438 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2006), 04-2132, Laber v. Harvey
|Citation:||438 F.3d 404|
|Party Name:||Stan LABER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Francis J. HARVEY, Secretary of the Army, Defendant-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||February 16, 2006|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit|
Argued Oct. 27, 2005.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. CA-03-732-1-A.
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Jeffrey Howard Greger, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant .
Charles Wylie Scarborough, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Kevin J. Mikolashek, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia; Captain Steven Michael Ranieri, UNITED STATES ARMY LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER, WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, MOTZ, TRAXLER, KING, GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
Stan Laber, a civilian employee of the Army, complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) that on two occasions the Army did not give him a job promotion for reasons that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (West Supp. 2005) (Title VII) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 633a (West Supp. 2005) (ADEA). In particular, Laber asserted that the Army once failed to promote him because of religious discrimination and later failed to promote him because of age discrimination and in retaliation for his prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) filings. The OFO found that the Army had discriminated against Laber on the basis of religion and awarded him certain relief, although it did not award him all he sought. The OFO also found that the Army had neither discriminated against Laber on the basis of age nor retaliated against him.
Laber filed suit in the district court alleging that (1) the OFO's remedy was insufficient to compensate him for the Army's religious discrimination and (2) the Army discriminated against him on the basis of age and retaliated against him. On his first claim, Laber contended that because the OFO found that the Army unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of religion, he was not required to relitigate the issue of liability in order to seek additional relief on that claim. The district court granted the Army's motion for summary judgment on both of Laber's claims, concluding that (1) it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Laber's claim for additional relief, and (2) (a) Laber's age discrimination claim failed because he had not shown he was qualified for the job in question, and (b) Laber's retaliation claim failed because the hiring officer made the decision not to select him before the officer knew about his prior EEO activity. After the district court's entry of judgment, Laber filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to amend his complaint, wherein he sought to put at issue the Army's underlying liability on his claim of religious discrimination. The district court denied these motions, and Laber appeals.
In concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Laber's claim for additional relief, the district court overlooked Pecker v. Heckler, 801 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.1986), and Morris v. Rice, 985 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.1993). Those cases stand for the proposition that a federal-employee plaintiff who prevails before the OFO on the issue of liability but is unsatisfied with the OFO's remedial award may file a civil action in the district court seeking additional relief without also putting at issue the OFO's finding of discrimination.
After oral argument to the panel assigned to hear this case, and at the request of that panel, a majority of the active circuit judges on this court agreed to rehear this case en banc to consider the continuing viability of Pecker and Morris. We now overrule Pecker and Morris and hold that a federal-employee plaintiff who prevails before the OFO on the issue of liability but who is unsatisfied with the OFO's remedy must place his employing agency's discrimination at issue in order properly to claim entitlement to a more favorable remedial award in the district court. Laber's failure to comply with this rule was not a jurisdictional defect, but it did entitle the Army to summary judgment on his claim for additional relief only. We also conclude, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying Laber's motion for reconsideration and motion to amend: Laber did not act in bad faith, his proposed amendment would not cause any prejudice to the Army, and the proposed amendment is not futile.
Finally, we hold that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of the Army on Laber's claim of age discrimination and retaliation. Laber failed to show he was qualified for the job in question and did not demonstrate that the Army's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his non-selection was a pretext for retaliation.
For reasons that are more extensively explained herein, we reverse the district court's denial of Laber's motion for reconsideration and motion to amend, vacate the district court's grant of the Army's motion for summary judgment on Laber's claim for additional relief, and remand with instructions to allow Laber to amend his complaint to put at issue the Army's alleged religious discrimination. We also affirm the grant of summary judgment to the Army on Laber's claims of age discrimination and retaliation.
This appeal involves claims arising out of two occasions when the Army denied Laber a promotion. The administrative proceedings were protracted, and our resolution of the appeal requires us briefly to consider those proceedings and the facts that underlie them.
Laber, a male born in 1945, was employed by the Army as an Operations Research Analyst at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. In mid-1990, motivated in part by his Jewish heritage, Laber applied for a position as a Industrial Specialist in Tel Aviv, Israel. During the job interview, the selecting officer, Leo Sleight, asked Laber if he could be objective when dealing with Jewish contractors. Laber answered affirmatively, but Sleight offered the job to another applicant.
Laber filed a formal EEO complaint with the Army alleging that Sleight discriminated against him on the basis of religion in failing to select him for the job. The Army accepted the complaint and, after conducting an internal investigation, concluded that Laber suffered no discrimination. Laber appealed to the OFO.
On December 22, 1998, the OFO reversed and ordered the Army, inter alia, to pay Laber any backpay and benefits for which the Army determined he was eligible and to appoint Laber as an Industrial Specialist in Israel or find a similar position for him. On January 25, 1999, Laber filed a motion for reconsideration, which the OFO denied on April 11, 2000. In May 2000, the Army determined that Laber was entitled to no backpay because his pay at his current job was higher than it would have been had he been working in Israel and that he was entitled to no overseas benefits because he had not actually been overseas. The Army also offered Laber a position as an Industrial Specialist in Germany, contending that it had no similar positions open in Israel. Laber refused the job in Germany and instead filed a petition for enforcement with the OFO, claiming, inter alia, that the Army's backpay and benefits calculations and its job offer were insufficient. Soon thereafter, the Army re-offered Laber the position in Germany, which he accepted, and in doing so, he expressly waived any claim that the Germany position was not compliant with that portion of the OFO's remedial award. He therefore withdrew that portion of his petition for enforcement challenging the Army's Germany job offer.
On January 23, 2002, the OFO issued a decision on the remainder of the petition for enforcement. In relevant part, the OFO determined that the record was unclear with respect to Laber's backpay and benefits arguments, and it required the Army to redetermine whether Laber was entitled to additional backpay and benefits.
On or about May 29, 2002, the Army did so and concluded that Laber was entitled to over $9,000 in additional backpay, but that he was not entitled to receive any overseas benefits. On March 4, 2002, Laber filed a petition for clarification with the OFO, asserting that the Army's benefits and backpay calculations were still deficient. On March 10, 2003, the OFO affirmed that the Army had fully complied with the OFO's December 22, 1998 decision.
The second event giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in 1993. After returning from Germany, Laber was employed as a Management Analyst at the Defense Logistics Agency in Chicago, Illinois when a position for an Operations Research Analyst in the Economic Analysis Division of the Cost and Economic Analysis Agency in Falls Church, Virginia became available. Laber was a "priority candidate" for the position because of his prior EEO activity.1 (J.A. at 28, 405.) The parties agree that priority candidates need not compete against other candidates; rather, if qualified for the positions for which they have applied, they must be selected.
The Army's civilian personnel office determined that Laber was...
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