Stoken v. J.E.T. Electronics and Technology, Inc.
Decision Date | 15 March 1989 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 100841 |
Citation | 174 Mich.App. 457,436 N.W.2d 389 |
Parties | Mary STOKEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J.E.T. ELECTRONICS AND TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Meana, Spruit & Bedevia, P.C. by Richard M. Spruit, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.
Clary, Nantz, Wood, Hoffius, Rankin & Cooper by Douglas W. Van Essen, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant.
Before WEAVER, P.J., and DOCTOROFF and SAPALA, * JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right from two orders entered by the trial court. First the trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of all proofs. Then a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, awarding plaintiff damages of $14,152.18, was returned on May 1, 1987, following which defendant made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur, which also was denied. We hold that defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. Therefore, we vacate the jury's verdict, the judgment after verdict, and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur.
Plaintiff was hired by defendant in February, 1978. She was given the company handbook on her first day of work and was told that it contained the policies and procedures of the company. Plaintiff believed that once an employee completed the probationary period, an employee's termination was determined by the guidelines spelled out in the handbook. Plaintiff felt that as long as she abided by the rules set forth in the handbook, she would have a job.
The handbook contains a section on leaves of absence. Pertinent parts of that section state:
The handbook states that after two years of medical leave, an employee's employment is terminated. The handbook also contains a section called "Rules and Regulations" which delineates the disciplinary action that will be implemented for violations of company rules and regulations. The possible disciplinary actions, depending upon the rule violated, are verbal warning, written warning, three working day disciplinary lay-off, and termination. Following this section is a qualifying statement that violations of the attendance policy are subject to disciplinary action as separately stated in the section on attendance policy and that the "Rules and Regulations" section does not apply to attendance violations.
Sometime during December, 1982, through March, 1983, plaintiff took a medical leave. She submitted a doctor's statement within the five-day required period and received temporary disability benefits. During a period beginning in late June through sometime in August, 1983, plaintiff was hospitalized. Again, a doctor's statement was properly submitted and plaintiff received temporary disability benefits.
On October 14, 1983, plaintiff attempted suicide by shooting herself. She was hospitalized at Blodgett Hospital for five to six weeks. She was then transferred to Kent Oaks Psychiatric Hospital. During this time, plaintiff was quite ill and disoriented. She did not request a leave of absence or follow the prescribed procedures and policies as stated in the manual.
Shortly after her attempted suicide, plaintiff's son, August Swanson, went to defendant to pick up plaintiff's check. He informed the person who gave him the check that plaintiff was in intensive care. There was disputed testimony as to whether Swanson was told by a representative of defendant that plaintiff must submit medical documentation and fill out a leave application or that, absent these procedures, plaintiff's employment could be terminated. In any event, no medical documentation or request for leave was ever submitted to defendant.
On November 9, 1983, defendant sent a certified letter to plaintiff stating that her employment would be terminated if defendant did not receive medical documentation by November 18, 1983. The return receipt was signed on November 21, 1983. Defendant received a telephone call from plaintiff's mother on November 18, 1983. Plaintiff's mother was informed that medical documentation was required.
Defendant has never granted a medical leave absent a doctor's statement. On November 18, 1983, thirty-two days after her first missed day, plaintiff's employment was terminated because she was on unauthorized leave. Plaintiff was given additional time over the required five days because defendant knew that she was hospitalized.
Plaintiff learned of the termination of her employment on December 12, 1983. In January, 1984, plaintiff applied for and received social security disability benefits. The Social Security Administration found that plaintiff was totally disabled from October 14, 1983. Plaintiff submitted into evidence a doctor's notation dated sometime in May, 1985, which stated that an appointment was scheduled for August 4, 1985, and that it was hoped that a determination would be made at that time that plaintiff could return to work. However, no medical documentation was ever submitted to defendant or at trial stating that plaintiff could return to work, and at the time of trial plaintiff was still receiving social security benefits for permanent disability. Plaintiff has not applied to other employers for work and is not registered for employment at the Michigan Employment Security Commission.
At the close of all proofs, defendant moved for a directed verdict. MCR 2.515. The trial court denied the motion. We find that, as a matter of law, this was error.
A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict where a plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case. When a fact question is presented upon which reasonable persons could reach different conclusions, the trial judge may not take the question from the jury. In deciding whether the trial court erred in granting or denying a directed verdict, we review all the evidence presented to determine whether a question of fact existed. In doing so, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, granting him every reasonable inference and resolving any conflict in the evidence in his favor. Goldman v. Phantom Freight, Inc., 162 Mich.App. 472, 477, 413 N.W.2d 433 (1987), lv. den. 429 Mich. 867 (1987)...
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