United States v. Lancaster

• Decision Date: 05 January 1891
• Citation: 44 F. 896
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. LANCASTER et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

44 F. 896

UNITED STATES v. LANCASTER et al.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. Georgia, Western Division.

January 5, 1891

Syllabus by the Court

A conspiracy is an unlawful confederacy or combination of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or have accomplished an unlawful purpose. The offense is complete when the unlawful conspiracy, combination, or agreement is made, and a criminal act done in pursuance of the conspiracy is not necessary to justify a conviction for the crime of conspiracy itself.

Where several persons are proved to have combined together for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of the parties in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is, in contemplation of law, the act of the whole party, and the proof of such act will be evidence against any of the others who engaged in the same conspiracy. Declarations of a co-conspirator, made during the pendency of the illegal enterprise, is not only evidence against himself but is evidence against his associates in the crime.

An unlawful combination to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate a citizen of the United States i- the free exercise of a right and privilege secured to him by the constitution and laws of the United States, and because of his having so exercised the same, is a conspiracy, indictable and punishable under section 5508 of the Revised Statutes. Where a citizen of the United States is interested in a decree of a circuit court of the United States, and where it has become necessary for him to sue out attachments for contempt to enforce respect for said decree, and obedience to the same, and to punish violations thereof, a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate him because of the exercise of his right to apply for such relief is a violation of the statute.

If, in pursuance of the conspiracy above defined, the conspirators murder the agent of the party against whom the conspiracy is directed, they are indictable and punishable under section 5509 of the Revised Statutes, as such crime is punished by the laws of the state in which the murder was committed.

The evidence necessary to support the charge of conspiracy discussed.

If it appear that a particular motive for the conspiracy is alleged in the indictment, and the jury is justified from the evidence in finding that such motive did really exist, it will not matter if the conspirators had different motives additional to that the indictment describes.

It is the duty of the trial judge in a court of the United States to sum up the evidence for the assistance of the jury. This is not done to interfere with the province of the jury, for notwithstanding the summary of the judge, they are obliged to find the facts for themselves.

Where a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of contradictory statements in matters material to the issue, it must appear that the contradictory matter is material. The witness so attacked may be sustained by proof of general good character and at last his credit is a question for the jury.

Where three persons who are jointly charged with the conspiracy make disclosures with reference thereto,-- one makes a voluntary confession, another is permitted to become a witness for the government, under an implied promise of pardon, and testifies, and the other makes a declaration during the pendency of the criminal enterprise,-- and there could have been no collusion or knowledge inter sese with reference to the several statements, the fact that the three statements are, in all material respects, identical, is confirmatory of the testimony of the accomplice, and of the credit of a witness who testifies to the declaration.

The confirmatory evidence need not extend to the whole testimony but, it being shown that the accomplice has testified truly in some particulars, the jury may infer that he has in others.

It is a settled rule of evidence that an accomplice, notwithstanding the turpitude of his conduct, is not on that account an incompetent witness, but the jury may, if they please, act upon the evidence of an accomplice. It is, as a matter of practice, the duty of the judge to advise them not to convict of felony upon such testimony alone, and without corroboration. No evidence can be legally competent and sufficient to corroborate an accomplice which does not tend to confirm the testimony of the accomplice upon a point material to the issue in the sense that it tends to prove the guilt of the defendant. Com. v. Holmes, 127 Mass 424, decided by Chief Justice GRAY.

Circumstances of corroboration in this case instanced.

It is not within the power of the United States to punish for a conspiracy to murder within the state unless the murder was in violation of a United States statute. In this case the question of the power of the United States to inquire into and punish for the alleged murder of Forsyth depends upon whether the killing was done in pursuance of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment.

It requires more than proof of mere passive cognizance on the part of a prisoner of a crime to sustain a charge of conspiracy, but the jury must find that such prisoner did some act or made some agreement showing an intention to participate in some way in such conspiracy.

Effect of proof of good character discussed. U.S. v. Jackson, 29 F. 503, followed.

Because a prisoner may not choose to put his character in issue he is not to be prejudiced in the minds of the jury thereby.

Reference in argument by counsel to impertinent topics commented on.

Marion Erwin and F. G. du Bignon, for the prosecution.

Bacon & Rutherford, Dessau & Bartlett, C. C. Smith, and H. V. Washington, for the prisoners.

SPEER, J., (charging jury.)

The prisoners are on trial upon an indictment in which they are charged with a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate a citizen of the United States of America in the free exercise and enjoyment of a right secured to him by the constitution and laws of the United States. They are further charged with a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate the citizen because of his having exercised such right and privilege so secured. The laws of the United States (Rev. St. Sec. 5508) provide that--

'If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter (ineligible) to any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the constitution or laws of the United States.' This section defines the conspiracy with which the defendants are charged. The laws of the United States (Id. Sec. 5509) further provide--

'If in the act of violating any provision in either of the two preceding sections any other felony or misdemeanor be committed, the offender shall be punished for the same with such punishment as is attached to such felony or misdemeanor by the laws of the state in which the offense is committed.'

The person against whose rights and privileges, their exercise and enjoyment, the conspiracy is charged to have been directed is Norman W. Dodge, a citizen of the United States and of the state of New York. The rights and privileges because of which it is alleged that the conspiracy was formed 'to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate' Norman W. Dodge, were the right to sue out certain contempt proceedings against the parties whose names are mentioned in the indictment as having violated a certain decree of this court, granted and made upon a bill in equity filed, presented, and sued to final judgment by George E. Dodge, which decree had become a muniment of the title of Norman W. Dodge to large bodies of land situated in several counties in this district. As we have seen, from the indictment, the conspiracy was to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate the citizen in the exercise and enjoyment of his right, secured by the constitution and laws of the United States, or, in other words, because he continued to exercise that right. It also charges that the conspiracy was formed to injure the citizen because of his having so exercised his right so secured; in other words, because he had in the past exercised the right so secured. You will observe, therefore, gentlemen, that the indictment presents the twofold accusation,-- a conspiracy to injure because of a present exercise and of a past exercise of a right secured by the constitution and laws of our general government. It is further charged in the indictment that, in pursuance of the conspiracy, a description of which you have just heard, the prisoners committed a felony, to-wit, the crime of murder of John C. Forsyth, the agent of Norman W. Dodge; and, under the provision of the statute which I have read, it is in the legal contemplation of the indictment that if the prisoners, or two of them, are convicted of this conspiracy, and the murder in pursuance thereof, they shall be punished by the law of the state of Georgia relative to the crime of murder. I will not ask your attention to a somewhat closer analysis of the legal import of this statute, and the indictment which charges the prisoners with its violation. 'If two or more persons conspire, '-- that is, if two or more persons enter into a conspiracy. Now, what is a conspiracy? It is an unlawful confederacy or combination of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to accomplish an unlawful purpose. The offense is complete when the unlawful confederacy, combination, or agreement is made, and...