Briggs v. Kerrigan
Decision Date | 14 August 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 7518,7542.,7518 |
Citation | 431 F.2d 967 |
Parties | Archie BRIGGS et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. John T. KERRIGAN et al., Defendants, Appellees. Bonnie FAY et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Ray GAUTHIER et al., Defendants, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Gershon Michael Ratner, Boston, Mass., and John Cratsley, Cambridge, Mass., with whom Nicola Smith, Mark Willis, and Stephen Rosenfield were on the brief, for appellants.
Raymond D. Battocchi, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom William D. Ruckelshaus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Herbert F. Travers, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for Clifford Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture, and others, federal appellees.
Alan G. MacDonald, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom Robert H. Quinn, Atty. Gen., was on the brief, for William G. Saltonstall, Chairman of the Board of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and others, state appellees.
Edith W. Fine, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Boston, for John T. Kerrigan, Chairman of the Boston School Committee, and others, city appellees.
Paul F. Hennessey, Asst. City Solicitor for the City of Somerville, for Ray Gauthier, Chairman of the Somerville School Committee, and others, city appellees.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
These suits seek to enjoin the operation of the school lunch programs in the Boston and Somerville school systems on the grounds that these programs violate the National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1751 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The alleged violation consists of providing school lunches to some relatively affluent students while failing to provide such lunches to other, needier students. The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiffs in both cases. We affirm on the basis of the district court's careful opinion in Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969), adding only the following comments.
First, we think both cases were ripe for summary judgment. The undisputed evidence indicated that both Boston and Somerville provided lunches in all their high schools and junior high schools, but in only a few of their elementary schools. School officials, by deposition, explained this discrepancy on the grounds that elementary schools, being generally older and smaller than high schools, lacked the necessary facilities for preparing meals. Since the National School Lunch Act makes only limited provision for capital expense, compare 42 U.S.C. § 1759a with 7 C.F.R. § 210.6(b), providing additional facilities would require substantial expenditures of scarce local funds. Plaintiffs criticize aspects of this testimony as mere assertion and call for additional substantiation. However, the purpose of summary judgment is not to explore all the factual ramifications of the case, but to determine whether such exploration is necessary. When a motion for summary judgment has been properly made and supported, an adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(e). This plaintiffs have failed to do.
Second, we reject plaintiffs' assertion that an absolute need priority must be read into the statute in order to give effect to the Congressional intent. The statutory provision on which plaintiffs primarily rely requires state officials to disburse funds to individual schools "taking into account need and attendance". 42 U.S.C. § 1757. In our view, this language is addressed to cases in which the limited federal funds available under 42 U.S.C. § 1753 are insufficient to satisfy all the requests for aid from schools willing...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Alcaraz v. Block
...would be effectuated by the widest participation possible. The more children involved, the greater the potential market."), aff'd, 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir.1970). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.Fed. 634 (1973 & Supp.1983). The Lunch Act delegates authority to the Secretary to carry out its pro......
-
Serrano v. Priest
...Code details the mechanics of this process.13 Defendants ask us to follow Briggs v. Kerrigan (D.Mass.1969) 307 F.Supp. 295, affd. (1st Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 967, which held that the City of Boston did not violate the equal protection clause in failing to provide federally subsidized lunches a......
-
Lau v. Nichols
...U.S. 948, 92 S.Ct. 930, 30 L.Ed.2d 818 (1972); Johnson v. Education Department, 449 F.2d 871, 877 (2d Cir. 1971); Briggs v. Kerrigan, 431 F.2d 967, 968-969 (1st Cir. 1970). Judged by this standard, the administration of the compensatory education program for non-English-speaking Chinese chi......
-
Haddon Tp. Bd. of Ed. v. New Jersey Dept. of Ed.
...program. Davis v. Robinson, 346 F.Supp. 847, 852 (D.R.I.1972); Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F.Supp. 295, 299-301 (D.Mass.1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970); Comment, The National School Lunch Program, 1970: Mandate to Feed the Children, 60 Geo.L.J. 711, 718 (1972); Comment, The National ......