. Bryan, 124 Hawai‘i 404, 410, 245 P.3d 477, 483 (App. 2010) (citing Ditto v. McCurdy, 103 Hawai‘i 153, 157, 80 P.3d 974, 978 (2003) ). The right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory and, as such, it is only available where provided by some constitutional or statutory provision. See Grattafiori v. State, 79 Hawai‘i 10, 13, 897 P.2d 937, 940 (1995). Pursuant to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-11 and HRPP Rule 40, appeals from proceedings for post-conviction relief must be taken in accordance with Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(b). See id."[P]ursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b), an appeal from an order denying post-conviction relief must either be filed within thirty days after the entry of the order denying the HRPP Rule 40 petition or, in the alternative, after the announcement but before the entry of the order." Id.
The Circuit Court's Order Denying Petition was entered on April 27, 2015 and was an appealable final order pursuant to HRS § 641-11 and HRPP 40(h). See id. (). St. Clair's next filing was his Motion for Reconsideration on June 29, 2015, over thirty days after the order denying his Rule 40 Petition, which, regardless, is not a tolling motion. See State v. Brandimart, 68 Haw. 495, 496, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (1986) (). No appeal of the Order Denying Petition was filed until January 27, 2016, well beyond the time-limits required by HRAP 4(b). Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction over the Order Denying Petition. See id. ()
In addition, St. Clair has not argued and the court does not find that any exception to this general rule is applicable as this is not a direct appeal from a criminal conviction and there is no basis to believe the Circuit Court's decision was unannounced or that no entry of judgment was ever provided. See Grattafiori, 79 Hawai‘i at 13-14, 897 P.2d at 940-41 (). However, St. Clair did timely file his notice of appeal within thirty days of the Circuit Court's entry of its Order Denying Reconsideration. Therefore, we have appellate jurisdiction over that order and we will review only claims with respect to the Circuit Court's denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) St. Clair filed his Motion for Reconsideration asking the Circuit Court to reconsider its Order Denying Petition, which denied his request for post-conviction relief under HRPP Rule 40. HRPP Rule 47 is the general rule allowing parties to apply to the court for an order under the Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure. See HRPP Rule 47. A party may use this rule to ask the court to reconsider a previous ruling. See Brandimart, 68 Haw. at 496, 720 P.2d at 1010 ().
[T]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow the parties to present new evidence and/or arguments that could not have been presented during the earlier adjudicated motion. Reconsideration is not a device to relitigate old matters or to raise arguments or evidence that could and should have been brought during the earlier proceeding,
Cho v. State, 115 Hawai‘i 373, 384, 168 P.3d 17, 28 (2007) ().
St. Clair's first point of error argues that the decision by the HPA to base its MTI decision in the 2015 MTI Order on the sole factor of "Nature of Offense" resulted in an illegal sentence because the finding that he acted "callously" implicates an intent or knowing state of mind that the jury did not find by convicting him for acting recklessly.
In order to understand St. Clair's claim, a general understanding of the background of the relevant HPA Guidelines is instructive. "The legislature required the HPA to establish guidelines for the ‘uniform determination of minimum sentences which shall take into account both the nature and degree of the offense of the prisoner and the prisoner's criminal history and character.’ " Fagaragan v. State, 132 Hawai‘i 224, 238, 320 P.3d 889, 903 (2014) (quoting HRS § 706-669(8) ). A deviation from the HPA Guidelines, without explanation, is an arbitrary and capricious action that violates a prisoner's right to a uniform determination of his minimum sentence. Coulter v. State, 116 Hawai‘i 181, 185, 172 P.3d 493, 497 (2007).
In establishing the minimum term, the HPA considers a variety of factors including the prisoner's characteristics and the nature of the underlying offense. See State v. Bernades, 71 Haw. 485, 490, 795 P.2d 842, 845 (1990). Section III of the HPA Guidelines requires the Order Establishing Minimum Terms of Imprisonment to include the "specific minimum term(s) established in years and/or months, the level of punishment (Level I, II, or III) under which the inmate falls, and the significant criteria upon which the decision was based."
Fagaragan, 132 Hawai‘i at 239, 320 P.3d at 904 (footnote and emphasis omitted). In St. Clair's case, the HPA in its 2015 MTI Order based its Level III classification decision on the sole significant criterion of "Nature of Offense." One factor in support of Level III classification, and the only one applicable to the facts of St. Clair's manslaughter conviction, is whether "[t]he offense was against a person(s) and the offender displayed a callous and/or cruel disregard for the safety and welfare of others."
In 2013, this court specifically held that there was sufficient evidence to support the HPA's finding that the "Nature of Offense" criterion was satisfied in...
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