United Aircraft Corporation v. NLRB

Decision Date16 November 1970
Docket NumberDockets 34798,No. 167,34928.,168,167
Citation434 F.2d 1198
PartiesUNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, District 91, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Intervenor.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Joseph C. Wells, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Elliott Moore, Attorney (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Stanley J. Brown, Atty., Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.

Mozart G. Ratner, Washington, D. C. (Plato E. Papps, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for intervenor.

Before CLARK, Associate Justice,* LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge.

LUMBARD, Chief Judge:

We are called upon in this case to decide whether United Aircraft Corporation violated section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to furnish the unions involved with a list of the names and addresses of all employees represented by the unions in six of the Company's plants in Connecticut.

United Aircraft Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of aircraft engines and parts, helicopters, and electronic devices. Its Pratt and Whitney Division operates plants in East Hartford, Manchester, Southington, and Middletown; and its Hamilton Standard Division operates two plants in Windsor Locks. Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and 743 are all local Lodges of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, affiliated with District 91, I.A.M., the charging party in the instant case, which coordinates their labor relations programs. All of these Lodges have for some years been recognized as exclusive bargaining agents in contracts covering the production and maintenance employees at the various plants of the Company. Lodge 1746 represents units of these employees at the East Hartford and Manchester plants, Lodge 700 represents these employees at the Middletown plant, Lodge 1746A represents these employees at the Southington plant, and Lodge 743 represents these employees at Windsor Locks.

On July 3, 1969, the unions filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the Company had violated section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by its refusal to furnish the unions with the home addresses of the approximately 25,000 employees represented by the unions in the six plants. The Company agreed that it had refused to furnish the unions with the employees' home addresses, but contended that under the circumstances, its refusal did not violate the Act. More specifically, the Company contended that such information was neither necessary nor relevant to the unions' proper performance of their statutory duties and, further, that in the case of Lodges 1746, 743, and 700, the unions were not — when the requests were made — legally entitled to recognition as the exclusive representatives of the employees involved.

The Board's trial examiner found to the contrary — holding, in substance, that the home addresses of the unit employees were necessary and relevant to the unions' function as bargaining agents, and that — in the case of Local Unions 1746, 743, and 700 — the unions were legally entitled to recognition as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the units where they claimed such status. By decision and order dated April 2, 1970, the Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the trial examiner. Accordingly, the Board ordered the Company to cease and desist from refusing to furnish the union with the home addresses of all the employees in their respective collective bargaining units, and promptly to furnish the union with those addresses.

United Aircraft now petitions this court to review and set aside the Board's order, and the Board cross-petitions for enforcement. The unions have intervened on the side of the Board. For the reasons set forth below, we deny United Aircraft's petition for review and grant the Board's cross-petition for enforcement.

I.

In the summer of 1960, after a stalemate in negotiations between the Company and Lodges 1746 and 743 for new contracts, most of the employees represented by those Lodges went on strike. That strike was accompanied by violence, threats, and physical damage to the non-strikers, particularly at their homes. In August 1960, the Company and the unions finally agreed on the terms of new contracts, and a strike settlement was reached.

In the fall of 1965, the Company and the unions entered into negotiations to settle pending litigation and to enter into new three-year contracts to replace those about to expire. In March 1966, the Company questioned the unions' majority status and refused to negotiate further unless the unions could demonstrate their majority status by a Board election. The unions responded with a charge of a section 8(a) (5) violation, and the Board's General Counsel filed both a complaint before the Board and a petition for an injunction in the United States District Court in Connecticut.

On August 5, 1966, the district court granted an injunction requiring the Company to recognize and bargain with the unions. As a consequence of the court's order, the Company entered into new two-year contracts with the unions. Those contracts contained a "savings clause" to the effect that if the Company was ultimately found not to be obligated to bargain with the unions, it could terminate. The district court then dissolved its order. In October 1966, Trial Examiner Ricci held a hearing on the General Counsel's complaint and found that by withdrawing recognition from unions in March 1966 and refusing to bargain, the Company had violated section 8(a) (1) and (5); he ordered the Company to bargain with the unions.

On November 27, 1967, the Board issued a decision upholding the trial examiner's findings. That decision was promptly appealed by all parties to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

On September 29, 1968, the unions requested the Company to give them a list of the names and addresses of all bargaining unit employees, and on September 30, the Company denied the unions' request. Nevertheless, on October 15, 1968, the Company sent a letter to the unions proposing that when a local union desired to write letters to all employees on matters relating to contract negotiations, the local deliver the sealed envelopes to the Company and the Company would, by addressograph equipment, put the names and addresses on the envelopes and mail them. The Company stated, however, that this offer was subject to the availability of the addressograph equipment and the Company had first call on the equipment. Nevertheless, the next month, the unions took advantage of the Company's offer and sent letters to all employees by this means.

In November 1968, the Company and the unions entered into negotiations for the Pratt and Whitney Division for new contracts to succeed the ones entered into in 1966. The Company again questioned the unions' majority status; and the unions agreed to submit sufficient dues checkoff cards to constitute a majority and, if that was not enough, to have a Board-conducted election. The Company rejected this offer, proposing that they continue to negotiate and that any agreement reached contain the "savings clause" giving it the option to terminate the contract in the event the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia should reverse the Board's decision and find that the Company had no obligation to bargain with the unions in March 1966. The unions, however, opposed inclusion of the "savings clause" and asked the Company "unconditionally and unequivocally" to recognize the unions as the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees involved. Finally, the Company signed three-year contracts containing clauses of unconditional exclusive recognition of the unions and omitting the "savings clause." Both parties agreed, however, that by their actions they were not waiving any legal position previously taken.

In March 1969, the Company and the unions began negotiations for new contracts for the Hamilton Standard Division, but this time the Company did not question the union's majority.

On May 29, 1969, while those negotiations were proceeding, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order of November 27, 1967, and found that in March 1966 the Company had a reasonably grounded good-faith doubt as to the union's majority and hence had not violated the Act. Lodges 1746 and 743, Int. Ass'n of Mach. and Aero. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 135 U.S.App.D.C. 53, 416 F.2d 809 (1969). But on July 1, 1969, despite this decision, the Company signed new contracts for its Hamilton Standard Division, containing exclusive recognition clauses and omitting the "savings clause." All contracts covering both the Hamilton Standard and Pratt and Whitney Divisions contained provisions for dues checkoff authorizations, but no other form of union security.

II.

The Company employs large numbers of people whose homes are dispersed over a wide geographical area. Of the 17,000 employees at the East Hartford and Manchester plants, only a little over 6,000 live in towns closer than seven miles from the plant. The rest live in some 118 different towns in Connecticut, in 27 towns in Massachusetts, and in various places in other states. Similarly, only 641 of the 3,000 employees in the Southington plant and 693 of the 1,700 employees in the Middletown plant live in those towns. The rest are scattered over a radius of more than 40 miles from the plants. The same wide dispersion can be found among the 5,000 employees at the Windsor Locks plants.

When the Company has had serious labor relations problems in the past, it has resorted to the mails to reach the employees with its point of view. Thus, the...

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