Reeb v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Correction

Decision Date24 January 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-3994.,04-3994.
PartiesRachel REEB, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, Belmont Correctional Institution, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Stephen P. Carney, Office of the Attorney General of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Nicholas E. Kennedy, Kennedy, Reeve & Knoll, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen P. Carney, Douglas R. Cole, Office of the Attorney General of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio, Jack W. Decker, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Nicholas E. Kennedy, Kennedy, Reeve & Knoll, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. Ann E. Reesman, McGuiness, Norris & Williams, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.

Before: KEITH and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; OBERDORFER, District Judge.*

BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which OBERDORFER, J., joined.

KEITH, J. (pp. 651-660), delivered separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Four named female employees of the Belmont Correctional Institution ("Belmont"), a prison operated by the State of Ohio, filed a class action against Belmont and certain officials under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that female corrections officers have been treated differently from similarly situated male corrections officers and accordingly have been denied promotions, denied leave and overtime, given undesirable positions, and replaced by men. The plaintiffs specifically requested money damages and an injunction, though they did not specify the conduct they sought to have enjoined. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified the plaintiff class, finding that the plaintiffs had shown the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2) had been met, and refused to certify the class under subdivision (b)(3). Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 203 F.R.D. 315 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (hereinafter Reeb I). We granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) and reversed the grant of certification, finding that the record did not demonstrate that the district court had engaged in the rigorous analysis required to determine whether the Rule 23(a) requirements had been met. Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 81 Fed.Appx. 550 (6th Cir.2003) (hereinafter Reeb II).

Upon remand, the district court received no new evidence and re-certified the plaintiff class, again finding the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) met and declining to certify the class under subdivision (b)(3). Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 221 F.R.D. 464, 469 (S.D.Ohio 2004) (hereinafter Reeb III). We again permitted Belmont's appeal. Because the district court did not follow our instructions and conduct a "rigorous analysis" of the requirements of Rule 23(a), and because Title VII cases in which plaintiffs seek individual compensatory damages are not appropriately brought as class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) because such individual claims for money damages will always predominate over requested injunctive or declaratory relief, we VACATE the district court's grant of class certification and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts of this case have been stated in the two prior district court opinions and the prior decision of this court. We therefore adopt the background as set forth in the opinion of the first panel of this court to deal with this case:

[Belmont] is a prison operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. It employs approximately 528 people, some of whose positions are covered by Ohio's civil service laws while others are covered by collective bargaining agreements with three distinct unions District 1199, OCSEA, and OEA. One Hundred Forty-One of [Belmont's] employees are female-some unknown number of whom are OCSEA members....

Plaintiffs Reeb and Brown, members of OCSEA, work as female corrections officers at BeCI. Plaintiff Mackey, a member of OCSEA, also works as a corrections officer at BeCI; yet, for some period of time starting on May 18, 2000, Mackey worked as a secretary in a Temporary Work Level. Plaintiff Beabout, a member of OCSEA, began working at [Belmont] in 1995 as a corrections officer; on January 16, 2000, Beabout received a promotion to records officer on a permanent basis after holding that position on a Temporary Work Level as of December 1, 1999. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that: 1) plaintiffs "have been treated differently, held to a different standard, and given different duties ... [than] similarly situated male corrections officers"; 2) plaintiffs "are frequently required to perform undesirable positions at BeCI ... [while] similarly situated male employees are not assigned to such duties"; 3) plaintiffs "are routinely pulled off of their posts and replaced with male [o]fficers because [p]laintiffs are not seen as able to handle difficult situations that may arise with inmates"; 4) plaintiffs "are routinely denied leave and/or overtime, despite having valid excuses or reasons, while similarly situated male [o]fficers are granted leave and/or overtime for much less valid excuses"; 5) plaintiffs are "routinely written up for alleged infractions or rule violations ... while similarly situated males are not disciplined for the same or more severe infractions"; 6) plaintiffs "have been denied training for various reasons ... [while] similarly situated male employees have not been denied such training for the same or any reasons"; 7) those female employees who "claimed to have had [sexual] relations with the [w]arden... and other supervisors" are "treated substantially better than the rest of the class"; 8) plaintiffs are not promoted while less qualified male officers are promoted because such officers socialize with and bestow various gifts or services upon the warden; 9) plaintiffs have been retaliated against "in the form of increased scrutiny on their behavior and more disparate treatment" because they filed "numerous grievances and complaints regarding such discriminatory treatment" and, subsequently, hired legal counsel; 10) "[m]ale officers routinely allow the male inmates to harass, intimidate, and threaten [p]laintiffs"; 11) the warden "has interfered with the methods and developed processes" that are to protect employees such that plaintiffs have been unable to obtain relief with [Belmont]; and 12) plaintiffs "have routinely been denied promotions ... over less qualified, similarly situated male correction[s] officers" such that males hold seventeen out of eighteen captain and lieutenant positions. Regarding this last allegation, plaintiffs further allege that [Belmont] "circumvents the [usual] requirements of posting and interviewing for a [promotion] position" by routinely using "a `temporary position' to place hand-selected males into a promotion position over more qualified females" and later making such "temporary positions" permanent so as to prevent plaintiffs "from even applying for such positions."

The complaint seeks $2 million in compensatory damages, $3 million in punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and declaratory relief Tho complaint explicitly seeks neither injunctive relief nor a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs assert that their request "[t]hat the rights of class members to the relief sought herein be adjudicated and declared" is sufficient to state a claim for injunctive relief. In their motion for class certification, plaintiffs expressly state that, among other relief, they seek injunctive relief Plaintiffs do not specify what that injunctive relief would entail.

Reeb II, 81 Fed.Appx. at 551-52.

On October 25, 2001, the district court certified the class to include "[a]ll those female employees of Defendant Belmont Correctional Institute [sic], past or present, who are members of the OCSEA and who now work, or at any time during the five years preceding the commencement of this action, worked for [Belmont]." Reeb I, 203 F.R.D. at 320. It found the commonality and typicality requirements met because each of the individual plaintiffs claimed to have been the victim of discrimination on the basis of sex as a result of the defendant's general policy. Id. at 320-22. In finding that the class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), the court stated that the plaintiffs "will feel their rights have been vindicated not by an award of monetary damages alone, but by effecting a change in the way their employer treats females." Id. at 323-24. However, the court did not make any findings detailing how it reached its conclusion that the requirements of the rule had been met other than to state that it could certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) "as long as money damages do not constitute the predominate [sic] type of relief requested." Id. at 323. It did find, however, that it could not certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) because the individual considerations regarding the employer's motivation behind its actions towards each plaintiff and her entitlement to compensatory damages would predominate over the common issues in the case, namely Belmont's policy of gender discrimination. Id. at 324.

We permitted an appeal of the certification for the purpose of determining when injunctive relief "predominates" in an action in which compensatory damages are also claimed for the purposes of certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Reeb II, 81 Fed. Appx. at 553-54. However, we believed it improper to rule on that basis because the record did not show that the district court had conducted a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23(a) factors, and we therefore remanded for closer consideration of whether the Rule 23(a) factors had been met. Id. at 554, 559. Moreover, we noted that the district court, at the time it originally certified the class, did not have the benefit of our opinion...

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