State v. BNSF Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. 118,095,118,095
• Citation: 56 Kan.App.2d 503,432 P.3d 77
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

56 Kan.App.2d 503

432 P.3d 77

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 118,095

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed November 2, 2018.

Marianne M. Auld and Jody S. Sanders, of Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, of Fort Worth, Texas, and Noah K. Garcia, of Knight Nicastro, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant.

Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Bruns, P.J., McAnany, J., and Burgess, S.J.:

Bruns, J.:

BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appeals its conviction for violating K.S.A. 66-273. This statute prohibits a railroad company from allowing its trains to stand upon a railroad crossing for more than 10 minutes without leaving an opening at least 30 feet wide on the public roadway. Following a bench trial, the district court found that a BNSF train blocked two crossings in Chase County for approximately four hours. Because we find that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (2016), preempts K.S.A. 66-273, we reverse BNSF's conviction as a matter of law.

FACTS

BNSF operates a rail line through Chase County on which it operates freight trains. Both BNSF and Union Pacific operate trains on the track. Although BNSF does not have a rail yard or terminal in Chase County, it does have a side track adjacent to the main track near Bazaar. The side track is used to change crews, to perform maintenance, to allow other trains to pass, and for various other reasons.

There are two grade crossings—located within several hundred feet of each other—where the main line and side tracks intersect with public roadways northeast of Bazaar. One is at the intersection with Norton Creek Road and the other is at the intersection with T Road. According to BNSF, it built the two grade crossings so closely together to minimize inconvenience for local residents whose property is only accessible by crossing the railroad tracks. Yet, as BNSF acknowledges, trains occasionally block both railroad crossings. This case involves one of those occasions.

Shortly after 6 a.m. on the morning of December 19, 2016, the Chase County Sheriff's Department received a call reporting a stopped train blocking both of the railroad crossings. Sheriff Richard Dorneker arrived at the scene around 8 a.m. He spoke to a BNSF employee who he saw walking up and down the tracks. Although the BNSF employee told Sheriff Dorneker that he had to check the train, he evidently offered no additional information regarding why the train was stopped.

After assessing the situation, Sheriff Dorneker instructed someone in his office to call BNSF in an attempt to clear the railroad crossings. Although the Sheriff's office apparently placed three phone calls to BNSF, the crossings remained blocked until 9:54 a.m. As a result, Sheriff Dorneker issued BNSF a citation—which listed Engine No. 7220 and Engine No. 8169—for blocking the railroad crossings for four hours and six minutes in violation of K.S.A. 66-273.

Prior to trial, BNSF moved to dismiss the citation. In the motion, BNSF argued that the State had failed to come forward with sufficient evidence for the case to proceed to trial. BNSF also argued that federal law preempts the Kansas statute. The district court heard the motion on March 14, 2017. On April 18, 2017, the district court denied the motion. In its memorandum decision, the district court found that the State had come forward with sufficient evidence to go to trial. In addition, the district court ruled that federal law did not preempt K.S.A. 66-273.

On June 1, 2017, the district court held a bench trial. The State offered the testimony of Sheriff Dorneker and several residents affected by the blocked railroad crossings on the morning of December 19, 2016. Several area residents testified that they missed work that day because the crossings were blocked. Likewise, because of the blocked crossings, service technicians were unable to reach the house of one resident who had no water and was having problems with his heating system. At the close of the State's evidence, BNSF moved for acquittal and the district court took the motion under advisement.

In its defense, BNSF called one of its terminal managers to testify. Through this witness, BNSF introduced evidence regarding a locomotive event recorder for Engine No. 7220. An event recorder records a train's speed, braking, throttle position, location, and other information. Apparently, the event recorder showed that Engine No. 7220 stopped near Bazaar for only 7 minutes and 40 seconds to transfer crews. It also showed that Engine No. 7220 was about 20 miles southeast of Wichita at 9:54 a.m. There was no evidence presented about Engine No. 8169.

The BNSF terminal manager also testified about various alternatives to blocking the railroad crossings that might be available. He testified that it would not be "conducive to business" to run shorter trains on the rail line. He also testified that the train could be "cut" to allow motor vehicles to use the roadway but suggested that this was not a practical solution. He explained that someone would have to walk to the place where the train could uncoupled—which could be more than a mile away from the engine—and then go through multiple steps to uncouple the cars. He also explained the process of recoupling the cars, which includes federally mandated air brake testing, could take as much as two hours to complete.

In rebuttal, the State recalled Sheriff Dorneker as a witness. He acknowledged that he might have been mistaken about the engine numbers. At the conclusion of the evidence, BNSF again moved for acquittal based on the lack of identification as well as on federal preemption. After hearing the closing arguments presented by counsel, the district court took the case under advisement.

On July 7, 2017, the district court entered a journal entry denying BNSF's motions and finding it guilty of violating K.S.A. 66-273. Specifically, the district court found that a BNSF train blocked the crossings for 3 hours and 52 minutes. Accordingly, it ordered BNSF to pay a fine of $4,200 fine plus court costs.

ANALYSIS

Contentions of the Parties

On appeal, BNSF contends that we should reverse its conviction for violating K.S.A. 66-273 for three reasons. First, BNSF argues that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., preempts K.S.A. 66-273. Second, BNSF argues that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq. (2016), preempts the K.S.A. 66-273. Third, BNSF argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was guilty of violating K.S.A. 66-273.

In response, the State contends that we should affirm BNSF's conviction. The State argues that federal law does not preempt K.S.A. 66-273. Instead, the State maintains that the Kansas antiblocking statute is a valid exercise of traditional police powers to protect public health and safety. The State also argues that it presented sufficient evidence at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that BNSF violated K.S.A. 66-273.

Federal Preemption of State Law

The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution establishes the doctrine of federal preemption:

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

Consequently, "the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law." Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, Inc ., 292 Kan. 285, 294, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011). Whether federal preemption exists and the scope of the preemption are questions of congressional intent. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc ., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). In determining whether Congress intended for federal preemption to apply in a given case, we must first look to the "language of the preemption statute and the ‘statutory framework’ surrounding it." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 485-86, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). Because federal preemption involves an interpretation of law, our review of the issue is unlimited. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co ., 296 Kan. 906, Syl. ¶ 1, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013).

Federal preemption can be either express or implied. Board of Miami County Comm'rs , 292 Kan. at 294, 255 P.3d 1186. Express preemption occurs "when Congress makes its intent known through explicit statutory language." 292 Kan. at 295, 255 P.3d 1186. Implied preemption happens "when congress does not expressly preempt state law, but its intent to do so can be inferred from a statutory or regulatory scheme." 292 Kan. at 296, 255 P.3d 1186. The Kansas Supreme Court has also recognized several analytical subcategories of implied preemption:

"Broadly speaking, a preemption analysis divides into two principal categories: express and implied preemption. Implied preemption is further divided into two analytical subcategories: field preemption and conflict preemption. Then, yet a third strata of analytical subcategories is used when examining claims of conflict preemption: per se conflict and obstacle preemption. [Citations omitted.] Even though it is analytically helpful to consider the relationship of these categories, it must be remembered that these analytical categories are not ‘rigidly distinct.’ English , 496 U.S. at 79 n.5 . For example, ‘field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.’ English , 496 U.S. at 79 n.5 ." Board of Miami County Comm'rs , 292 Kan. at 294-95, 255 P.3d 1186.

Furthermore,...