Grubb v. State

Decision Date27 December 1988
Docket NumberNo. C5-88-951,C5-88-951
Citation433 N.W.2d 915
PartiesDonald L. GRUBB, et al., Respondents, v. STATE of Minnesota, et al., Defendants, City of Faribault, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Trial court did not clearly err in its findings that respondents met the common law requirements of adverse possession.

2. Trial court did not err in concluding that this action cannot be considered a boundary-line dispute that would relieve respondents of statutory requirement that they pay taxes on land claimed.

3. Trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that record owner could not recover separately assessed parcel, where disseizor claimed major portion of parcel but did not pay taxes assessed on parcel for at least five consecutive years during the adverse occupancy as required by statute.

Keith R. Nelson, Cook, Voegele & Nelson, Faribault, for respondents.

Warren D. Chamberlain, Faribault, for appellant.

Heard, considered and decided by PARKER, P.J., and RANDALL and BOWEN, JJ.

OPINION

ROBERT E. BOWEN, Acting Judge. *

This quiet-title action comes to us on appeal from an order denying appellant's motion for a new trial, following a trial which resulted in a judgment awarding respondents title by adverse possession. Respondents seek review of the trial court's determination that the action did not involve a boundary-line dispute. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

On July 29, 1961, respondents purchased a 43-acre farm in Rice County. At the time of the purchase, St. Olaf College (college) owned 16 acres of land adjoining respondents' land on the north and west, which the college had obtained for the sole purpose of providing a source of stone for construction of buildings on its campus in Northfield, some 15 miles away. Most of the college property, including a stone quarry, is situated between the Straight River on the west, and respondents' land on the east. The remainder, approximately two acres, lies west of the Straight River, next to land owned and operated by a charitable corporation, the River Bend Nature Center.

The college leased all of its 16 acres to appellant on June 8, 1982, and conveyed it to appellant as a gift on January 8, 1984 by a warranty deed providing that it must be used exclusively as a nature interpretive center with emphasis on natural history. From 1946 until 1982, the college paid real estate taxes assessed on the property; thereafter, appellant paid them until it acquired title, at which time the property became exempt from taxes.

When respondents took possession of their farm in 1961, they were aware that the college owned some property to the north and west, including the stone quarry, but they did not know how many acres the college owned or where the boundary lines between the properties were located. It appeared to respondents that their vendors had been using part of the college property; and in fact they had been renting land, including part of the college property, to another farmer for grazing purposes. Respondents received payments under this rental arrangement for approximately one year after they took possession.

From the time that respondents purchased the farm until November 5, 1982, they pastured cattle and sheep and fenced the pastured area, including portions of the disputed land. They placed "no trespassing" signs along the boundaries, including along the Straight River. They tilled a portion of the land for crops, and harvested trees for firewood and fenceposts. They refused entrance to and evicted people they found undesirable and permitted school and church groups to use the disputed land.

Between July 29, 1961 and November 5, 1982, the college failed to use, occupy or in any way exercise ownership over the subject property, except for the payment of real estate taxes each year. The former business manager of the college visited the property once in the 1950's and once after respondents took possession. On both occasions, although he did not see any animals being pastured on the property, he noted that some grazing had occurred. The college at no time either granted permission for, or objected to, respondents' use of its property. The trial court found that the college knew or should have known that respondents were openly using and occupying the disputed property, but did nothing to prevent it or to assert its ownership interest.

On November 5, 1982, appellant by letter requested that respondents remove their livestock from the subject property. The trial court found that the letter was the first notice respondents had received that anyone was exercising an ownership right in the property. Respondents countered by commencing this action.

In addition to the above facts, the trial court found and concluded that the entire 16-acre college property is a parcel which is separately assessed for real estate tax purposes and that the college or appellant paid the real estate taxes each year; respondents never paid any part of the taxes. The trial court found that the disputed property was part of the whole parcel of property for which taxes were separately assessed to the college, but that the disputed property itself was not a separately assessed parcel within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 541.02 (1986). It further found that the action was not one involving boundary lines.

The trial court concluded that respondents were in hostile, actual, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property for at least 15 years, and that the requirement of payment of real estate taxes for five years did not apply. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that respondents were the owners of the property as a result of adverse possession.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court clearly err in finding and concluding that respondent satisfied the requirements for acquiring title by adverse possession?

2. Did the trial court clearly err in finding and concluding that this is not a boundary-line dispute which would exempt respondents from payment of real estate taxes under Minn.Stat. § 541.02 (1986)?

3. Did the trial court err in concluding that respondents are exempt from the tax payment requirement because the disputed property is not a "separately assessed" parcel of real estate within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 541.02 (1986)?

ANALYSIS

1. The trial court found that respondents met each of the five elements necessary to acquire land by adverse possession. The fact findings of a trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See Wheeler v. Newman, 394 N.W.2d 620 (Minn.Ct.App.1986).

To prevail in an adverse possession claim, the disseizor must show by clear and convincing evidence hostile, actual, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land for the 15-year period required by our statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. § 541.02. Ehle v. Prosser, 293 Minn. 183, 197 N.W.2d 458 (1972). The trial court found and concluded that respondents satisfied the above requirement and obtained title to the disputed land by adverse possession.

There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's specific findings on each of the five elements of adverse possession. The record is clear that for a continuous period well in excess of 15 years, respondents used the disputed land for farming purposes. Their possession was exclusive; the college exercised no ownership rights other than visiting the property once and paying the taxes. Respondents admitted some and excluded others, and posted no-trespassing signs. Their actual uses of the property included grazing of cattle and sheep, building and maintaining fences, removing gravel, quarry rock and trees, and engaging in certain conservation practices on the land.

Appellant contends that for their possession to be hostile, respondents should have notified the college or appellant earlier of their claim to the property. Hostile possession does not require personal animosity or overt acts toward the record owner. Ehle at 190, 197 N.W.2d at 462. Rather, the disseizor must intend to exclude the world and treat the disputed property in a manner generally associated with the ownership of a similar type of property in the particular area involved. Id. The record indicates that respondents treated the disputed property as if it were part of their farm. Further, there was no evidence that either the college or appellant ever granted respondents permission to use the property; on the contrary, appellant has sought damages for trespass from respondents by its counterclaim in this action.

Appellant next contends that respondents' possession was not open because the disputed property could be seen only from the respondents' farmyard and from the west side of the Straight River. The trial court found that possession was open throughout the statutory period. Respondents posted "no trespassing" signs and evicted trespassers, while granting permission to other parties to use the land. The land was being used for grazing which was, in fact, visible to the college on the one visit it made during respondents' tenancy. Thus it is clear that respondents openly used the property, undisturbed by the record owner.

The trial court's findings and conclusions that the five common-law elements of adverse possession were established by respondent are amply supported in the record, and are not clearly erroneous.

2. Generally, a party claiming title to land by adverse possession is required to pay the real estates taxes for five consecutive years preceding the assertion of the claim. The requirement is contained in Minn.Stat. 541.02, the statute of limitations pertaining to actions to recover land:

No action for the recovery of real estate or the possession thereof shall be maintained unless it appears that the plaintiff, the plaintiff's ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the premises in question within...

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