Matter of the Search of the Scranton Housing
| Citation | 436 F.Supp.2d 714 |
| Decision Date | 22 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-MISC NOS. 318-322.,04-MISC NOS. 318-322. |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF THE SEARCH OF THE SCRANTON HOUSING AUTHORITY. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Presently before the court is a "MOTION FOR THE UNSEALING OF AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT AND THE UNSEALING OF THE APPLICATION AND RELATED DOCUMENTS FOR SEALING OF AFFIDAVIT, RETURN OF PROPERTY AND REQUEST FOR HEARING," (Doc. No. 6), filed on behalf of the Scranton Housing Authority.
By way of background, on or about December 6, 2004, search warrants were issued, the subjects of which were offices of the Scranton Housing Authority. Simultaneously, upon motion of the government, the court sealed the application for the search warrant, the affidavit of probable cause, and the motion to seal itself. On the following day, federal agents executed the search warrants.
Some six months later, on June 8, 2005, the instant motion was filed on behalf of the Scranton Housing Authority pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal procedure.1 The government filed its brief in opposition on June 27, 2005, (Doc. No. 8), and the movant filed a reply brief on July 7, 2005. (Doc. No. 9).
After reviewing the parties' briefs, the court issued an order dated November 8, 2005, in which the Scranton Housing Authority was directed to file a supplemental brief addressing (1) whether this is a criminal or civil matter and (2) whether the undersigned has jurisdiction to decide the matter. The government was given time to file a reply brief. (Doc. No. 10).
On November 28, 2005, the Scranton Housing Authority filed its supplemental brief. (Doc. No. 11). Subsequently, on December 8, 2005, the government filed its response. (Doc. No. 12).
On May 30, 2006, the government filed, in camera, documents for consideration by the court in conjunction with its brief in opposition to the unsealing of the search warrant affidavit. (Doc. No. 16).
After a number of continuances, a hearing on the motion was held on June 1, 2006.
Considering the supplemental briefs filed by the parties, as well as relevant case law, the court finds that the instant motion is an "independent matter" aside from any civil or criminal proceedings. Specifically, the court is persuaded by the reasoning of In the Matter of the Search of 4330 North 35th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 142 F.R.D. 161 (1992)2. In that case, the movant filed a motion for return of cash seized by the government pursuant to a search warrant. The government argued that the motion under former Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e)3 could only be brought within the context of a criminal or civil case. In considering the matter, the court held that the Rule 41(e) motion could be brought independently, rather than only within the context of a separate civil or criminal action. Id. at 163-64. In so holding, the court relied upon several factors.
Initially, the court noted that there exists several cases in which Rule 41(e) motions were filed "independent" of any pending civil or criminal case, either under the magistrate judge's docket or under a "miscellaneous" docket, which encompasses those matters that are "ancillary and supplementary proceedings not defined as civil actions." Id. at 163 (citing In re One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Five Dollars in United States Currency, 777 F.Supp. 418 (E.D.Pa.1991))(filed under "Miscellaneous Docket"); In re Motion for Return of All Monies Seized, 1991 WL 183363 (S.D.N.Y.1991)(filed under "Miscellaneous Docket"); In re Search Warrants Concerning National Insurance Consultants Incorporated, 139 F.R.D. 684 (D.Colo. 1991)(filed under same magistrate judge's docket as the initial warrants); In re Seizure of Four (4) DC-3 Aircraft, 134 F.R.D. 251 (E.D.Wis.1991)(filed under same magistrate judge's docket as the initial warrants). Moreover, the court found that, within the context of a search and seizure warrant, the concept of an "independent" court action is not novel, noting that the court routinely issues the warrants themselves without any pending civil or criminal case. Id. at 164.
The court further looked to the language of Rule 41 itself, noting that Rule 41 is a self-contained rule, which starts by conveying the authority to issue warrants, establishes the scope of warrants and procedures for issuance, sets forth the manner in which property is to be seized and inventoried, establishes procedures for the return of property, and addresses the manner for challenging the use of the property as evidence in criminal proceedings. Id. at 164. The court found that, since Rule 41 was complete in itself and allowed "independent" court action on behalf of the government in the first paragraphs of the Rule, it would only be logical that the Rule would also allow "independent" court action on behalf of the party aggrieved by the government's actions. (Id.).
Finally, in determining that a Rule 41(e) motion could be filed independent of any civil or criminal proceedings, the court looked to the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules which accompanied Rule 41(e). Here, the court indicated that the Notes which accompanied the 1972 amendments to Rule 41(e) discussed the distinction between a pre-indictment Rule 41(e) motion brought in the district in which the property was seized and a post-indictment Rule 41(e) motion brought in the district in which the criminal case is pending. In the former circumstance, the Committee indicated that any ruling on the motion would be "tentative], and is best treated as] interlocutory." This "interlocutory" status would be closely parallel to the status of the initial seizure warrant, in that at the time the warrant was issued there were no civil or criminal proceedings pending. Since Rule 41 is not intended to deny the government of the use of evidence, the ultimate disposition of the property under a Rule 41 motion is subject to further review if the government pursues criminal charges or civil forfeiture.
Finding that the pre-indictment Rule 41 motion is really only a request for modification in the terms of the warrant, which was issued by the magistrate judge in the first instance, the court determined that the motion is not a dispositive matter in either a criminal or civil context.
In the context of the instant Rule 41(g) motion, the court finds the above reasoning to be logical and persuasive. As such, the instant Rule 41(g) motion filed by the Scranton Housing Authority is properly maintained as an "independent matter" filed to the same Magistrate Judge's docket as the initial warrants. It need not be filed to a separate civil or criminal action.
Having concluded that the instant motion is an independent matter, not properly classified as either a civil or criminal action, the question becomes whether the undersigned has jurisdiction to decide the motion. At the hearing held on this motion, the parties agreed that the undersigned does have jurisdiction to hear this matter. The court agrees.
Looking to In the Matter of the Search of 4330 North 35th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, supra, that court, once again, went to the language of Rule 41 itself. In doing so, the court noted that prior to the 1989 amendments to Rule 41, subpart (e) read in relevant part:
(e) Motion for return of property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion
Id. at pp. 164-65. (emphasis added).
After the 1989 amendments, the court noted that Rule 41(e) read, in relevant part, that "a person aggrieved by ... the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property ... The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion." Id. at 165. (emphasis added).
The Notes accompanying the 1989 amendments reflect the following: The word "judge" is changed to "court" in the second sentence of subdivision (e) to clarify that a magistrate [judge] may receive evidence in the course of making a finding or a proposed finding for consideration by the district judge. Id.
Given the above, Judge Goodstein reasoned that the word "court" in the first sentence of subsection (e) would refer to both district judges and magistrate judges. He reasoned that, if it were intended that the word "court" in the first sentence was to have a different meaning from the use of the same word in the second sentence, the drafters would have substituted the word "judge" or "district judge" for the word "court" in the first sentence. Id.
Judge Goodstein further reasoned that the phrase in the Notes accompanying the amendments that "a magistrate [judge] may receive evidence in the course of making a finding . .," connoted a decision by the magistrate judge, as opposed to a recommendation, while the subsequent language that a magistrate judge may receive evidence in the course of making " . a proposed finding for consideration by the district judge," clearly connoted a recommendation by the magistrate judge4. Id. at 166. (emphasis added). Otherwise, if the drafters of the 1989 amendments wanted to empower only Article III judges to resolve Rule 41(e) motions, the court found that there would have...
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