United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc v. Carey

Decision Date01 March 1977
Docket NumberNo. 75-104,75-104
Citation97 S.Ct. 996,430 U.S. 144,51 L.Ed.2d 229
PartiesUNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS OF WILLIAMSBURGH, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. Hugh L. CAREY et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

After New York State had submitted for the approval of the Attorney General its 1972 reapportionment statute with respect to Kings County and two other counties which were subject to §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, he concluded that as to certain districts in Kings County the State had not met its burden under § 5 of demonstrating that the redistricting had abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color. In May 1974 the State submitted to the Attorney General a revision of those portions of the 1972 plan to which he had objected, including provisions for elections to the state senate and assembly from Kings County. The 1974 plan did not change the number of districts with nonwhite majorities but did change the size of the nonwhite majorities in most of those districts. To attain a nonwhite majority of 65%, which it was felt would be acceptable to the Attorney General for the assembly district in which the Hasidic Jewish community was located (which had been 61% nonwhite under the 1972 plan), a portion of the white population, including part of the Hasidic community, was reassigned to an adjoining district, and that community was also split between two senatorial districts though it had been within one such district under the 1972 plan. Petitioners, on behalf of the Hasidic community, brought this suit for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the 1974 plan violated their rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Petitioners contend that the plan 'would dilute the value of (their) franchise by halving its effectiveness,' solely for the purpose of achieving a racial quota, and that they were assigned to electoral districts solely on the basis of race. Upon motions by the Attorney General (who had advised the State that he did not object to the 1974 plan) and an intervenor, the District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that petitioners enjoyed no constitutional right in reapportionment to separate community recognition as Hasidic Jews; that the redistricting did not disenfranchise them; and that racial considerations were permissible to correct past discrimination. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that the 1974 plan left approximately 70% of the Kings County senate and assembly districts with white majorities and that only 65% of the county was white, the court held that the plan would not underrepresent the white population. The court, relying on Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569, 89 S.Ct. 817, 833-834, 22 L.Ed.2d 1, concluded that a State could use racial considerations in an effort to secure the approval of the Attorney General under the Voting Rights Act, reasoning that the Act contemplated that he and the state legislature would have 'to think in racial terms'; because the Act 'necessarily deals with race or color, corrective action under it must do the same.' Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 155-168; (opinion of White, J.); pp. 179-180 (opinion of Stewart, J.).

510 F.2d 512, affirmed.

Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Stevens, concluded that the use of racial criteria by the State of New York in its 1974 plan in attempting to comply with § 5 of the Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 155-165.

(a) Under § 5, new or revised reapportionment plans are among those voting procedures, standards, or practices that may not be adopted by a State covered by the Act without a ruling by the Attorney General or the specified court that the plan does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra. Pp. 157-159.

(b) Compliance with the Act in reapportionment cases will often necessitate the use of racial considerations in drawing district lines, and the Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Act from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629; City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45 L.Ed.2d 245. Pp. 159-161.

(c) Permissible use of racial criteria is not confined to eliminating the effects of past discriminatory districting or apportionment. P. 161.

(d) A reapportionment cannot violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses specific numerical quotas in establishing a certain number of black majority districts. P. 162.

(e) Petitioners have not shown or offered to prove that minority voting and thus have not shown that New York did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer v. United States, supra, a principle that this Court has accepted as constitutionally valid. Pp. 162-165.

Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Stevens and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, concluded that, wholly aside from New York's obligations under the Act to preserve minority voting strength in Kings County, the Constitution permits the State to draw lines deliberately in such a way that the percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the county. Though in individual districts where nonwhite majorities were increased to about 65% it became more likely that nonwhite candidates would be elected, as long as Kings County whites, as a group, were provided with fair representation, there was no cognizable discrimination against whites. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 298. Pp. 165-168.

Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Powell, concluded that, having failed to show that the 1974 plan had either the purpose or effect of discriminating against them because of their race, petitioners, who erroneously contend that racial awareness in legislative reapportionment is unconstitutional per se, have offered no basis for affording them the constitutional relief that they seek. Pp. 179-180.

Nathan Lewin, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Louis H. Pollak, Philadelphia, Pa., for NAACP and others.

Sol. Gen. Robert H. Bork, Washington, D.C., for United States.

George D. Zuckerman, New York City, for respondents.

Mr. Justice WHITE announced the judgment of the Court and filed an opinion in which Mr. Justice STEVENS joined; Parts I, II, and III of which are joined by Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN; and Parts I and IV of which are joined by Mr. Justice REHNQUIST.

Section 5 of the Voting rights Act of 1965 prohibits a State or political subdivision subject to § 4 of the Act from implementing a legislative reapportionment unless it has obtained a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia, or a ruling from the Attorney General of the United States, that the reapportionment 'does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . ..'1 The question presented is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the use of racial criteria by the State of New York in its attempt to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

I

Kings County, N. Y., together with New York (Manhattan) and Bronx Counties, became subject to §§ 4 and 5 of the Act, by virtue of a determination by the Attorney General that a literacy test was used in these three counties as of November 1, 1968, and a determination by the Director of the Census that fewer than 50% of the voting-age residents of these three counties voted in the Presidential election of 1968.2 Litigation to secure exemption from the Act was unsuccessful,3 and it became necessary for New York to secure the approval of the Attorney General or of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for its 1972 reapportionment statute insofar as that statute concerned Kings, New York, and Bronx Counties. On January 31, 1974, the provisions of the statute districting these counties for congressional, state senate, and state assembly seats were submitted to the Attorney General. In accordance with the regulations governing his § 5 review, the Attorney General considered submissions from interested parties criticizing and defending the plan.4 Those submissions included assertions that voting in these counties was racially polarized and that the district lines had been created with the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans).5 On April 1, 1974, the Attorney General concluded that, as to certain districts in Kings County covering the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn, the State had not met the burden placed on it by § 5 and the regulations thereunder to demonstrate that the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color.6

Under § 5, the State could have challenged the Attorney General's objections to the redistricting plan by filing a declaratory judgment action in a three-judge court in the District of Columbia. Instead, the State sought to meet what it understood to be the Attorney General's objections and to secure his approval in order that the 1974 primary and general elections could go forward under the 1972 statute.7 A revised plan, submitted to the Attorney General on May 31, 1974, in its essentials did not change the number of districts with nonwhite majorities, but did change the size of the nonwhite majorities in most of those districts. Under the 1972 plan, Kings County had three state senate districts with nonwhite majorities of...

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