California v. Southland Royalty Company El Paso Natural Gas Company v. Southland Royalty Company Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Southland Royalty Company

• Citation: 436 U.S. 519,56 L.Ed.2d 505,98 S.Ct. 1955
• Decision Date: 07 December 1977
• Docket Number: Nos. 76-1114,76-1133 and 76-1587,s. 76-1114
• Parties: State of CALIFORNIA et al., Petitioners, v. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY COMPANY et al. EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY COMPANY et al. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY COMPANY et al
• Court: United States Supreme Court

436 U.S. 519

98 S.Ct. 1955

56 L.Ed.2d 505

State of CALIFORNIA et al., Petitioners,

v SOUTHLAND ROYALTY COMPANY et al.

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, Petitioner,

v. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY COMPANY et al.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Petitioner,

v. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY COMPANY et al.

Nos. 76-1114, 76-1133 and 76-1587.

Argued Dec. 7, 1977.

Reargued April 17, 1978.

Decided May 31, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1978.

See 439 U.S. 885, 99 S.Ct. 230, 231.

Syllabus

In 1925, Gulf Oil Corp. executed a lease under which it paid royalties for the exclusive right to produce and market oil and gas from certain land for 50 years. Thereafter, the lessors sold their mineral fee interest to respondents. In 1951 Gulf contracted to sell casinghead gas from the leased property to petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Co., an interstate pipeline. Subsequently, Gulf obtained from the Federal Power Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity of unlimited duration authorizing the service to El Paso. When Gulf's original lease expired in 1975, its interest as lessee in the remaining gas reserves terminated and reverted to respondents. Just before the lease expired, respondents arranged to sell the remaining casinghead gas to an intrastate purchaser. El Paso, in order to preserve one of its sources of supply, petitioned the FPC for a determination that the remaining gas reserves could not be diverted to the intrastate market without abandonment authorization pursuant to § 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act (Act). The FPC agreed, holding that once gas began to flow in interstate commerce from a field subject to a certificate of unlimited duration, such flow could not be terminated unless the FPC authorized abandonment of service. On respondents' petition for review, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Gulf, as a tenant for a term of years, could not legally dedicate that portion of the gas that respondents might own upon the lease's expiration. Held: The FPC acted within its statutory powers in requiring that respondents obtain permission to abandon interstate service. The issuance of the certificate of unlimited duration created a federal obligation to serve the interstate market until abandonment authorization had been obtained, and the FPC reasonably concluded that under the Act the obligation to continue service attached to the gas, not as a matter of contract but as a matter of law, and ound all those with dominion and power of sale over the gas, including the lessors to whom it reverted. The service obligation imposed by the FPC survived the expiration of the private agreement that gave rise to the FPC's jurisdiction. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 80 S.Ct. 1392, 4 L.Ed.2d 1623. Pp. 523-531.

543 F.2d 1134, reversed and remanded.

Stephen R. Barnett, Washington, D. C., for petitioner Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Randolph W. Deutsch, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners California et al.

J. Evans Attwell, Houston, Tex., for respondents.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for State of Tex., as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1925 the owners of certain acreage in Texas executed a lease which gave to Gulf Oil Corp., as lessee, the exclusive right to produce and market oil and gas from that land for the next 50 years.¹ Gulf was entitled to drill wells, string telephone and telegraph wires, and build storage facilities and pipelines on the land. Gulf would also have "such other privileges as are reasonably requisite for the conduct of said operations." App. 135. In exchange, the owners were to receive a royalty based on the quantity of natural gas produced and the number of producing wells, as well as other royalties and payments. The following year, the owners of the property sold one-half of their mineral fee interest to respondent Southland Royalty Co. and the rest to other respondents.

In 1951 Gulf contracted to sell casinghead gas from the leased property to the El Paso Natural Gas Co., an interstate pipeline. After this Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 74 S.Ct. 794, 98 L.Ed. 1035 (1954), Gulf applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Power Commission authorizing the sale in interstate commerce of 30,000 Mcf per day. By order dated May 28, 1956, the Commission granted a certificate of unlimited duration, and this certificate was among those construed as "permanent" by this Court in Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170, 175, 80 S.Ct. 1388, 1391, 4 L.Ed.2d 1639 (1960).² Gulf entered into a second contract to sell additional volumes of gas to El Paso in 1972, and obtained a certificate of unlimited duration for those volumes in 1973.

The original 50-year lease obtained by Gulf expired on July 14, 1975, and, under local law, the lessee's interest in the remaining oil and gas reserves terminated and reverted to respondents. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 496 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.1973). Just prior to expiration of the lease, respondents arranged to sell the remaining casinghead gas to an intrastate purchaser, at the higher prices available in the intrastate market.

El Paso, in order to preserve one of its sources of supply, then filed a petition with the Commission seeking a determination that the remaining gas reserves could not be diverted to the intrastate market without abandonment authorization pursuant to § 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 824, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976 ed.). ³ The Commission agreed with this contention, relying on the "principle established by Section 7(b) that 'service' may not be abandoned without our permission and approval." El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F.P.C. 145, 150, 10 P.U.R. 4th 344, 348 (1975). The Commission held that respondents could not upon termination of the lease, sell gas in intrastate commerce without prior permission from the Commission under § 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act and that Gulf was also obligated to seek abandonment permission. The Commission reaffirmed this view in an order denying rehearing, but added language insuring that any deliveries of gas to El Paso during the period that the Commission's order was under review would not constitute a dedication of those reserves to the interstate market. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F.P.C. 2821, 11 P.U.R. 4th 488 (1975).

On respondents' petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F.2d 1134 (1976). The court held that Gulf, as a tenant for a term of years, could not legally dedicate that portion of the gas which Southland and other respondents might own upon expiration of the lease. Because of the importance of the question presented to the authority of the Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, we granted the petition for certiorari. 433 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2970, 53 L.Ed.2d 1091. We reverse.

The fundamental purpose of the Natural Gas Act is to assure an adequate and reliable supply of gas at reasonable prices. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 147, 151-154, 80 S.Ct. 1392, 1400-1402, 4 L.Ed.2d 1623 (1960); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 360 U.S. 378, 388, 79 S.Ct. 1246, 1253, 3 L.Ed.2d 1312 (1959). To this end, not only must those who would serve the interstate market obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity but also, under § 7(b) of the Act:

"No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the con- tinuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment." 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976 ed.).

The Commission may therefore control both the terms on which a service is provided to the interstate market and the conditions on which it will cease:

"An initial application of an independent producer, to make movements of natural gas in interstate commerce, leads to a certificate of public convenience and necessity under which the Commission controls the basis on which 'gas may be initially dedicated to interstate use. Moreover, once so dedicated there can be no withdrawal of that supply from continued interstate movement without Commission approval.' " Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., supra, 364 U.S., at 156, 80 S.Ct., at 1403.

The Act was "so framed as to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, supra, 360 U.S., at 388, 79 S.Ct., at 1253.

The jurisdiction of the Commission extends t the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce or the sale in interstate commerce for resale to consumers. § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976 ed.). Gas which flows across state lines for resale is dedicated to interstate commerce regardless of the intentions of the producer. California v. Lo-Vaca Co., 379 U.S. 366, 85 S.Ct. 486, 13 L.Ed.2d 357 (1965). The Court there approved an approach to questions of the Commission's jurisdiction based on the physical flow of the gas:

"We said in Connecticut Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 529, 65 S.Ct. 749, 89 L.Ed. 1150, 'Federal jurisdiction was to follow the flow of electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic or governmental, test.' And that is the test we have followed under both the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act, except as Congress itself has substituted a so-called legal standard for the technological one. Id., at 530-531, 65 S.Ct. 749." Id., at 369, 85 S.Ct., at 488.

The Court...