44 643 Intercounty Construction Corporation v. Walter 8212 362

• Decision Date: 16 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74,74
• Citation: 95 S.Ct. 2016,44 L.Ed.2d 643,422 U.S. 1
• Parties: . 44 L.Ed.2d 643 INTERCOUNTY CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. Noah C. A. WALTER, etc., et al. —362
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

422 U.S. 1

95 S.Ct. 2016.

44 L.Ed.2d 643

INTERCOUNTY CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION et al., Petitioners,

v Noah C. A. WALTER, etc., et al.

No. 74—362.

Argued April 23, 1975.

Decided June 16, 1975.

Syllabus

Section 13 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides that the right to compensation for disability under the Act shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury. Section 22 provides that, upon his own initiative or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in his determination of fact, the Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Employees' Compensation (the agency charged with administering the Act) may, 'at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim,' review a compensation case and issue a 'new compensation order' which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation. A claimant, who was injured in 1960 while working for petitioner employer, filed a claim for total permanent disability within § 13's one-year statute of limitations. Petitioner insurance carrier, in advance of an award by the Deputy Commissioner, first paid the weekly amount for total disability though denying the extent of disability, but in 1965 filed notice that it was contesting the extent of disability and was reducing the weekly compensation to the amount for 50% temporary disability, and in 1968 stopped payment of compensation after reaching the maximum of its liability for any condition other than permanent disability or death. In 1970, two years after his last receipt of a voluntary compensation payment, the claimant requested a hearing on his claim for permanent disability, this being the first requested action to adjudicate the merits of the claim by either him or the carrier in the 10 years following the filing of the claim, and no order or award having been entered during this period. Respondent Deputy Commissioner then entered an award for permanent total disability, and petitioners brought suit to enjoin its enforcement. The District Court held that § 22 barred the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: While the language of § 22 is ambiguous, the section's legislative history, including the history of the amendment inserting the phrase 'whether or not a compensation order has been issued,' shows that the section's one-year time limit was meant to apply only to the Deputy Commissioner's power to modify previously entered orders, and that therefore the section does not bar consideration of a claim timely filed under § 13, which has not been the subject of prior action by the Deputy Commissioner, and with respect to which the Deputy Commissioner took no action until more than one year after the claimant's last receipt of a voluntary compensation payment. Taken in its historical and statutory context, the phrase 'whether or not a compensation order has been issued' is properly interpreted to mean merely that the one-year time limit imposed on the Deputy Commissioner's power to modify existing orders runs from the date of final payment of compensation even if the order sought to be modified is actually entered only after such date. Pp. 6-12.

163 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 500 F.2d 815, affirmed.

John C. Duncan, III, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Washington, D.C., for respondents, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 13 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1432, 33 U.S.C. § 913, provided that 'The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury.' We must decide in this case whether § 22 of the same Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 922, bars consideration of a claim timely filed under § 13, which has not been the subject of an order by the deputy commissioner within one year after the cessation of voluntary compensation payments.

Petitioners in the instant case are Intercounty Construction Corp., an employer, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., its insurance carrier. Respondents are Noah C. A. Walter, a deputy commissioner of the Bureau of Employees' Compensation which was charged with administration of the Act,¹ and Mary Jones, the personal representative of Charles Jones, an intervenor below who is an employee claimant under the Act. Claimant was injured in 1960 while working for the employer in the District of Columbia.² Shortly thereafter, well within the one-year statute of limitations established by § 13 of the Act,³ he filed a claim for total permanent disability with the Bureau of Employees' Compensation. The insurance carrier, admitting claimant's injury in the course of employment while denying permanent disability to the extent stated in the claim, filed notice that it had begun payment of $54 per week, the amount payable for total disability, in advance of an award by the deputy commissioner.⁴

In 1965, the carrier filed notice that it was controverting the pending claim on the ground, inter alia, of extent of disability and that it was reducing claimant's weekly compensation to $27 per week, the rate for 50% temporary disability. In 1966 a claims examiner from the Bureau held a hearing on the pending claim for total permanent disability benefits but the hearing was adjourned without action on the claim. On January 23, 1968, the carrier stopped payment of compensation to the claimant since its payments to claimant totaled $17,280, its maximum liability under the Act at the time for any condition other than permanent total disability or death. On February 11, 1970, two years after his last receipt of a voluntary payment of compensation from the carrier, claimant requested a hearing on his previously filed claim for total permanent disability. Although the claim had been pending since its timely filing in 1960, neither the carrier nor the claimant had requested action by the Bureau in the intervening 10 years to adjudicate its merits and no order or award had been entered during this period resolving it.⁵

Deputy Commissioner Walter, reversing his own initial determination that the claim was time barred under § 22 of the Act, concluded that § 22 was not applicable to this claim and entered an order awarding claimant compensation for permanent total disability. Petitioners then brought this suit under 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) against respondent Walter to enjoin enforcement of the award. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the petitioners, holding that § 22 of the Act barred the claim. ⁶ On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that § 22 of the Act, applicable only to the power of the deputy commissioner to modify prior orders, erected no barrier to consideration of claims which had not been the subject of a prior order by the deputy commissioner.⁷

Because of the conflict between the holding of the Court of Appeals in this case and that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis, 460 F.2d 1108, cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Strachan Shipping Co., 409 U.S. 887, 93 S.Ct. 114, 34 L.Ed.2d 144 (1972), we granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 1119, 95 S.Ct. 801, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975).

Section 22 of the Act, as amended, provides:

'Modification of awards

'Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in section 919 of this title, and in accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation. Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.'

Petitioners urge, and the Fifth Circuit in Strachan Shipping Co. held, that this provision superimposes on the express statute of limitations contained in § 13 of the Act, providing a time period for the filing of claims, an additional limitations period requiring action by the deputy commissioner on pending claims within one year after the date of the last voluntary payment of compen- sation where such payments have been made. In their view, since no action was taken on the pending claim in the instant case until more than one year after the claimant's last receipt of a voluntary compensation payment, the claim was time barred under § 22.

In contrast, respondents argue, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, that § 22 is applicable only to the power of the deputy commissioner to modify prior orders and awards issued by him. In their view, it has no application to timely filed claims on which no prior action has been taken by the deputy commissioner. In this case they say that since the...