U.S. v. Martin, 04-51289.

• Citation: 431 F.3d 846
• Decision Date: 02 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-51289.,04-51289.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adam Eugene MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 846

431 F.3d 846

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adam Eugene MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-51289.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 2, 2005.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Mark Randolph Stelmach (argued), Asst. U.S. Attys., San Antonio, TX, for U.S.

Peter Drew Kennedy (argued), Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, Austin, TX, for Martin.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, District Judge.^*

LITTLE, District Judge:

This appeal arises from a jury verdict of guilty against appellant Adam Eugene Martin ("Martin") on seven counts of committing bank robbery and one count of committing attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and the district court's subsequent sentencing of Martin to life imprisonment pursuant to the federal "three strikes" law. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Comal County, Texas issued an arrest warrant for Martin on 14 November 2002 on a state charge of bank robbery in New Braunfels, Texas. Authorities in Henderson County, Texas arrested Martin on this warrant on 8 March 2003. He was detained in Henderson County for 25 days before being transferred to Comal County on 2 April 2003.

On 29 May 2003 and 5 June 2003, while in custody in Comal County, Martin wrote letters to the Comal County authorities requesting an opportunity to be interviewed. On 16 July 2003, Martin made incriminating statements during a videotaped interview by a member of the Comal County Sheriff's Department.

A federal grand jury indicted Martin on seven counts of bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery on 16 September 2003. Before trial, Martin moved to suppress his videotaped confession to the Comal County authorities. The district court denied the motion, finding that Martin initiated the contact leading to this interview and that he had strategic reasons for doing so, including trying to shield his girlfriend from prosecution and his own desire to go to federal rather than state prison. The district court also found no Fifth or Sixth Amendment violation as a result of this interview, and Martin raises neither of these issues here.

With the district court's permission, Martin represented himself at trial with stand-by counsel. The evidence against Martin included the videotaped confession, testimony from bank tellers, testimony from Martin's brother and half-brother (both of whom testified as part of their plea agreements), the presence of Martin's fingerprints in one of the getaway cars, lay testimony that one of the demand notes was in Martin's handwriting, and testimony that Martin was the person in photographs of one of the robbery scenes.

After a three-day trial, on 18 August 2004 the jury convicted Martin of committing bank robberies in San Antonio, Austin, and New Braunfels, Texas, from October 2002 through February 2003. On 15 November 2004, the district court entered a judgment of conviction. That same day, the district judge sentenced Martin to eight concurrent life sentences under the federal "three strikes" law based on convictions for prior robberies and an aggravated assault. On 1 December 2004, the district court denied a motion by Martin for a new trial. On 15 April 2005, the district court entered an amended judgment of conviction that did not change any of the substantive provisions of the sentence.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Transfer Martin Timely from One County Jail to Another

Martin argues that the district court improperly admitted his videotaped confession made while in the custody of the Comal County authorities. He reasons that the district court should have suppressed the confession because the term of his prior confinement in Henderson County violated a state procedural rule, Article 15.21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, he argues, any incriminatory statements made while in Comal County custody were tainted by his illegal detention in Henderson County and, therefore, should have been suppressed.

Article 15.21 reads as follows: "If the proper office of the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed does not demand the prisoner and take charge of him within ten days from the day he is committed, such prisoner shall be discharged from custody." TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 15.21. Henderson County, however, retained custody of Martin for the 25 days from his arrest on 8 March 2003 until his transfer to Comal County on 2 April 2003. More than three months later, on 16 July 2003, while in Comal County custody, Martin made the videotaped confession that he claims the district court should have suppressed. It is not clear whether Henderson County had an independent, valid reason to hold Martin based on an extradition warrant from Arizona. As such, the Henderson County authorities may not have even violated Article 15.21. We need not interpret this state law, however, as we find that, even if the Henderson County authorities did violate Article 15.21, this violation of a state procedural rule does not lead to suppression of a voluntary, reliable confession in a federal criminal case.

In determining the admissibility of a defendant's statements to authorities, courts first look to voluntariness. "The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). In West v. Johnson, we addressed admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of another state procedural rule, Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 92 F.3d 1385, 1404-05 (5th Cir. 1996). Article 15.17 requires a person to be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 15.17. This court found in that case that violation of Article 15.17 did not implicate the admissibility of the incriminating statements unless it implicated voluntariness. Id. "Notwithstanding the delay between arrest and arraignment, under all the circumstances reflected by the record here, West's confession is shown to be the product of his free and voluntary choice." Id. at 1405. In the case we consider today, there is no evidence that Martin's confession was not voluntary. In fact, as noted above, Martin himself initiated the communication to his custodians that led to the videotaped confession.

We have stated that in order to suppress statements because of an illegal detention, there must be a causal connection between the statements and the illegality of the detention. See United States v. Mullin, 178 F.3d 334, 342 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Perez-Bustamante, 963 F.2d 48, 53 (5th Cir. 1992)). "[W]here there is no evidence to support a finding that the delay was for the purpose of obtaining a confession, there is no evidence that the delay had a coercive effect on the confession, there is no causal connection between the delay and the confession, and the confession was otherwise voluntarily given, we hold that the defendant has not shown prejudice by the delay." Perez-Bustamante, 963 F.2d at 53 (quoting United States v. Bustamante-Saenz, 894 F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1990)).

In evaluating Martin's argument, it is helpful to look to the general rules articulated by the Supreme Court regarding admissibility of statements and illegal detention. In Brown, the Supreme Court established a list of four factors to consider in determining whether a confession resulting from an illegal arrest is nevertheless admissible: a waiver of the right to "procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); the time lapse between the arrest and the confession; intervening circumstances; "and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254.

First, it is undisputed, as the district court found, that Martin "specifically and expressly waived his right to counsel at the beginning" of the interview. He does not challenge the confession on Miranda grounds. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. This factor therefore weighs in favor of admissibility.

Second, the statements here were made more than three months after Martin's transfer to Comal County. Assuming his confinement in Henderson County was in violation of state law, he had been legitimately immured in Comal County custody for more than three months at the time of his statements. Martin does not challenge the legitimacy of his confinement in Comal County outside of the allegation of an Article 15.21 violation. The violation of Article 15.21 did not temporally relate to Martin's custody in June 2003, when he made the incriminating statements. If the Henderson County officials had complied with Article 15.21 and released Martin from custody on 18 March 2003, the Comal County authorities could have arrested him at that time or later. The Comal County authorities held him in custody legally when he made the incriminating statements. The significant time lapse between his transfer and the statements weighs in favor of admissibility.

Third, courts look for intervening circumstances that suggest a break in the causal chain between the illegal detention and the incriminating statements. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Martin was in legal custody in Comal County for more than three months after the procedural violation occurred but before volunteering his confession. This intervening time period weighs in favor of the government.

Finally, courts examine the purposefulness and flagrance of the conduct. Id. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254. In Brown, the Court held against the government the fact that "[t]he [illegal] manner in which Brown's arrest was affected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion." Id. at 605, 95...