Dougherty County, Georgia Board of Education v. White 1978

• Citation: 58 L.Ed.2d 269,99 S.Ct. 368,439 U.S. 32
• Decision Date: 28 November 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-120,77-120
• Parties: DOUGHERTY COUNTY, GEORGIA, BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., v. WHITE. Argued Oct. 2-3, 1978
• Court: United States Supreme Court

439 U.S. 32

99 S.Ct. 368

58 L.Ed.2d 269

DOUGHERTY COUNTY, GEORGIA, BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.,

v WHITE.

No. 77-120.

Argued Oct. 2-3, 1978.

Decided Nov. 28, 1978.

Syllabus

Shortly after appellee, a Negro employee of the Dougherty County Board of Education, announced his candidacy for the Georgia House of Representatives, the Board adopted a requirement (Rule 58) that its employees take unpaid leaves of absence while campaigning for elective political office. As a consequence of Rule 58, appellee, who sought election to the Georgia House on three occasions, was forced to take leave and lost over $11,000 in salary. When compelled to take his third leave of absence, appellee brought this action in District Court, alleging that Rule 58 was unenforceable because it had not been precleared under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act). Concluding that Rule 58 had the "potential for discrimination," the District Court enjoined its enforcement pending compliance with § 5. Held :

1. Rule 58 is a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5 of the Act. Pp. 36-43.

(a) Informed by the legislative history and the Attorney General's interpretation of § 5, this Court has consistently given the phrase "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" the "broadest possible scope," and has construed it to encompass any state enactments altering the election law of a covered State "in even a minor way," Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566, 89 S.Ct. 817, 832, 22 L.Ed.2d 1. Pp. 37-40.

(b) Rule 58, like a filing fee, imposes substantial economic disincentives on employees who seek elective public office, and the circumstances surrounding its adoption and its effect on the political process suggest a potential for discrimination. Pp. 40-43.

2. A county school board, although it does not itself conduct elections, is a political subdivision within the purview of the Act when it exercises control over the electoral process. United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148. Pp. 43-47.

431 F.Supp. 919, affirmed.

Jesse W. Walters, Albany, N. Y., for appellants. John R. Myer, Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.

Lawrence G. Wallace, Washington, D. C., for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of appellee.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,¹ all States and political subdivisions covered by § 4 of the Act ² must submit any proposed change affecting voting, for preclearance by the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. At issue in this appeal is whether a county board of education in a covered State must seek approval of a rule requiring its employees to take unpaid leaves of absence while they campaign for elective office. Resolution of this question necessitates two related inquiries: first, whether a rule governing leave for employee candidates is a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and second, whether a county school board is a "political subdivision" within the purview of the Act.

I

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Appellee, a Negro, is employed as Assistant Coordinator of Student Personnel Services by appellant Dougherty County Board of Education (Board). In May 1972, he announced his candidacy for the Georgia House of Representatives. Less than a month later, on June 12, 1972, the Board adopted Rule 58 without seeking prior federal approval. Rule 58 provides:

"POLITICAL OFFICE. Any employee of the school system who becomes a candidate for any elective political office, will be required to take a leave of absence, without pay, such leave becoming effective upon the qualifying for such elective office and continuing for the duration of such political activity, and during the period of service in such office, if elected thereto."

Appellee qualified as a candidate for the Democratic primary in June 1972, and was compelled by Rule 58 to take a leave of absence without pay. After his defeat in the August primary, appellee was reinstated. Again in June 1974, he qualified as a candidate for the Georgia House and was forced to take leave. He was successful in both the August primary and the November general election. Accordingly, his leave continued through mid-November 1974. Appellee took a third leave of absence in June 1976, when he qualified to run for re-election. When it became clear in September that he would be unopposed in the November 1976 election, appellee was reinstated.³ As a consequence of those mandatory leaves, appellee lost pay in the amount of $2,810 in 1972, $4,780 in 1974, and $3,750 in 1976.

In June 1976, appellee filed this action in the Middle District of Georgia alleging that Rule 58 was a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" adopted by a covered entity and therefore subject to the preclearance requirements of § 5 of the Act.⁴ Appellee averred that he was the first Negro in recent memory, perhaps since Reconstruction, to run for the Georgia General Assembly from Dougherty County. The Board did not contest this fact, and further acknowledged that it was aware of no individual other than appellee who had run for public office while an employee of the Dougherty County Board of Education.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the three-judge District Court held that Rule 58 should have been submitted for federal approval before implementation. 431 F.Supp. 919 (1977). In so ruling, the court correctly declined to decide the ultimate question that the Attorney General or the District of Columbia court would face on submission of the Rule for preclearance under § 5—whether the change in fact had a discriminatory purpose or effect. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-385, 91 S.Ct. 431, 434-435, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971). Rather, the District Court confined its review to the preliminary issue whether Rule 58 had the "potential" for discrimination and hence was subject to § 5. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973). In concluding that the Rule did have such potential, the District Court interpreted Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), and Georgia v. United States, supra, to mandate preclearance of any modification by a covered State or political subdivision "which restricts the ability of citizens to run for office." 431 F.Supp., at 922. The court reasoned that Rule 58 was such a modification because:

"By imposing a financial loss on [Board] employees who choose to become candidates, [the Rule] makes it more difficult for them to participate in the democratic process and, consequently, restricts the field from which the voters may select their representatives." Ibid.

The District Court therefore enjoined enforcement of Rule 58 pending compliance with the preclearance requirements of § 5. We noted probable jurisdiction. 435 U.S. 921, 98 S.Ct. 1482, 55 L.Ed.2d 514 (1978). Since we find Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, and United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978), dispositive of the issues presented in this appeal, we affirm.

II

Section 5 provides that whenever a covered State or political subdivision "shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964," it may not implement that change until it either secures a determination from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or submits the change to the Attorney General and he interposes no objection within 60 days. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (emphasis added). Although § 14(c)(1) expansively defines the term "voting" to "include all action necessary to make a vote effective," 79 Stat. 445, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l (c)(1), the Act itself nowhere amplifies the meaning of the phrase "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." Accordingly, in our previous constructions of § 5, we have sought guidance from the history and purpose of the Act.

A.

This Court first considered the scope of the critical language of § 5 in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), involving consolidated appeals in three cases from Mississippi and one from Virginia. After canvassing the legislative history of the Act, we concluded that Congress meant "to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." 393 U.S., at 566, 89 S.Ct., at 832.⁵ Conceived after "nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment," South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328, 86 S.Ct. 803, 818, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966),⁶ the Voting Rights Act was, as Allen emphasized, "aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race." 393 U.S., at 565, 89 S.Ct. at 831 (footnote omitted). To effectuate the "articulated purposes of the legislation," id., at 570, 89 S.Ct. at 835, the Allen Court held that the phrase "standard, practice, or procedure" must be given the "broadest possible scope," id., at 567, 89 S.Ct. at 832, and construed it to encompass candidate qualification requirements. Id., at 570, 89 S.Ct. at 834 (Whitley v. Williams, companion case decided with Allen, supra ). The Court concluded that any enactment which burdens an independent candidate by "increasing the difficulty for [him] to gain a position on the general election ballot" is subject to § 5 since such a measure could "undermine the effectiveness" of voters who wish to elect nonaffiliated...