In re A.B.

• Decision Date: 20 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–0749.,13–0749.
• Citation: 437 S.W.3d 498,57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 595
• Parties: In the Interest of A.B. and H.B., Children.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

437 S.W.3d 498

57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 595

In the Interest of A.B. and H.B., Children.

No. 13–0749.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued April 22, 2014.

Delivered May 16, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 20, 2014.

Thomas Wayne McKenzie, Attorney at Law, Hurst, TX, for Other interested party.

Richard A. Gladstone, Attorney at Law, Fort Worth, TX, for Petitioner.

Jeffrey N. Kaitcer, Monroe Allen (Mike) Windsor, Loe Warren, P.C., Fort Worth, TX, for Respondent G.H. and J.H.

Charles M. Mallin, Tarrant County Dist. Atty., Christopher William Ponder, Criminal Appellate Section, Melissa Lee Russell Paschall, Assistant District Attorney, Fort Worth, TX, for Respondent Texas Dept. of Family & Protective Serv.

Justice GUZMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In parental termination cases, our courts of appeals are required to engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient to support the termination of parental rights. And to ensure the jury's findings receive due deference, if the court of appeals reverses the factfinder's decision, it must detail the relevant evidence in its opinion and clearly state why the evidence is insufficient to support the termination finding by clear and convincing evidence. Today, we are asked to extend this requirement well beyond its previous parameters—requiring courts to detail the evidence even when affirming the jury's decision. Because the current standard appellate courts must adhere to in conducting a factual sufficiency review in a termination case protects the fundamental interests at stake, we decline the invitation to unnecessarily expand it.

This protracted parental termination case dates back to 2008. There have been two trials resulting in termination of parental rights, two court of appeals opinions reversing and remanding for new trial on factual sufficiency grounds, and finally, an en banc court of appeals decision affirming termination. But despite the protracted history of this case, this appeal only requires us to decide whether the court of appeals, in affirming the termination, adhered to the proper standard for conducting a factual sufficiency review. Because the court of appeals' opinion and the record demonstrate the court of appeals considered the record in its entirety—as a proper factual sufficiency review requires—we affirm.

I. Background

Mother and Father married in 2005 in Missouri. Their son, A.B., was born later that year, and their daughter, H.B., was born in 2006. By the time Mother and Father separated in July 2007, the family had relocated to Texas. Following the parents' separation, the children remained primarily in Mother's care. There are varying accounts as to how often Father cared for the children following the parents' separation.

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) became involved when H.B. was admitted to the intensive care unit at Cook Children's Hospital in September 2007, after Mother reported H.B. had been having seizures. Her seizures were attributed to hyponatremia—inadequate sodium levels in the blood—which can be caused by inadequate nutrition. H.B. was fifteen months old, and weighed fifteen pounds upon admission to the hospital. Testimony at trial indicated H.B. had dropped from the fiftieth percentile in weight on February 2007, to the third percentile by April, and fell off the growth chart entirely by May. Her treating physicians also observed significant developmental delays, noting that H.B. could not crawl, walk, or sit up on her own. She was subsequently diagnosed with failure to thrive, which DFPS concluded was a result of physical neglect.

Rather than return the children to Mother and Father after H.B. was discharged from the hospital, DFPS placed both children with maternal relatives so Mother and Father could complete services with DFPS. Father completed his services, and the children were returned to his care in June 2008. Roughly one month later, in July 2008, a caseworker visited the children at Father's home and discovered A.B. with injuries to his face and bruising on his left ear extending to his cheek. The children were removed from Father's care, placed with a foster family, and DFPS filed suit to terminate both parents' rights the following day.

After a bench trial in 2009, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for termination under subsections (D) and (E) of 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code. Specifically, the court held Father had knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions and surroundings that endangered their physical and emotional well-being, and that Father engaged in conduct and knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children.¹ The court also concluded termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interest.

Father appealed the trial court's 2009 decision, challenging, among other things, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's endangerment findings. 412 S.W.3d 588, 613 (Walker, J., dissenting). The court of appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient but factually insufficient to support the finding of endangerment. Id. at 651–52, 656. The court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 660.

In February 2011, the case was retried before a jury. The jury made the same findings as the trial court had in 2009, including the endangerment findings under section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children's best interest. The trial court entered a decree of termination pursuant to the jury's findings in June 2011.

Father appealed the termination order, once again arguing the State failed to present legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. Id. at 674. The court of appeals, finding that DFPS did not present enough new evidence to change its holding from the prior case, once again held there was factually insufficient evidence of endangerment. Id. at 660.

Both DFPS and Intervenors ² filed motions for en banc reconsideration in the court of appeals. Id. at 591. The court of appeals granted the motion and, in a per curiam opinion, found the evidence of endangerment was factually sufficient to support termination under section 161.001(1)(E) and affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights. Id. at 601. Two justices dissented, arguing the court misapplied the standard in conducting its factual sufficiency review and that, under the correct standard in which the entire record is accounted for, the evidence remained factually insufficient to terminate Father's rights under subsection (E). Id. at 613 (Walker, J., dissenting).

Here, Father echos the concerns raised by the dissent, namely that the court failed to conduct a proper factual sufficiency review because, though its opinion analyzed the evidence favorable to DFPS, it failed to review evidence favorable to Father. As such, Father argues the court improperly disregarded relevant, probative evidence in performing its factual sufficiency review, and erred when it “failed to detail the conflicting evidence.” We granted Father's petition for review.

II. Discussion

The authority to conduct a factual sufficiency review lies exclusively with the courts of appeals. Tex. Const. art. V, § 6. Because proper application of the standard involves a legal question, this Court may review a court of appeals' factual sufficiency analysis to ensure the court of appeals adhered to the correct legal standard. See Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.1993). Nevertheless, this Court must refrain from transforming such authority into a guise for conducting its own independent review of the facts. SeeTex. Gov't Code § 22.225(a) (“A judgment of a court of appeals is conclusive on the facts of the case in all civil cases.”).

A factual sufficiency review pits two fundamental tenets of the Texas court system against one another: the right to trial by jury ³ and the court of appeals' exclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact.⁴ And, in the context of parental termination cases, a third interest must also be accounted for—that is, parents' fundamental right to make decisions concerning “the care, the custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); see Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1985) (“The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions.”). Thus, in In re C.H., we articulated a factual sufficiency standard to strike an appropriate balance between these competing principles. 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.2002).

Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at trial. See In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980). Given this higher burden at trial, in C.H. we concluded a heightened standard of appellate review in parental termination cases is similarly warranted. 89 S.W.3d at 25–26. Specifically, a proper factual sufficiency review requires the court of appeals to determine whether “the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations.” Id. at 25. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002). And in making this determination, the reviewing court must undertake “an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.” See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.

But, as we also recognized in C.H., while parental rights are of a...