State v. Lees
| Decision Date | 16 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 119,052,119,052 |
| Citation | 432 P.3d 1020,56 Kan.App.2d 542 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Aaron Matthew LEES, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Mitch Spencer, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
C. Ryan Gering, of Hulnick, Stang, Gering & Leavitt, P.A., of Wichita, for appellee.
Before Standridge, P.J., Malone, J., and Stutzman, S.J.
The State appeals the district court's decision granting Aaron Matthew Lees' motion to suppress. The district court found that a Kansas highway patrol trooper had no legal grounds to stop Lees' vehicle for a brake light violation because the vehicle's brake lights complied with Kansas law. The State claims the trooper's mistake of law about the brake light violation, if he made one, was objectively reasonable, so the mistake did not invalidate the traffic stop. The State also claims the traffic stop was lawful under the trooper's inspection power as authorized in K.S.A. 8-1759a. For the reasons stated below, we reject the State's claims and affirm the district court's judgment.
On July 10, 2017, around 11:13 p.m., Lees was leaving the Kansas Star Casino in Sumner County. Lees was driving and he had a female passenger. Just as Lees was leaving the casino and about to enter the Kansas turnpike, Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Reed Sperry pulled him over because his "left-side brake light [was] out." Before informing Lees of the reason for the stop, Sperry instructed him to test his brake and blinker lights to see if they were working. The tests confirmed Sperry's belief that the left brake light was not functioning properly. Lees' vehicle had three separate brake lights, including the standard left and right brake lights, in addition to a top-middle brake light. The right and top-middle brake lights were both functional.
According to Sperry's arrest report, after he explained the reason for the stop to Lees, he noticed an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. Upon inquiry, Lees denied consuming any alcohol, but his passenger admitted to having a couple drinks. Sperry then asked for Lees' driver's license and proof of insurance. He provided an identification card. Sperry ran Lees' information and discovered that he was restricted to operating vehicles equipped with ignition interlock devices. There was no interlock device in Lees' vehicle.
Because it was illegal for Lees to operate his vehicle without an interlock device, Sperry asked the passenger to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT) to determine if she could legally drive them home. The passenger failed the test. Sperry then questioned the passenger about whether Lees had really been drinking. The passenger said that Lees had, in fact, been drinking. When confronted with this new information, Lees admitted to consuming two beers at the casino and two beers earlier in the day. While speaking to Lees, Sperry noticed he had bloodshot, watery eyes.
Based on what had happened during the stop, Sperry asked Lees to submit to three standard field sobriety tests. According to the arrest report, Lees failed the tests. Sperry read Lees the PBT advisory, after which Lees took and failed the PBT. Sperry then arrested Lees for driving under the influence (DUI) and for driving without the ignition interlock device. Sperry did not issue a citation or warning for the defective brake light. Later, Lees blew a .085 on the Intoxilyzer 9000, putting him over the legal limit.
On July 19, 2017, the State charged Lees with DUI and operating a vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device. Lees filed a motion to suppress the evidence on January 2, 2018. In the motion, Lees argued that Sperry made a mistake of law, which, under Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 285 Kan. 625, 639, 176 P.3d 938 (2008), rendered the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Lees argued that the law required two working brake lights, and without counting the broken left brake light, Lees' vehicle still had two operational brake lights, the right and top-middle brake lights.
The State filed a written response to the motion and argued that based on appellate decisions filed after Martin , a law enforcement officer's traffic stop is not invalidated if it is based on an objectively reasonable mistake of the law and that Sperry committed a reasonable mistake of law on Lees' brake light violation. The State also argued that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and that Lees voluntarily provided the evidence to be used against him. The State's written response did not argue that the traffic stop in question was authorized under K.S.A. 8-1759a.
On January 26, 2018, the district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. Sperry was the only witness and he testified consistent with the above facts. Sperry admitted that he misunderstood the law about brake lights. He testified that he mistakenly believed that Lees' brake lights needed to be as widely spaced laterally as practicable and mounted at the same height. In other words, he thought that both the left and right brake lights had to be working and that the middle brake light did not count. Sperry testified that he stopped Lees for a brake light violation, and he said nothing about any intent to perform an inspection under K.S.A. 8-1759a.
During oral arguments, the State asserted that Sperry's mistake of law about the brake light violation was objectively reasonable, so the mistake did not invalidate the stop. The State also argued for the first time that K.S.A. 8-1759a grants uniformed highway patrol troopers the authority to stop vehicles for defective equipment and that Lees' defective left brake light provided grounds for a legal stop under that statute.
The district court filed a memorandum decision on February 9, 2018. The district court found that Sperry made a mistake of law on the brake light violation because the applicable statutes require only two working brake lights and Lees' vehicle satisfied this requirement. The district court also found that Sperry's mistake of law in this instance was not objectively reasonable. As for the State's argument under K.S.A. 8-1759a, the district court found as a matter of law "that the authority granted by this statute does not extend to equipment that is outside what is already required by statute." Because Lees' brake lights complied with state law and posed no safety hazard, the district court found that K.S.A. 8-1759adid not authorize the stop. Finally, the district court found that the good-faith exception did not apply and that Lees did not voluntarily submit to providing any evidence. Thus, the district court granted Lees' motion to suppress the evidence. The State timely filed an interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, the State contends that the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. The State first argues that the traffic stop was legal under Sperry's inspection power as authorized in K.S.A. 8-1759a. Second, the State argues that Sperry's mistake of law about the brake light violation was objectively reasonable, rendering the traffic stop lawful. We will address these arguments in reverse order. Lees contends that the district court did not err in granting his motion to suppress the evidence.
The standard of review for a district court's decision on a motion to suppress has two components. The appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. In reviewing the factual findings, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. The district court's ultimate legal conclusion, however, is reviewed using a de novo standard. State v. Hanke , 307 Kan. 823, 827, 415 P.3d 966 (2018). When the material facts supporting the district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the ultimate question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. 307 Kan. at 827, 415 P.3d 966.
The State claims the traffic stop was lawful under Sperry's inspection power as authorized in K.S.A. 8-1759a. But as to the Kansas statutes governing brake lights, the State does not dispute that Sperry made a mistake of law about whether Lees committed a traffic infraction for a brake light violation. Still, the State argues that Sperry's mistake of law about the brake light violation was objectively reasonable, so the mistake did not invalidate the traffic stop. Lees argues that the district court correctly found that Sperry's mistake of law in this instance was not objectively reasonable.
protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Sharp , 305 Kan. 1076, 1081, 390 P.3d 542 (2017). A traffic stop is considered a seizure of the driver of the vehicle. City of Atwood v. Pianalto , 301 Kan. 1008, 1011, 350 P.3d 1048 (2015). To legally perform a traffic stop, a law enforcement officer must have a reasonable suspicion, requiring specific and articulable facts, that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime or traffic infraction. See K.S.A. 22-2402(1). A traffic infraction is an objectively valid reason to effectuate a traffic stop. State v. Jones , 300 Kan. 630, 637, 333 P.3d 886 (2014).
In Kansas, the requirements for stop lamps are set forth in K.S.A. 8-1708(a) which states that "[e]very motor vehicle ... shall be equipped with two (2) or more stop lamps meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of K.S.A. 8-1721." K.S.A. 8-1721(a) states:
"Any vehicle may be equipped and when required under this act shall be equipped with a stop lamp or lamps on the rear of the vehicle which shall display a red or amber light, or any shade of color between red and amber, visible from a distance of not less than three hundred (300) feet to the rear in...
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