Williams v. Massa

Decision Date10 March 2000
Citation431 Mass. 619,728 NE 2d 932
PartiesDONNA J. WILLIAMS v. DONALD P. MASSA.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, IRELAND, & SPINA, JJ.

Barbara F. Wand (Karen Tosh with her) for the plaintiff.

Roberta F. Benjamin for the defendant.

Stacey L. Cushner, for The Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

GREANEY, J.

This case involves divorce proceedings between Donna J. Williams (wife) and Donald P. Massa (husband). The wife appeals from the amended judgment of divorce and the orders on her posttrial motions. She argues that the judge erred (1) in the distribution of certain inherited and gifted assets of the husband; (2) in the property division that was contrary to the evidence and plainly wrong and excessive; (3) by failing to order sufficient alimony and child support; (4) by declining to award her attorney's fees; and (5) by the arrangement made for custody of the children. The wife concludes that she is entitled to a new trial on all issues. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We conclude that the judge's orders regarding property division, alimony and child support, and attorney's fees were proper, but that part of the judge's order concerning custody of the children must be modified. Accordingly, we affirm the amended judgment as to the property division, alimony and child support, and attorney's fees. We also affirm the judgment as to joint legal custody. We vacate that part of the order allowing for future changes in custody on motion of either party, and direct, instead, that any change occur only by way of a complaint for modification.

The judge filed a lengthy decision in which she considered all relevant factors as stated in G. L. c. 208, § 34. We summarize the judge's findings. The parties were married on June 8, 1974. They have two children, a daughter, born on April 5, 1980, and a son, born on September 30, 1985. Both children have learning disabilities as well as emotional problems. The parties themselves are in good health, although the wife manifests some emotional instability, and the husband has asthma and has had severe attention deficit disorder. The parties enjoyed a comfortable middle-class lifestyle during the marriage, residing in an oceanfront, fifteen-room residence in Cohasset that they had extensively renovated. They provided the children with tutors, therapy, and enrichment programs to address the children's special needs. The family ate out occasionally and took family vacations several times a year. The wife shopped recreationally and continually, acquiring large amounts of goods and products. Since 1976, the husband has been chief executive officer and president of Massa Products Corporation, a small, closely held family business founded by his father fifty years ago. After their marriage, the wife was employed at Massa Products Corporation until the birth of the parties' first child. Since then, she has not been employed outside the home. The wife has skills as a graphic designer and is a talented painter. She is employable in the field of graphic design and in art-related work, but her employability is limited by her years away from her vocation. The parties separated on or about October 4, 1993. At the time of trial, the parties' daughter resided exclusively with the wife and had no contact with the husband. Their son divided his time equally between his parents' homes.

The judge divided the marital assets into three categories: (1) noninherited assets, valued at $1,950,155, which included the marital home, valued at $892,000, and a ski condominium unit, valued at $175,000, as well as personal property, vacation time-share weeks, the husband's pension, individual retirement accounts for both parties, and various stocks and bonds owned jointly and individually; (2) gifted assets, valued at $478,195, which included stocks and bonds acquired by the husband prior to the marriage as gifts from his parents; and (3) inherited assets, valued at $2,246,999, which included the husband's interest in five separate family trusts, described below.1 The valuation of real estate in two of the trusts, Stoneleigh and Stoneleigh II, reflected a projected capital gains tax that the judge applied in order to determine a more accurate value for those assets. The judge found that the assets of these trusts historically had not been traded and had been used by the family as a stream of income with minimal invasions of principal. The judge further found that the basis of the trust portfolios was low, and there would be significant capital gains tax implications if the trusts were liquidated.

The judge assessed the husband's liabilities at $45,000 in rent owed to the Stoneleigh II Trust, and the wife's at $128,107, which included $120,000 in attorney's fees and $7,598 in credit card debt. The judge assessed the wife's needs at $6,000 per month, for which she will require contribution from the husband, and the husband's needs, including his support obligations, at $17,831 per month. In the future, the husband has the opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income through his employment and in a contingent remainder interest of two-thirds of the Frank Massa Trust and the Frank Massa Irrevocable Trust. The wife has a more limited opportunity to acquire future capital assets and income, depending on the investment of her assets and her ability to earn money through employment in her former field.

The judge assessed the conduct and contribution of the parties as follows. The husband contributed all of his income, earned and unearned, to the marital estate during the marriage, and the wife contributed her earned income to the marriage before the birth of the first child in 1980. The husband invested and managed all of the parties' money, and he was responsible for all accountings and tax returns. While the wife on occasion recorded dividend and interest payments in ledger books, she made no contribution to the husband's business or any of the various trusts in which the husband has an interest. The wife's major contribution to the marital estate was her design assistance and her overseeing (with the husband) of the substantial renovations to the family home.

During the course of the marriage, the husband was supportive of the wife, preparing her lunch and dinner on a daily basis, assisting in substantial ways as a homemaker and with child care. The wife was occasionally supportive of the husband, but was insensitive to his time commitments as the primary wage earner, as evidenced by her failure to relieve him of homemaking functions she was capable of providing and for which she could have obtained help. The judge found that the husband did virtually all food shopping for the household. On most days, he would return home at lunchtime and prepare both his lunch and lunch for the wife. Each evening, he would return from work, set the dinner table, prepare the family dinner, and, after cleaning up after dinner, would help the children with homework. The husband was also responsible for heavy cleaning chores, routine yard maintenance, taking the trash to the dump, and for the daily feeding of the wife's many cats. The wife, who was not employed outside of the home after the birth of the children, was responsible for laundry and for running the dishes through the dishwasher and putting them away. These jobs were seldom done in a consistent manner. The wife was also responsible for cleaning the cats' litter boxes, which she did inconsistently. As a result of the wife's over-all neglect, the marital home was untidy, cluttered with mounds of laundry, every available surface heaped with items recently purchased by the wife, and the "reek of cat urine pervad[ed] the home." The wife was responsible for purchasing the family clothes and gifts, and for decorating the home for holidays.

The wife was primarily responsible for child care during the children's early years, but as the children grew older, the husband increasingly became involved with their routine care. The husband was essential in obtaining appropriate services for both children's special needs. While the wife did more routine car transportation, the husband was equally involved in scheduling and attending meetings with treating professionals around the children's unique issues and working with school personnel. The husband, more than the wife, engaged in specific one-on-one athletic and recreational activities with each child.

The daughter, who was fifteen years old at the time of the trial, has a history of serious learning disabilities and special needs, as well as serious emotional problems, and was hospitalized in 1993 for loss of control and suicidal tendencies. Although she enjoyed a close relationship with her father prior to the litigation, she had chosen to ally with her mother against her father in the present highly charged conflict. The son, who was nine years old at the time of the trial, also has significant learning disabilities and special educational needs.

The judge found that the wife, who has been involved in individual therapy for a number of years, continues to manifest behaviors that are profoundly worrisome in her role as a parent. She has limited insight into the children's special needs and her interpersonal skills, and often succeeds in alienating treating professionals and school personnel. The husband, on the other hand, has a realistic view of the over-all emotional and educational needs of the children and has been pivotal in securing required services and effectively acting as an advocate for their needs. He has a unique and sensitive insight into their special needs, given his own lifelong struggle with attention deficit disorder. In contrast to the wife, the husband understands the importance to the children of having both parents play a major role...

To continue reading

Request your trial
104 cases
  • Cavanagh v. Cavanagh
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • August 8, 2022
    ...in a custody judgment, however, should be made pursuant to a complaint for modification under G. L. c. 208, § 28." Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 636, 728 N.E.2d 932 (2000).12 Additionally, we note that the divorce judgment provides that, if the parties "are unable to agree, the matter i......
  • Canisius v. Morgenstern
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • August 6, 2015
    ...is fairly certain, and current valuation possible, the assets may be considered for assignment under § 34.’ Williams v. Massa, [431 Mass. 619,] 628 [728 N.E.2d 932 (2000) ]. Interests considered too remote or speculative for inclusion within the estate are instead weighed under the § 34 cri......
  • Dilanian v. Dilanian
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • November 21, 2018
    ...title, however acquired.’ " Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. 105, 110, 55 N.E.3d 933 (2016), quoting Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 625, 728 N.E.2d 932 (2000). The trial judge, therefore, properly considered the husband's substantial inheritance in determining the division of ma......
  • Hunter v. Rose
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • September 28, 2012
    ...home was not “settled” and child would be cared for by multiple providers rather than parent). See generally Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 623–624, 728 N.E.2d 932 (2000) (probate judge assessing and finding wife's efforts to disrupt husband's relationship with their children). The judge......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Property Transfers & Distribution of Assets and Liabilities
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Divorce Taxation Content
    • April 30, 2022
    ...and should minimize adverse tax consequences 36 .” In a later case, citing Fechtor as authority, the court held in Williams v. Massa , 431 Mass. 619, 728 N.E. 2d 932, 941 (2000), that the trial court judge does “not need testimony regarding the necessity of a sale.” The Fechtor court cited ......
  • Preliminary Issues
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Divorce Taxation Content
    • April 30, 2022
    ...about tax consequences in the absence of testimony or other evidence properly introduced at trial 7 . The Court in Williams v. Massa , 431 Mass. 619, 728 N.E.2d 932 (Mass. 2000), observed that, in dealing with estimated capital gains taxes in the valuation of certain assets, expert testimon......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT