Caudill v. Hollan
| Decision Date | 14 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-6017.,No. 04-6018.,04-6017.,04-6018. |
| Citation | 431 F.3d 900 |
| Parties | Teresa CAUDILL, et al. (04-6017); Lynn Butler (04-6018), Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Doris HOLLAN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Michael J. Curtis, Curtis Legal Services, Inc., Ashland, Kentucky, for Appellants. Phillip Bruce Leslie, McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, Greenup, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael J. Curtis, Curtis Legal Services, Inc., Ashland, Kentucky, for Appellants. Phillip Bruce Leslie, McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, Greenup, Kentucky, for Appellee.
Before: KENNEDY, CLAY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's dismissal of their claims against Defendant Doris Hollan, County Clerk for Boyd County, Kentucky. Plaintiffs allege that because they supported Defendant's opponent in her election, Defendant failed to reappoint them to positions as deputy county clerks in violation of their First Amendment rights of free speech and free association and in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Finding that the district court improperly granted Defendant Hollan qualified immunity with respect to certain Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Hollan, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in part, and REVERSE it in part.
Plaintiffs Teresa Caudill, Cheryl Fields, and Patty Conlin are all former Boyd County, Kentucky, deputy county clerks. All three had served as deputy county clerks for several years, but they were not reappointed to their positions after Hollan won election in 2002 and took office in 2003. Plaintiff Lynn Butler is the former Boyd County, Kentucky, County Clerk. She was a former deputy clerk who was appointed to that office after the death of the previously elected clerk. She never sought election to the office of County Clerk either before or after her appointment. During the election, Plaintiffs supported Hollan's opponent.
After winning the primary and the election, Defendant received a memo, dated December 16, 2002, that the county attorney circulated to all newly-elected county executives. The memo specifically warned new county executives not to use patronage dismissals. Defendant provided written notice to Plaintiffs of her decision not to rehire them on January 3, 2003.
Plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they were not rehired (a constructive discharge) in violation of their First Amendment rights of free speech and free association, as applied to state actors through the Fourteenth Amendment, because they had supported Defendant Hollan's opponent. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. Defendant Hollan denied that she failed to reappoint Plaintiffs for political reasons. She also argued, in the alternative, that had she engaged in patronage dismissals as Plaintiffs alleged, she deserved qualified immunity, because the law regarding patronage dismissals of Kentucky deputy county clerks was not clearly established.
On August 28, 2003, the district court dismissed Plaintiff Butler's claims against Defendant Hollan, reasoning that as the former County Clerk, Butler did not have any expectation of continued employment or of being rehired. The court also dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Hollan in her individual capacity, relying primarily on this court's decision in Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3d 452 (6th Cir.1997).
The parties conducted discovery on the deputy county clerk Plaintiffs' remaining claims. On August 11, 2004, in a second opinion, the district court dismissed the remaining claims against Defendant Hollan in her official capacity as County Clerk. The court held that Plaintiffs had presented no evidence that the office of the County Clerk had final authority to establish county policy with respect to hiring matters. The court held that such a finding would be a necessary prerequisite to Plaintiffs recovering against Defendant Hollan in her official capacity. The opinion also directed that judgment be entered for defendants.1 Plaintiffs appeal. Their appeals have been consolidated. Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have granted summary judgment to Hollan in either her individual or official capacities.
Although neither party raised the issue, before we address the merits of Plaintiffs' appeals, we must determine, sua sponte, whether we have jurisdiction over all aspects of those appeals. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (). In their notice of appeal, the deputy clerk Plaintiffs failed to appeal from the judgment. The appeal was taken from the "Memorandum Opinion and Order entered in this action on August 11, 2004." In the August 11th order, the district court directed the entry of final judgment in the case. It also disposed of the deputy clerks' claims against Defendant Hollan in her official capacity as clerk. In their briefs on appeal, however, Plaintiff deputy clerks also contest the district court's August 28, 2003 opinion and order on their claims against Defendant Hollan in her individual capacity.2 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) requires that a notice of appeal: "designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed." The question that confronts us, then, is whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the August 28, 2003 order dealing with individual liability, which is not mentioned in the notice of appeal.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we can reach all relevant aspects of the deputy clerk Plaintiffs' appeal. It has long been the rule "that an appeal of a final judgment draws into question all prior non-final rulings and orders." McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir.1985). We hold that the notice of appeal sufficiently complies with Fed. R.App. P. 3 to give us jurisdiction in that the opinion of August 11, 2004, which plaintiffs do list, ordered the entry of the final judgment in the case. An appeal referencing an order that directs entry of judgment in a case is a sufficient equivalent to appealing the judgment itself, even though the judgment is entered as a separate document. In the alternative, if the notice of appeal was technically deficient, we hold that such a technical deficiency should not prevent us from reaching the merits of the appeal, nor does such a technical deficiency divest us of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. To rule otherwise would be to rely on an overly technical reading of Fed. R.App. P. 3(c). Several decisions support finding jurisdiction under analogous situations.
In McLaurin, the plaintiff's notice of appeal referred solely to the district court's order, which embodied the jury's verdict on a federal age discrimination claim. Id. The Plaintiff sought to challenge, however, earlier dismissals of state law claims and an earlier grant of a directed verdict motion, in addition to the order specifically mentioned in the notice of appeal. Id. The defendant argued that because the plaintiff only mentioned the order relevant to the federal age discrimination claim on appeal, the panel could address only that issue and not the other issues. Id. This court disagreed with the defendant, holding:
In this case, by appealing from the district court's final order, Dr. McLaurin effectively preserved for review all of the district court's non-final rulings and orders, including the directed verdict and state law claim rulings. Furthermore, even assuming that the notice of appeal failed to properly preserve these issues for appeal, Dr. Fischer has failed to demonstrate any prejudice due to the alleged error; consequently, any error committed by appellant is harmless.
Id. at 102 ().
In Boburka v. Adcock, 979 F.2d 424 (6th Cir.1992), this court allowed a defendant to appeal a court's grant of a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff despite the fact that his notice of appeal specified only that the defendant was appealing from the district court's order denying his post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Id. at 426. The notice of appeal did not mention either the final judgment or the directed verdict. Id. This circuit, relying on Peabody Coal Co. v. Local Union Numbers 1734, 1508 & 1548, 484 F.2d 78 (6th Cir.1973), and the clear intent of the defendant, found that although "[s]trictly construed, the notice of appeal does not preserve the denial of the directed verdict issue," the "notice of appeal adequately preserved for appeal all the issues he raises before this court." Id.
In Crawford, et al. v. Roane, et al., 53 F.3d 750 (6th Cir.1995), plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal that sought review of the order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 752. In their brief, however, the plaintiffs also "discusse[d] the Trustees' failure to furnish information and ma[de] clear that the [Plaintiffs] also s[ought] review of the district court's denial of their motion for leave to file an amended complaint." Id. The court held that, because the brief put the defendants on notice as to what was being appealed, they suffered no prejudice as a result of the plaintiffs' failure to specify that they desired appellate review of the other subjects. Id. at 752-53. Cf. Sanabria v. U.S., 437 U.S. 54, 68 n. 21, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) () (citations omitted).
Our decision in United States...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Shimkus v. Hickner
...that the conduct complained of violated the Constitution before the official engaged in the unconstitutional act." Caudill v. Hollan, 431 F.3d 900, 912 (6th Cir.2005). Since there is evidence that Lutz attempted to silence the plaintiff with threats of adverse job action, which eventually c......
-
Curry v. School Dist. of the City of Saginaw
...unreasonable" and violates a constitutional right, the court will "collapse" the last two steps. Ibid. (quoting Caudill v. Hollan, 431 F.3d 900, 911 n. 10 (6th Cir.2005)). Where a more exacting analysis of the facts may be necessary, the court tends to employ the third step, since "[i]t is ......
-
Dever v. Kelly
...then this court has "collapse[d] the second and third prongs" in an effort to "avoid duplicative analysis." Caudill v. Hollan, 431 F.3d 900, 911 n. 10 (6th Cir. 2005). Hills v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 457 F.3d 583 (6th The key premise of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims is that the APC......
-
Baynes v. Cleland
...his alleged conduct was improper, we have determined that qualified immunity is an objective rather than a subjective inquiry. See Caudill, 431 F.3d at 911–12 ; Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir.1997) (“It is important to understand that Mrs. Heltsley's own subjective views on th......