Arrington v. Helms

• Decision Date: 13 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-15078.,04-15078.
• Citation: 438 F.3d 1336
• Parties: Kimberly ARRINGTON, Tammy Chapman, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Rhonda Warren, Jamie Codd, Intervenors-Appellants, v. Randy HELMS, Director, Administrative Office of Courts, in his official capacity, Page Walley, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

438 F.3d 1336

Kimberly ARRINGTON, Tammy Chapman, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants Rhonda Warren, Jamie Codd, Intervenors-Appellants, v. Randy HELMS, Director, Administrative Office of Courts, in his official capacity, Page Walley, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-15078.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

February 13, 2006.

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Brian Paddock, Paddock & Mastin, Cookeville, TN, Maryanne M. Prince, Montgomery, AL, for Appellants.

John J. Park, Jr., Montgomery, AL, Jennifer Mims Bush, James Edward Long, Ala. Dept. of Human Resources, Sandra Ingram Speakman, State Personnel Dept.-Legal, Montgomery, AL, for Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Custodial parents who receive child support payments collected, distributed, and disbursed by the State of Alabama appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Page Walley, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR), and Randy Helms, in his official capacity as Director of the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts (AOC).¹ Appellants argue the district court erred in holding they failed as a matter of law (1) to establish 42 U.S.C. § 657 creates individual rights, enforceable under § 1983, to distribution of child support payments in strict compliance with § 657; and (2) to show a § 1983 violation of their procedural due process rights under the standard articulated in Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir.2003). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of PRWORA and Title IV-D

This appeal involves an interlocking set of cooperative federal-state welfare and child support programs. Seeking to standardize the states' systems for welfare and child support payments, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) under its spending power. Among other sweeping changes, PRWORA abolished Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the federally-controlled entitlement program that had long provided cash assistance to underprivileged families. In AFDC's place, PRWORA established Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grants. Under the TANF regime, each state receives a predetermined block of TANF funding with which to administer its welfare program. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1).

Although PRWORA provides states significantly more discretion to design and manage their own welfare systems, TANF block grants do not come without strings. Rather, to qualify for a TANF block grant, a state's child support enforcement program must conform to the specifications of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. See § 602(a)(2). Among other requirements, Title IV-D requires a participating state to receive approval of its program from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). See § 652(a)(1), (3). Additionally, each state's child support enforcement program must use a single state disbursement unit (SDU) to collect, distribute, and disburse payments. § 654b(a)(1).

Child support payments made to custodial parents who (1) currently receive TANF benefits or (2) previously received TANF benefits are known as "Title IV-D payments." Under Title IV-A, current TANF recipients must assign their child support rights to the state. § 608(a)(3). To offset the costs of providing TANF benefits, the state may keep most of the child support payments it collects on behalf of current TANF recipients. See § 657(a)(1). Former TANF recipients are entitled to a portion of the payments collected, and the size of this portion varies according to the date the parent stopped receiving TANF benefits. § 657(a)(2).

Child support payments made to custodial parents who have never received TANF benefits are known as "non-Title-IV-D payments." Non-TANF custodial parents do not have to assign their child support rights to the state and are thus entitled to receive all collected child support funds. § 657(a)(3). If a state court issues an income withholding order in a non-TANF custodial parent's child support case, however, the non-custodial parent's employer must withhold a portion of the non-custodial parent's income and submit it to the SDU. §§ 666(a)(8)(B); 654b(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, in child support cases involving an income withholding order, non-TANF custodial parents' child support payments must flow through the SDU.

To oversee this complex federal-state program, Congress established the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) within the HHS. See § 652(a). This agency audits the states' compliance with their federally approved plans. § 652(a)(4)(c). If a state does not "substantially comply" with the requirements of Title IV-D, the Secretary of HHS may penalize the state by reducing its TANF grant by up to five percent. § 609(a)(8). The Secretary has interpreted "substantial compliance" as "(a) full compliance with requirements that services be offered statewide and that certain recipients be notified monthly of the support collected, as well as with reporting, recordkeeping, and accounting rules; (b) 90 percent compliance with case opening and case closure criteria; and (c) 75 percent compliance with most remaining program requirements." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 335, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 1357, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 305.20).

B. DHR's and AOC's Role in Alabama's Child Support Payment System

DHR administers Alabama's TANF and Title IV-D programs. Among its various Title-IV-D-related responsibilities, DHR oversees the operation of Alabama's SDU and collects, distributes, and disburses all Title IV-D payments. DHR also collects and distributes all non-Title-IV-D payments made pursuant to income withholding orders, and disburses a portion of these payments.

AOC's primary function is to oversee the administration of Alabama's court system. Under a contract with DHR, however, AOC also disburses all of the remaining non-Title-IV-D payments. Although Title IV-D requires states to have a single point of disbursement for all child support payments, HHS has authorized DHR's pre-PRWORA practice of disbursing a portion of its non-Title-IV-D payments via AOC.

C. Relevant Procedural History

On December 21, 2001, eight named plaintiffs filed a Corrected Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Amended Complaint) against DHR and AOC, alleging widespread deficiencies in Alabama's child support payment system. Two additional plaintiffs subsequently intervened. On September 1, 2004, the district court granted summary judgment to DHR and AOC on all of the ten named plaintiffs' 12 claims for relief.²

Only nine of the named plaintiffs have appealed the district court's summary judgment order. Each remaining appellant falls into one of two categories. First, Appellants Kimberly Arrington, Terralisa Casby-Jackson, Carmelitess Felder, Tanya Jackson, Sharon Scott, Rhonda Warren, and Lakisha Woodall (the Arrington Appellants) currently or formerly received TANF benefits.³ Accordingly, the child support payments they receive constitute Title IV-D payments disbursed by DHR. Second, Appellants Tammy Chapman and Jamie Codd (the Chapman Appellants) have never received TANF benefits, but their child support payments are subject to income withholding orders. The child support payments they receive constitute non-Title-IV-D payments disbursed by AOC.

On appeal, Appellants challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment to DHR and AOC on their Eleventh Claim for Relief, in which they assert § 657 provides them the right, enforceable against DHR and AOC under § 1983, to distribution of their payments in strict compliance with § 657.⁴ Additionally, the Arrington Appellants⁵ challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment to DHR on their Fourth⁶ and Eighth⁷ Claims for Relief. Under these two claims, they contend DHR violated their § 1983 procedural due process rights by failing to provide them adequate notice of (1) DHR's handling of their payments, and (2) their right to and the procedures for requesting a hearing.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court, and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir.2000).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Claim: 42 U.S.C. § 657⁸

Appellants contend DHR and AOC have failed to distribute their child support payments in accordance with the requirements set forth in § 657 of Title IV-D.⁹ Seeking redress for DHR's and AOC's alleged mishandling of their payments, Appellants claim § 657 gives them a private right, enforceable under § 1983, to distribution of their payments in strict compliance with § 657. This issue is one of first impression in our circuit.

1. Legal Framework for Claims that Spending Clause Legislation Creates Individual Rights Enforceable Under § 1983

In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court established that § 1983 provides a private cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges rights created by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See 448 U.S. 1, 4-5, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504-05, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One year later, in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, the Supreme Court clarified that Spending Clause legislation is especially unlikely to create individual rights enforceable under § 1983. See 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). "In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power," the Supreme Court reasoned, "the typical remedy for state noncompliance with...