Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz
| Decision Date | 01 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-695,76-695 |
| Citation | 98 S.Ct. 948,435 U.S. 78,55 L.Ed.2d 124 |
| Parties | BOARD OF CURATORS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI et al., Petitioners, v. Charlotte HOROWITZ |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The academic performance of students at the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School is periodically assessed by the Council of Evaluation, a faculty-student body that can recommend various actions, including probation and dismissal; its recommendations are reviewed by the faculty Coordinating Committee, with ultimate approval by the Dean. After several faculty members had expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of respondent medical student during a pediatrics rotation, the Council recommended that she be advanced to her final year on a probationary basis. Following further faculty dissatisfaction with respondent's clinical performance that year, the Council in the middle of the year again evaluated her academic progress and concluded that she should not be considered for graduation in June of that year and that, absent "radical improvement," she be dropped as a student. As an "appeal" of that decision, respondent was allowed to take examinations under the supervision of seven practicing physicians, only two of whom thereafter recommended that res ondent be allowed to graduate on schedule. Two others recommended that she be dropped from the school immediately; and three recommended that she not be allowed to graduate as scheduled but that she be continued on probation. The Council then reaffirmed its prior position. At a subsequent meeting, having noted that respondent's recent surgery rotation had been rated "low-satisfactory," the Council concluded that, barring reports of radical improvement, respondent should not be allowed to re-enroll; and when a report on another rotation turned out to be negative, the Council recommended that respondent be dropped. When notified of that decision, which the Coordinating Committee and Dean had approved, respondent appealed to the Provost, who after review sustained the decision. Respondent thereafter brought this action against petitioner officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending, inter alia, that she had not been accorded due process prior to her dismissal. The District Court, after a full trial, concluded that respondent had been afforded all rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held:
1. The procedures leading to respondent's dismissal for academic deficiencies, under which respondent was fully informed of faculty dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the consequent threat to respondent's graduation and continued enrollment, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dismissals for academic (as opposed to disciplinary) cause do not necessitate a hearing before the school's decisionmaking body. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, distinguished. Pp. 84-91.
2. Though respondent contends that the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of her claim of deprivation of substantive due process, this case, as the District Court correctly concluded, reveals no showing of arbitrariness or capriciousness that would warrant such a disposition, even if it were deemed appropriate for courts to review under an arbitrariness standard an academic decision of a public educational institution. P. 91-92.
538 F.2d 1317, reversed.
Marvin E. Wright, Columbia, Mo., for petitioners.
Arthur A. Benson, II, Kansas City, Mo., for respondent.
Respondent, a student at the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School, was dismissed by petitioner officials of the school during her final year of study for failure to meet academic standards. Respondent sued petitioners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri alleging, among other constitutional violations, that petitioners had not accorded her procedural due process prior to her dismissal. The District Court, after conducting a full trial, concluded that respondent had been afforded all of the rights guaranteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and dismissed her complaint. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 538 F.2d 1317 (1976), and a petition for rehearing en banc was denied by a divided court. 542 F.2d 1335 (1976). We granted certiorari, 430 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 1642, 52 L.Ed.2d 355, to consider what procedures must be accorded to a student at a state educational institution whose dismissal may constitute a deprivation of "liberty" or "property" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent was admitted with advanced standing to the Medical School in the fall of 1971. During the final years of a student's education at the school, the student is required to pursue in "rotational units" academic and clinical studies pertaining to various medical disciplines such as obstetrics-gynecology, pediatrics, and surgery. Each student's academic performance at the school is evaluated on a periodic basis by the Council on Evaluation, a body comp sed of both faculty and students, which can recommend various actions including probation and dismissal. The recommendations of the Council are reviewed by the Coordinating Committee, a body composed solely of faculty members, and must ultimately be approved by the Dean. Students are not typically allowed to appear before either the Council or the Coordinating Committee on the occasion of their review of the student's academic performance.
In the spring of respondent's first year of study, several faculty members expressed dissatisfaction with her clinical performance during a pediatrics rotation. The faculty members noted that respondent's "performance was below that of her peers in all clinical patient-oriented settings," that she was erratic in her attendance at clinical sessions, and that she lacked a critical concern for personal hygiene. Upon the recommendation of the Council on Evaluation, respondent was advanced to her second and final year on a probationary basis.
Faculty dissatisfaction with respondent's clinical performance continued during the following year. For example, respondent's docent, or faculty adviser, rated her clinical skills as "unsatisfactory." In the middle of the year, the Council again reviewed respondent's academic progress and concluded that respondent should not be considered for graduation in June of that year; furthermore, the Council recommended that, absent "radical improvement," respondent be dropped from the school.
Respondent was permitted to take a set of oral and practical examinations as an "appeal" of the decision not to permit her to graduate. Pursuant to this "appeal," respondent spent a substantial portion of time with seven practicing physicians in the area who enjoyed a good reputation among their peers. The physicians were asked to recommend whether respondent should be allowed to graduate on schedule and, if not, whether she should be dropped immediately or allowed to remain on probation. Only two of the doctors recommended that respondent be graduated on schedule. Of the other five, two recommended that she be immediately dropped from the school. The remaining three recommended that she not be allowed to graduate in June and be continued on probation pending further reports on her clinical progress. Upon receipt of these recommendations, the Council on Evaluation reaffirmed its prior position.
The Council met again in mid-May to consider whether respondent should be allowed to remain in school beyond June of that year. Noting that the report on respondent's recent surgery rotation rated her performance as "low-satisfactory," the Council unanimously recommended that "barring receipt of any reports that Miss Horowitz has improved radically, [she] not be allowed to re-enroll in the . . . School of Medicine." The Council delayed making its recommendation official until receiving reports on other rotations; when a report on respondent's emergency rotation also turned out to be negative, the Council unanimously reaffirmed its recommendation that respondent be dropped from the school. The Coordinating Committee and the Dean approved the recommendation and notified respondent, who appealed the decision in writing to the University's Provost for Health Sciences. The Provost sustained the school's actions after reviewing the record compiled during the earlier proceedings.
To be entitled to the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, respondent must in a case such as this demonstrate that her dismissal from the school deprived her of either a "liberty" or a "property" interest. Respondent has never alleged that she was deprived of a property interest. Because property interests are creatures of state law, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698-2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), respondent would have been required to show at trial that her seat at the Medical School was a "property" interest recognized by Missouri state law. Instead, respondent argued that her dismissal deprived her of "liberty" by substantially impairing her opportunities to continue her medical education or to return to employment in a medically related field.
The Court of Appeals agreed, citing this Court's opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).1 In that case we held that the State had not deprived a teacher of any liberty or property interest in dismissing the teacher from a nontenured position, but noted:
[T]here is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. The State, for example, did...
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