Williams v. Bartlett
| Decision Date | 28 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 548,D,548 |
| Citation | 44 F.3d 95 |
| Parties | Jerome WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. George BARTLETT, Respondent-Appellee, Howard R. Relin, Monroe County District Attorney, Intervenor-Respondent-Appellee. ocket 94-2082. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Mark B. Gombiner and the Legal Aid Soc., Federal Defender Div., Appeals Bureau, New York, NY, for petitioner-appellant.
Loretta S. Courtney, Monroe County, Rochester, NY, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Howard R. Relin, Dist. Atty., Monroe County, of counsel), for respondent-appellee and intervenor-respondent-appellee.
Before: OAKES, JACOBS and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jerome Williams seeks a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the New York State Supreme Court denied his application to represent himself in his trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge denied the application on the invalid grounds that Williams's lack of schooling and training would disserve his defense and that the proceedings, then three months away from trial, were too far advanced to allow the discharge of assigned counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed on the cognizable ground that the Petitioner was equivocal in manifesting his intent to proceed pro se. The Petitioner takes this appeal from a Decision and Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, J.) dismissing appellant's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 on the ground stated by the Appellate Division--that Williams's application to act pro se was not an "unequivocal request" because of Williams's prior conduct of accepting and then waiving appointed counsel--and on the further ground that Williams abandoned his request by failing to reassert his desire to act pro se, 842 F.Supp. 64.
We reverse the district court's decision because the Petitioner exhibited no equivocation in seeking and pursuing pro se status and did not waive his Sixth Amendment right through abandonment, and we remand with the instruction to order the petitioner's release unless the State, within 60 days from the date of the district court order, affords Williams a new trial.
Petitioner Jerome Williams was arrested on September 26, 1989 for selling cocaine to an undercover agent in Rochester, New York. Williams was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, in violation of N.Y.Penal Law Sec. 220.16(1), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, in violation of N.Y.Penal Law Sec. 220.03.
The Rochester Public Defender's Office was assigned to represent Williams when he was bound over for grand jury action. Williams, however, elected to represent himself before the grand jury, testified and was indicted.
On January 29, 1990, Williams appeared for arraignment before New York Supreme Court Justice John D. Doyle. Williams announced that he wished to waive his right to counsel. Williams explained: Justice Doyle conducted an extensive colloquy, inquiring into Williams's educational background and legal training, warning Williams of the perils of self-representation, and strongly recommending appointment of counsel. Williams responded, "I will represent myself." At the conclusion of the arraignment proceedings, Justice Doyle directed the Public Defender's Office to send an attorney to meet with Williams and discuss the "gravity" of his decision to represent himself.
At a status conference on February 15, 1990, which Williams did not attend, Assistant Public Defender Jill Paperno informed Justice Doyle that, pursuant to the court's instructions, she had spoken with the defendant and that Williams "wishes to proceed with an attorney." Paperno was formally assigned as Williams's attorney. At three brief status conferences held on March 1, March 22 and April 3, 1990, Williams acknowledged that Paperno was his attorney.
On July 5, 1990, Justice Donald G. Purple, Jr. (sitting in for Justice Doyle) held a hearing on Paperno's evidentiary motions. Williams was present. Paperno informed the court that Williams had refused to meet with her during the preceding week and was requesting that his counsel be dismissed. Nevertheless, Justice Purple decided to conduct the evidentiary hearing first. After 18 transcript pages of argument by Paperno on evidence and probable cause, the court turned to the issue of representation. Justice Purple offered Williams a complex choice: the court could (i) grant the defendant's pro se request and disregard Paperno's evidentiary motions, (ii) rule on the evidentiary issues and then discharge his attorney, or (iii) rule on the evidentiary issues and refer Williams's pro se request to Justice Doyle. After discussing these options with Paperno, Williams decided to "continue with counsel" for purposes of that hearing.
Williams next appeared in court on August 21, 1990, before Justice Donald J. Mark (sitting in for Justice Doyle). Through his attorney Paperno, Williams requested that he be allowed to make a motion addressed to Judge Doyle to discharge appointed counsel and proceed pro se. Justice Mark granted the defendant's request and adjourned the proceeding.
On September 18, 1990, Williams appeared before Justice Doyle. The sole purpose of the hearing was to address the defendant's application to dismiss his attorney and act pro se. Paperno informed the court that "Mr. Williams asked that I place his matter on the docket so he could request of this Court that he be allowed to proceed pro se." Williams reiterated what he had expressed at arraignment: he distrusted the Public Defender's Office and was uncomfortable with the representation. Williams described his prior decision to continue with counsel as follows:
I requested to go pro se and it was my intention to go pro se at the [July 5th] hearing, also. But I didn't and I let Jill Paperno represent me at that hearing. And it's still my intention[ ] now to go pro se. Before I wanted to have an attorney, but I can't afford a private attorney. That's why I'm going pro se.
After questioning Williams once again on his educational background and legal training, Justice Doyle denied Williams's request to proceed pro se:
I'm going to deny your request to go pro se. I don't think it is in your best interest to go pro se.
* * * * * *
We are too far along in these proceedings to have you represent yourself. I strongly recommend that you continue to cooperate with Miss Paperno and her efforts to represent you to the fullest extent of her abilities. You have no legal training, you have no college education, you have no law school education, you have no skills or on-the-job training. You don't know what the law is. In good conscience, Mr. Williams, I cannot allow you to represent yourself in this stage of the proceeding.
After Justice Doyle's ruling, Williams did not renew or reassert his application to represent himself.
At a motions hearing on October 18, 1990, Justice Doyle acknowledged receiving a letter dated October 10, 1990, in which Williams requested that a private attorney, David Murante, be assigned as his counsel. The court made the following statement:
Ms. Paperno is your lawyer. If you had the ... means to retain Mr. Murante as a private attorney, I would have no problem. I caution you, Mr. Williams, I want you to cooperate with Ms. Paperno.... Were you not to cooperate with her, there is recent case law that has come down that says that you are on your own. You are on your own.... I recommend seriously you continue to cooperate with Ms. Paperno.
Justice Doyle denied Williams's request to have Mr. Murante assigned as his lawyer.
The criminal trial commenced on December 10, 1990. Williams was represented by Jill Paperno. A jury convicted Williams on both counts of the indictment and he was sentenced to 6 to 18 years imprisonment. There is no assertion (or ground to think) that Williams's lawyer failed him in any way.
In his appeal to the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Williams argued that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been violated when Justice Doyle denied his application to appear pro se. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed the conviction and denied Williams's Sixth Amendment claim. Because the defendant had "repeatedly changed" his position regarding self-representation, the Appellate Division held that Williams's pro se request "cannot be deemed unequivocal." Such conduct, they stated, "undermines the orderly administration of justice." Williams's application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied.
On April 2, 1993, Williams filed a habeas corpus petition, pro se, asserting his Sixth Amendment claim in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. Judge Larimer denied Williams's petition on the ground that Williams repeatedly vacillated in his desire to act pro se and never renewed his application subsequent to the September 18 hearing. Judge Larimer further admonished that "[a] court should not have to guess, at its peril, when an indigent defendant really wants to proceed pro se and when he is just using the request as a tactic to change lawyers or disrupt proceedings." Judge Larimer accordingly ruled that Williams failed to make an "unequivocal request" to proceed pro se, and denied the petition.
The habeas petition attacks Justice Doyle's ruling on September 18, 1990, denying Williams's motion to discharge counsel and act pro se. At that hearing, the grounds expressed by Justice Doyle were principally the defendant's...
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