Fogle v. Pierson, 05-1405.
| Decision Date | 27 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-1405.,05-1405. |
| Citation | 435 F.3d 1252 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
| Parties | Ronald Jennings FOGLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Captain PIERSON, C.D.O.C., Committee Member and Chairperson at (D.R.D.C.); William Bokros, C.D.O.C., Administrative Head/Director at (D.R.D.C.); George Meskimen, Lt., C.D.O.C., Initiating Employee at (D.R.D.C.); Fosnot, C.D.O.C., Case Manager, Committee Member of (D.R.D.C.); S. Egan, C.D.O.C., Case Manager, Committee Member at (D.R.D.C.); LT. Norton, C.D.O.C., Programmer at (D.R.O.C.); Unknown Defendant # 1, C.D.O.C. Correctional Officer at (D.R.D.C.); Unknown Defendant #2, C.D.O.C. Correctional Officer at (D.R.D.C.); Unknown Defendant #3, C.D.O.C. Correctional Officer at (D.R.D.C.); John R. Clarkson, C.D.O.C., Committee Member at (S.C.F.); C. Wierzhicki, C.D.O.C., Committee Member at (S.C.F.); McMonagle, C.D.O.C., Case Manager, Committee Member at (S.C.F.); Paul Williams, C.D.O.C., Committee Member at (S.C.F.); T. Chase, C.D.O.C., Administrative Head at (S.C.F.); Nichels, C.D.O.C., Case Manager, Committee Member at (S.C.F.); M. Emily, C.D.O.C., Administrative Head at (S.C.F.); Cathy Slack, C.D.O.C., Administrative Head at (C.S.P.); V. Riddle, C.D.O.C., Committee Chairperson at (C.S.P.); J. Hunter, C.D.O.C., Case Manager, Committee Member at (C.S.P.); J. Carroll, C.D.O.C., Committee Chairperson at (C.S.P.); D. Comb, C.D.O.C., Case Manager, Committee Member at (C.S.P.); Joe Ortiz, C.D.O.C., Executive Director, Defendants-Appellees. |
Submitted on the briefs:* Ronald Jennings Fogle, filed a brief pro se.
Before EBEL, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Fogle, a prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging various civil rights violations committed by the Colorado Department of Corrections ("DOC"). He also argues that the district court failed to consider a number of claims that he raised in his pleadings. As Fogle was granted in forma pauperis ("IFP") status at the district court, any claim that is frivolous must be dismissed. Having reviewed his myriad claims, we conclude that not all are frivolous. We therefore AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.
Fogle is incarcerated at the Limon Correctional Facility in Limon, Colorado. Prior to this incarceration, while a pretrial detainee at the Denver County Jail, he posed as a visitor and escaped by simply walking out of the facility. He was quickly apprehended, but the escape led to embarrassing media coverage of DOC officials. Fogle was returned to the Denver County Jail, where he served time in punitive segregation as punishment for the escape.
Shortly after finishing this punishment, Fogle was sentenced on the original felonies for which he was being held in the Denver County Jail when he walked out. He was transferred to a new prison facility, where he claims he was immediately placed in administrative segregation, allegedly for the embarrassment that his escape caused DOC officials. Fogle remained in administrative segregation at three different state prisons from September 2000 until August 2003. During this time, he claims that he was kept in his cell 23 hours a day for 5 days each week and 24 hours a day the other 2 days each week, and was denied access to the telephone, the showers, outdoor exercise, the law library, and programs offered to general population inmates.
In June 2005, Fogle filed a § 1983 complaint with the district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights stemming from these conditions of his confinement. The district court granted Fogle leave to proceed IFP, although Fogle subsequently paid his full filing fee during the course of the proceedings below.
On August 12, 2005, the district court dismissed Fogle's complaint. Properly construing Fogle's pro se complaint liberally, see Lamb v. Rizzo, 391 F.3d 1133, 1135 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004), the district court found that he had raised six cognizable claims: (1) retaliation for the earlier jailhouse escape; (2) double jeopardy based on being punished twice for the escape; (3) violation of due process because the panels making his administrative segregation determinations were biased; (4) cruel and unusual punishment, primarily from his denial of outdoor exercise; (5) violation of due process because he was denied the opportunity to earn "good time credits" while in administrative segregation; and (6) violation of equal protection because he was treated differently than other inmates. The district court considered and rejected each claim as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Fogle appealed.
Fogle's appeal raises a host of issues. As a threshold matter, Fogle claims that the district court improperly treated him as IFP—and, consequently, improperly considered his complaint under § 1915—because, after being granted IFP status, he paid his filing fee in full. We reject this claim because, once a party is granted IFP status, dismissal under § 1915 is proper notwithstanding any filing fee paid. We next consider the district court's suggestion that Fogle's claims might be barred by the relevant statute of limitations. We conclude that dismissal of his claims as time-barred is not appropriate at this stage in the proceedings. We then turn to the merits of those claims ruled on by the district court and conclude that it was error for the court to dismiss all of the claims as frivolous. Finally, we consider those claims not ruled on by the district court and make a threshold determination of which are frivolous and which deserve consideration on remand.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) requires a district court to dismiss the complaint of a party proceeding IFP whenever the court determines that the claims are frivolous. Fogle claims that, because he paid his filing fee in full after being granted IFP status, the district court erred in dismissing under § 1915. However, § 1915 clearly provides that "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee ... that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that... the action or appeal ... is frivolous." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Thus dismissal of Fogle's frivolous claims was proper.1
Although not ruling on it, the district court suggested that any of Fogle's claims that arose before the final two months of his administrative segregation were barred by the statute of limitations. A complaint may be dismissed sua sponte under § 1915 based on an affirmative defense—such as statute of limitations— "only when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed." Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 674-75 (10th Cir.1995) (alterations, quotations omitted). In other words, a complaint may not be dismissed "by raising sua sponte a statute of limitations defense that was neither patently clear from the face of the complaint nor rooted in adequately developed facts." Id. at 675.
"Limitations periods in § 1983 suits are to be determined by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules...." Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989) (quotations omitted). We have made clear that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued. See, e.g., Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750-51 (10th Cir.1993). A § 1983 action "accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent." Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675 (quotations omitted). Fogle asserts that he was in administrative segregation from September 2000 until August 2003; he filed this action in June 2005. Many of his claims are based on facts that occurred at or near the beginning of his confinement; if no tolling provision applies, then it appears those claims are time barred.
Fogle's limitations period was not tolled by Colorado statute because Fogle was not "a minor under eighteen years of age, a mental incompetent, or a person under other legal disability." See Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-81-101(3).2 However, Colorado also recognizes the doctrine of equitable tolling, which applies "when flexibility is required to accomplish the goals of justice," such as "when plaintiffs did not timely file their claims because of `extraordinary circumstances' or because defendants' wrongful conduct prevented them from doing so." Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Colo.2004) (quotations omitted). Fogle asserted in his complaint that the defendants kept him locked in his cell 23 hours a day for 5 days each week and 24 hours the other two days with no access to, inter alia, law library clerks or prison lawyers. It is not "patently clear" that these are not the sort of extraordinary circumstances that would permit equitable tolling, and thus § 1915 dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations is not appropriate.
We generally review a district court's dismissal for frivolousness under § 1915 for abuse of discretion. See Fratus, 49 F.3d at 674. However, where the frivolousness determination turns on an issue of law, we review the determination de novo. See Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333, 1335 n. 4 (10th Cir.2003). "A district court may deem an in forma pauperis complaint frivolous only `if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.'" Fratus, 49 F.3d at 674 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). In other words, dismissal is only appropriate "for a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" and the frivolousness determination ...
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