Motley v. Parks

• Citation: 432 F.3d 1072
• Decision Date: 30 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 02-56648.,02-56648.
• Parties: Darla MOTLEY; Juan Jamerson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Bernard PARKS; Daryl Gates; Gerald Chaleff; Herbert Boeckman; T. Warren Jackson; Robert M. Talcott; Raymond C. Fisher; Guadalupe Sanchez; Gregory Kading; Al Ruegg; James Black; Lawrence Webster; Dean Hansell, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 1072

432 F.3d 1072

Darla MOTLEY; Juan Jamerson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Bernard PARKS; Daryl Gates; Gerald Chaleff; Herbert Boeckman; T. Warren Jackson; Robert M. Talcott; Raymond C. Fisher; Guadalupe Sanchez; Gregory Kading; Al Ruegg; James Black; Lawrence Webster; Dean Hansell, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-56648.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted En Banc June 23, 2005.

Filed December 30, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen Yagman; Marion R. Yagman; Kathryn S. Bloomfield, Yagman & Yagman & Reichmann & Bloomfield, Venice Beach, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney; Janet G. Bogigian, Deputy City Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees Bernard Parks, Daryl Gates, Gregory Kading and Albert Ruegg.

Debra W. Yang, United States Attorney; Leon W. Weidman, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Civil Division; David Pinchas, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees James Black and Larry Webster.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General; Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Allen Crown, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell Lepkowsky, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Robert Helfand, Elizabeth A. Keech, Deputies Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellee Guadalupe Sanchez.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-01472-MMM.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, B. FLETCHER, PREGERSON, REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, KLEINFELD, SILVERMAN, GRABER, McKEOWN, PAEZ, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge.

We took this case en banc to clarify a number of issues in this circuit surrounding parole-related searches. We hold that, before conducting a warrantless search pursuant to a properly imposed parole condition, law enforcement officers must have probable cause to believe that the parolee resides at the house to be searched. In this case, they did. We do not, however, decide whether law enforcement officers also need particularized suspicion of wrong-doing before conducting such a search because, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on that issue. It is sufficient for us to conclude that, at the time the officers searched plaintiffs' home, it was not clearly established that any suspicion of wrong-doing on the part of the parolee was needed.

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers on the illegal search claim. Also, we affirm the dismissal of the Monell claims against former LAPD police chiefs Parks and Gates, but reverse the summary judgment to Officer Kading on the excessive force claim.

FACTS AND DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

The material facts, as construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, are as follows.¹ On February 20, 1998, Janae Jamerson, a member of the Four Trey Crips gang, was released on parole from state prison. As a condition of his parole, Jamerson was required to consent that his person, residence, and any property under his control could be searched at any time, by any agent of the Department of Corrections or any other peace officer, with or without a warrant. See Cal.Penal Code § 3067.²

During the month of January 1999, Darla Motley, Jamerson's then-girlfriend, moved into an apartment located at 416 East 40th Place in Los Angeles. At some point, Jamerson also lived there. However, Motley testified that "everything" was in her name and that she paid the rent and all bills associated with the apartment. Jamerson's mother and brother lived in another apartment at that address. On February 3, 1999, Jamerson was taken back into custody as a result of a parole violation. A few days later, Motley gave birth to their son, Juan Jamerson.

Approximately six weeks later, on the morning of March 18, 1999, Los Angeles Police Department Officer Albert Ruegg held a briefing for LAPD officers, officers from the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and California state parole officers regarding the planned searches of ten parolees' residences in the Newton Street area. These officers were all part of the Newton Street task-force, a combined state and federal effort organized in November of 1998 to combat gang-related violence and criminal activity. In March 1999, the task force was investigating the sudden rise in shootings and armed robberies taking place in the Newton Street area. Janae Jamerson was one of the ten parolees with gang connections identified to be living in the Newton Street area in the spring of 1999. The officers concede they had no reasonable suspicion to believe that Jamerson was then-involved in any crime; they were simply contacting and searching local parolees with gang connections as a way to "clean up" the Newton Street neighborhood.

Sometime before March 18, Officer Ruegg had directed a member of his team to prepare "packages" on suspected gang-member parolees in the Newton Street area. The proper preparation of a package entailed verifying whether a parolee was on active parole and compiling address and identifying information. Ruegg was informed that Jamerson's last known address was the apartment at 416 East 40th Place and that he was on active parole. During the March 18 briefing, the officers charged with preparing the packages relayed the pertinent information to the members of the various search teams.

At approximately 10:00 or 10:30 that morning, four task-force officers from the various agencies went to search what they believed to be Jamerson's residence. The two ATF officers, James Black and Larry Webster, proceeded to the rear of the apartment unit; California Parole Agent Guadalupe Sanchez and LAPD officer Gregory Kading went to the front door and knocked loudly.

Motley testified at her deposition that when she came to the door, Kading identified himself as an LAPD officer, said that he was there with Jamerson's parole officer, and asserted that they had a warrant to search the apartment. In fact, the officers did not have a warrant, and Jamerson's parole officer was not present. An exchange regarding Jameron's whereabouts ensued. Motley told the officers that Jamerson did not live there and that he was in custody. One of the officers replied that Jamerson had been released three days earlier. Motley countered that she knew Jamerson was still in custody. The officers then asked who was inside with her, and Motley replied that only she and her five-week-old son, Juan, were at home. Finally, one of the officers told Motley that they needed to conduct the search and that if she did not let them in, they would arrest her for interfering with the search and Juan would be put in foster care. At this point, Motley unlocked the security gate and Kading, Sanchez, and Black entered the apartment. With their firearms drawn, Kading and Black searched the house for Jamerson; Webster eventually joined the others, but remained primarily in the living room.

During the search, Kading entered Motley's bedroom with his firearm unholstered. Juan was lying on Motley's bed in the bedroom. According to Motley, upon entering the room, Kading pointed his gun at Juan and kept the firearm trained on the infant while he searched the room; Kading put his gun away only when another officer came in and helped him examine a box at the foot of the bed. The officers spent at least twenty minutes searching Motley's bedroom.

After the officers left, Motley called Jamerson's parole officer, Ms. Smith, and told her that officers had come and searched her entire home. Ms. Smith stated that she did not authorize the search and confirmed that Jamerson was still in custody. A few weeks after the search of her residence, Motley moved to San Pedro, because she said that she was afraid to stay in the Newton Street area with her son.

Motley, on behalf of herself and her son Juan, filed a § 1983 action alleging that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights, used excessive force, and conspired to violate their Fourth Amendment and equal protection rights, and that the law enforcement agencies were liable for the officers' actions under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The officers moved for summary judgment asserting that they were immune from suit. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment on all claims. Motley argues on appeal that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for the unlawful search, the use of excessive force against her infant son, and the Monell claims against Gates and Parks.³

ANALYSIS

I. Qualified Immunity Standard

A private right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists against law enforcement officers who, acting under the color of authority, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights of an individual. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). The defense of qualified immunity, however, shields an officer from trial when the officer "reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted," even if the officer's conduct was constitutionally deficient. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the Supreme Court laid out the framework for determining an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity. The threshold inquiry requires a court to ask, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The inquiry ends at this stage if no constitutional right is found to have been violated; the plaintiff cannot prevail. Id. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff's allegations do make out a constitutional injury, then the court must...