Deer/mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Kimbrell
| Decision Date | 21 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. CV–13–182.,CV–13–182. |
| Citation | 2013 Ark. 393,430 S.W.3d 29 |
| Parties | DEER/MT. JUDEA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. Thomas W. KIMBRELL, Appellee. Deer/Mt. Judea School District, Appellant v. Mike Beebe, individually and in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Arkansas; Mark Darr, individually and in his Official Capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Arkansas; Dr. Thomas W. Kimbrell, individually and in his Official Capacity as Commissioner of Education for the State of Arkansas; Dr. Naccaman Williams, individually and in his Official Capacity as Chairman of the State Board of Education; Dr. Ben Mays, individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Sherry Burrow, individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Jim Cooper, individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Brenda Gullett, individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Samuel Ledbetter, individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Alice Williams Mahoney, individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Toyce Newton, individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Vicki Saviers, individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the State Board of Education; Richard Weiss, individually and in his Official Capacity as Director of the Department of Finance and Administration; Mac Dodson, individually and in his Official Capacity as President of the Arkansas Development Finance Authority; Robert Moore, individually and in his Official Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; and Paul Bookout, individually and in his Official Capacity as President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Prior Version Recognized as Unconstitutional
West's A.C.A. § 6–20–604(e)(2)(B)John C. Fendley, Jr., P.A., by: Clay Fendley; and Lewellen & Associates, Marianna, by: Roy C. “Bill” Lewellen, for appellants.
Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Scott P. Richardson, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
The Deer/Mt. Judea School District (DMJ) appeals from the decision of the Pulaski County Circuit Court. On appeal, DMJ asserts that the circuit court erred on three points: (1) in ruling that DMJ's claims were barred by res judicata; (2) in striking only the date ranges of section 31 of Act 269 of 2010; and (3) in striking its amended and supplemental complaint. Beebe and the other appellees (“Beebe”) have also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which we ordered passed until the case was submitted by letter order dated March 28, 2013. We deny the motion to dismiss, affirm in part and reverse and remand in part on the first point, hold that the second point is moot, and affirm on the third point.
The current appeal has a long and complex history of litigation in circuit court and this court. The following is a summary of the procedural history and current posture of the case.
The appeal arises from a school-funding dispute. DMJ operates two kindergarten through twelfth-grade campuses in Newton County and serves approximately 360 students. On December 3, 2010, DMJ filed an action on its own behalf and on behalf of its taxpayers to enjoin state actions in violation of state law and the Arkansas Constitution. In its complaint, DMJ alleged that the State failed to conduct adequacy studies in compliance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 10–3–2102 (Supp.2007) in 2008 and 2010, and to make necessary adjustments to maintain an education system in compliance with article XIV, section 1 and article II, sections 2, 3, and 18 of the Arkansas Constitution. DMJ also claimed that section 32 of Act 293 of 2010 is local or special legislation in violation of amendment 14 to the Arkansas Constitution, as it provided extra funding to only one school district. For ease of reference, throughout this opinion, the claim regarding adequacy studies and adjustments will be referred to as “the adequacy claim” and the claim regarding local or special legislation will be referred to as “the special-and-local-legislation claim.”
Beebe filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on January 28, 2011, asserting that DMJ's claims were barred by res judicata. On March 17, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing on Beebe's motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the circuit judge stated from the bench that he would grant Beebe's motion to dismiss as to the adequacy claim. On April 11, 2011, DMJ filed a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to the special-and-local-legislation claim, so as to “facilitate an immediate appeal.” The circuit court entered orders the next day dismissing both of DMJ's claims. The adequacy claim was dismissed because it was precluded by previous school-funding cases. The special-and-local-legislation claim was dismissed pursuant to DMJ's voluntary nonsuit of the claim. DMJ filed a timely notice of appeal of the Beebecase (NO. 60–CV–10–6936), which now consisted of only the adequacy claim, on April 14, 2011.
On March 1, 2012, this court dismissed the appeal of the Beebe case for lack of a final appealable order. Deer/Mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Beebe, 2012 Ark. 93, 2012 WL 665604. We held that the nonsuit of the special-and-local-legislation claim did not operate to make the April 12, 2011 order final because it could be refiled. The special-and-local-legislation claim, in fact, had been refiled on June 1, 2011, in the Pulaski County Circuit Court against Dr. Thomas W. Kimbrell the Kimbrell case, NO. 60–CV–11–2677). 1
After this court dismissed the appeal, DMJ filed a motion to consolidate the Beebe case with the Kimbrell case in circuitcourt. The circuit court granted this motion over the Kimbrell's objection.
DMJ filed a motion for summary judgment on March 29, 2012, regarding the Kimbrell case. The circuit court heard oral arguments on the motion on August 16, 2012, and held a second hearing on November 1, 2012. DMJ filed an amended and supplemental complaint on November 1, 2012, which included both the adequacy claim and the special-and-local-legislation claim. The circuit court entered an order on December 11, 2012, granting the motion for summary judgment and severing the date restrictions in section 31 of Act 269 of 2010.
On January 22, 2013, the circuit court entered an order denying DMJ's motion for reconsideration of the order to dismiss filed April 12, 2011, striking DMJ's amended and supplemental complaint, and granting a stay on the enforcement of the judgment during the pendency of this appeal. DMJ then filed a notice of appeal for both the Beebe and the Kimbrell cases on January 22, 2013.
Beebe filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on March 14, 2013, alleging that the notice of appeal in the Beebe case was not timely filed. We chose to take the motion with the case.
In summary, DMJ filed a complaint alleging two claims against Beebe. DMJ then voluntarily nonsuited the special-and-local-legislation claim so that it could immediately appeal the adequacy claim in the Beebe case. DMJ brought the special-and-local-legislation claim as a separate case, the Kimbrell case. This court then dismissed the appeal of the Beebe case, holding that there was a lack of finality. After we dismissed the Beebe case on appeal, DMJ moved to consolidate the Beebe case and the Kimbrell case, and the motion was granted by the circuit court. After the circuit court decided the Kimbrell case and the Beebe case, DMJ filed a notice of appeal for both cases. These appeals, and Beebe's motion to dismiss the appeal of the Beebe case, are now before us.
We note that, while the cases were consolidated at the circuit-court level, they have not been consolidated on appeal, nor has a motion to do so been filed. This court may consolidate cases for appeal on its own motion under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure—Civil 3(c) (2013). We hereby consolidate these cases to avoid unnecessary delay.
While we consolidate these cases for appeal, they are still separate cases. Consolidation does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in the other. Dwiggins v. Elk Horn Bank & Trust Co., 364 Ark. 344, 219 S.W.3d 181 (2005). Consolidated cases remain joint and separate entities. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Pennington, 261 Ark. 650, 553 S.W.2d 436 (1977). Because these remain separate cases on appeal, we will address the issues relating to each case separately.
First, we address the matters in the appeal relating to the Beebe case. DMJ asserts that the circuit court erred in granting Beebe's motion to dismiss based on the claim-preclusion aspect of res judicata. DMJ also asserts that the circuit court erred in striking its amended and supplemental complaint, which was filed in the Beebe case. First, however, we must take up the motion to dismiss the appeal in the Beebe case.
Beebe has moved to dismiss the appeal as to the Beebe case. In that motion,Beebe asserts that the appeal was not timely filed, as the Beebe case became final when the Kimbrell case was filed. Beebe further asserts that this court erred in ruling that the appeal in the Beebe case was not final. We hold that DMJ's notice of appeal was timely and deny the motion to dismiss.
Beebe asserts that, under Mountain Pure LLC v. Affiliated Foods Southwest, Inc., 366 Ark. 62, 233 S.W.3d 609 (2006), because DMJ filed the special-and-local-litigation claim as a separate suit, the Beebe case became final upon the filing of the Kimbrell case and the notice of appeal was not timely in the Beebe case. This argument is founded on a misinterpretation of our holding in Mountain Pure. We did not hold in ...
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