433 U.S. 562 (1977), 76-577, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
|Docket Nº:||No. 76-577|
|Citation:||433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965|
|Party Name:||Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.|
|Case Date:||June 28, 1977|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued April 25, 1977
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Petitioner's 15-second "human cannonball" act, in which he is shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet away, was, without his consent, videotaped in its entirety at a county fair in Ohio by a reporter for respondent broadcasting company and shown on a television news program later the same day. Petitioner then brought a damages action in state court against respondent, alleging an "unlawful appropriation" of his "professional property." The trial court's summary judgment for respondent was reversed by the Ohio Court of Appeals on the ground that the complaint stated a cause of action. The Ohio Supreme Court, while recognizing that petitioner had a cause of action under state law on his "right to the publicity value of his performance," nevertheless, relying on Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, rendered judgment for respondent on the ground that it is constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose.
1. It appears from the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion syllabus (which is to be looked to for the rule of law in the case), as clarified by the opinion itself, that the judgment below did not rest on an adequate and independent state ground, but rested solely on federal grounds, in that the court considered the source of respondent's privilege to be the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore this Court has jurisdiction to decide the federal issue. Pp. 566-568.
2. The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the news media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent, and the Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner, or to film or broadcast a prize fight or a baseball game, where the promoters or participants had other plans for publicizing the event. Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, distinguished. Pp. 569-579.
(a) The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance, since (1) if the public can see the act free on television it will be less willing
to pay to see it at the fair, and (2) the broadcast goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an entertainer. Pp. 575-576.
(b) The protection of petitioner's right of publicity provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public. Pp. 576-577.
(c) While entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection, and entertainment itself can be important news, neither the public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized. P. 578.
(d) Although the State may, as a matter of its own law, privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so. Pp. 578-579.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 579. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 582.
WHITE, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, is an entertainer. He performs a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet away. Each performance occupies some 15 seconds. In August and September, 1972, petitioner was engaged to perform his act on a regular basis at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. He performed in a fenced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds. Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a separate admission fee to observe his act.
On August 30, a freelance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the operator of a television broadcasting station and respondent in this case, attended the fair. He
carried a small movie camera. Petitioner noticed the reporter and asked him not to film the performance. The reporter did not do so on that day; but on the instructions of the producer of respondent's daily newscast, he returned the following day and videotaped the entire act. This film clip, approximately 15 seconds in length, was shown on the 11 o'clock news program that night, together with favorable commentary.1
[97 S.Ct. 2852] Petitioner then brought this action for damages, alleging that he is "engaged in the entertainment business," that the act he performs is one "invented by his father and . . . performed only by his family for the last fifty years," that respondent "showed and commercialized the film of his act without his consent," and that such conduct was an "unlawful appropriation of plaintiff's professional property." App. 5. Respondent answered and moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The majority held that petitioner's complaint stated a cause of action for conversion and for infringement of a common law copyright, and one judge concurred in the judgment on the ground that the complaint stated a cause of action for appropriation of petitioner's "right of publicity" in the film of his act. All three judges agreed that the First Amendment did not privilege the press to show the entire performance on a news program without compensating petitioner for any financial injury he could prove at trial.
Like the concurring judge in the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio rested petitioner's cause of action under state law on his "right to publicity value of his performance." 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (1976). The opinion syllabus, to which we are to look for the rule of law used to decide the case,2 declared first that one may not use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another, whether or not the use or benefit is a commercial one, and second that respondent would be liable for the appropriation, over petitioner's objection and in the absence of license or privilege, of petitioner's right to the publicity value of his performance. Ibid. The court nevertheless gave judgment for respondent because, in the words of the syllabus:
A TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of publicity, unless the actual intent of the TV station was to appropriate the benefit of the publicity for some nonprivileged private use, or unless the actual intent was to injure the individual.
We granted certiorari, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977), to consider an issue unresolved by this Court: whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent from damages for its alleged infringement of petitioner's state law "right of publicity." Pet. for Cert. 2. Insofar as the Ohio Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution required judgment for respondent, we reverse the judgment of that court.
If the judgment below rested on an independent and adequate state ground, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted, Wilson v. Loew's Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958), for
[o]ur only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could [97 S.Ct. 2853] amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126 (1945). We are confident, however, that the judgment below did not rest on an adequate and independent state ground and that we have jurisdiction to decide the federal issue presented in this case.
There is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded in state law and that the right of publicity which petitioner was held to possess was a right arising under Ohio law. It is also clear that respondent's claim of constitutional privilege was sustained. The source of this privilege was not identified in the syllabus. It is clear enough from the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, which we are permitted to consult for understanding of the syllabus, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 441 143 (1952),3 that in adjudicating
the crucial question of whether respondent had a privilege to film and televise petitioner's performance, the court placed principal reliance on Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), a case involving First Amendment limitations on state tort actions. It construed the principle of that case, along with that of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to be that "the press has a privilege to report matters of legitimate public interest even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise private," and concluded, therefore, that the press is also "privileged when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his talents while keeping the benefits private." 47 Ohio St.2d at 234, 351...
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