Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 18043.
| Decision Date | 18 December 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 18043.,18043. |
| Parties | Michael L. SHAKMAN and Paul M. Lurie, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF COOK COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Robert Plotkin, C. Richard Johnson, Roger R. Fross, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Raymond F. Simon, Corp. Counsel, Marvin E. Aspen, Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Daniel P. Coman, Atty., George J. Schaller, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees City of Chicago, Richard J. Daley and Marshall Korshak; Edmund Hatfield, Daniel Pascale, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of counsel.
Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge, and FAIRCHILD and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.
This action challenges the use of patronage in the city of Chicago and Cook County in a manner which allegedly puts at an electoral disadvantage those who desire the election of candidates in opposition to those in power. In briefest outline, plaintiffs allege that officers of the city and county require city and county employees, as a condition of holding their jobs and drawing their salaries from the public treasuries, to furnish votes, campaign work, and money to elect candidates chosen by the regular democratic organization, and that this practice makes more difficult and often prevents the election of other candidates.
The district court dismissed the complaint and plaintiffs appealed.
The two plaintiffs allege that they are residents, voters, and taxpayers within the 24th state senatorial district, within the city of Chicago and Cook County. Plaintiff Shakman was a candidate, not endorsed by any party, at the election held November 18, 1969 for delegates to the Illinois constitutional convention. Plaintiff Lurie supported Shakman. This action was commenced about a month before the election. Although the particular election is over, the practices challenged are allegedly of a continuing nature, and the case is not moot.1
Plaintiffs set out six counts, so as separately to seek redress for deprivation of constitutional rights on behalf of (1) Shakman, and all other independent candidates, including those at future elections, as candidates; (2) both plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, as voters; (3) both plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, as taxpayers; and separately to predicate each such claim upon an averment of conspiracy to effect such deprivation.
The defendants include the mayor and treasurer of the city, the president of the board of county commissioners, the county assessor, the county clerk, and the clerk of circuit court. There has been no argument that these defendants are not acting under color of law in making the appointments which allegedly implement the patronage system under attack. The democratic county central committee, which is a statutory party organ, several of its members, several aldermen and county commissioners, and a not for profit corporation known as The Democratic Organization of Cook County are additional defendants. It is alleged that all conspired to deprive plaintiffs of rights.
Jurisdiction is claimed under 28 U.S. C. § 1331, of a controversy arising under the constitution, and a jurisdictional amount is alleged. Jurisdiction is also claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) of an action to redress the deprivation under color of state law, of rights secured by the constitution. Assuming justiciability, the existence of jurisdiction, at least under § 1343(3), is clear.2
The complaint defines a democratic patronage employee (DPE) as a person employed by the city or county on the basis of his political support of the county democratic organization, of which the mayor is president, and who is not protected by law against arbitrary discharge. It is alleged that there are between 8,000 and 30,000 DPEs; that many are hired on a basis where one's employment must be renewed each several months if it is to continue; that most DPEs are required, as a condition of keeping their jobs, or in order to escape discipline, to contribute money to the county democratic organization, or its affiliates, or endorse candidates, and to do political work for such organizations and candidates. Some of such allegedly coerced work is done during regular working hours and some on the DPE's own time. The defendants, it is alleged, coerce DPEs by this means to give votes, political support, campaign work, and money to candidates endorsed by the organization and its affiliates.
Plaintiffs ask, among other things, for a declaration that the practices of defendants violate constitutional and other federal rights of candidates, voters, and taxpayers of Chicago, an injunction against those practices, and damages.
One of the reasons given by the district court for dismissing the complaint is that plaintiffs lack standing to seek redress for the injury to the rights of the DPEs resulting from the alleged coercion. Plaintiffs point out that there are decisions permitting vicarious vindication of constitutional rights for reasons of policy.3 But here, in any event, plaintiffs are seeking redress for injuries to their own interests and the interests of others similarly situated. Assuming the truth of plaintiffs' averments, and assuming that interests of theirs which are allegedly injured are rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal constitution, their standing to bring a § 1983 or § 1985 action is apparent.4
Plaintiffs also aver that they are taxpayers, challenging the misuse of tax funds in that DPEs are allegedly required, as a condition of continuing to receive their compensation out of public money, to vote for and assist candidates selected by defendants and opposed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are asserting that the practice causes injury to their interests as candidates and voters, and if those interests are constitutionally protected from the type of injury alleged, it will be unnecessary to decide whether their taxpayer interest alone would give them standing.5
The other reason given by the district court for dismissing the complaint is that it is conclusory. The court pointed to a number of assertions in the portion of the complaint where the pleader attempted to describe the impact of the practice complained of on plaintiffs' right of association, right to express one's self as a candidate, right to vote effectively, and the like. The district court did not agree, and we do not, with much of plaintiffs' expression of the legal analysis of such impact. Most § 1983 complaints contain material in this area, and we agree that a pleader's abstract assertion that one or another constitutional right has been violated does not require the court to decide that a claim has been adequately stated.
But the averments concerning the operation of the patronage system and the disadvantage it causes to candidates and voters who attempt to use the election process to change the direction of government are factual and give adequate fair notice of the claim asserted.6
We consider the significant questions, unanswered to this point, to be whether these disadvantages to the interests of candidates and voters amount to deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution, and whether for any reason this area of controversy must be deemed nonjusticiable.
It is clear that at least some aspect of the interests of candidates in an equal chance and of the interests of voters in having an equally effective voice are rights secured from state action by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The interests of candidates in official treatment free from intentional or purposeful discrimination are entitled to constitutional protection.7 "Where discrimination is sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights."8
The equal protection clause secures from invidious official discrimination the voter's interest in a voice in government of equal effectiveness with other voters.9
We acknowledge that the decisions just referred to involved mechanical aspects of the election process: e. g., the right to cast a vote, a candidate's place on the ballot, and equal size in districts entitled to a representative. The interest in an equal chance and an equal voice is allegedly impaired in the case before us by the misuse of official power over public employees so as to create a substantial, perhaps massive, political effort in favor of the ins and against the outs. We conclude that these interests are entitled to constitutional protection from injury of the nature alleged as well as from injury resulting from inequality in election procedure.
We see no ground upon which to decide that the controversy suggested by plaintiffs' claims is nonjusticiable.
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