Denson v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 31 March 1999
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 98-11156-WGY.
• Citation: 44 F.Supp.2d 400
• Parties: MacArthur DENSON, Plaintiff, v. John MARSHALL, Jr. and Mark Powers, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

44 F.Supp.2d 400 MacArthur DENSON, Plaintiff,
v.
John MARSHALL, Jr. and Mark Powers, Defendants. Civil Action No. 98-11156-WGY. United States District Court, D. Massachusetts. March 31, 1999.

Page 401

MacArthur Denson, MCI Walpole, South Walpole, MA, pro se.

Ann M. McCarthy, Mass. Dept. of Corrections, Boston, MA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, Chief Judge.

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, MacArthur Denson ("Denson"), is a state prison inmate housed at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution Cedar Junction in Walpole ("Cedar Junction"). Denson, a practicing Muslim, brings this civil rights action against Cedar Junction Superintendent John Marshall, Jr. ("Marshall") and Cedar Junction Deputy Superintendent Mark Powers ("Powers") for violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Both sides' summary judgment motions are now before the Court.

II. Background

The following facts are undisputed:

Denson is serving a ten year disciplinary sentence in the Department Disciplinary Unit ("the Unit") at Cedar Junction for raping a female therapist at the Massachusetts Treatment Center on July 10, 1997.¹ At the time of the attack, Denson was serving a prison term for a previous conviction of aggravated rape.

The Unit consists of inmates found guilty of serious and repetitive disciplinary offenses while in prison. See Marshall Aff. at ¶ 3. The Unit houses "the most violent, assaultive and disruptive inmates in the Commonwealth." Id. Inmates are sentenced to the Unit as a punitive measure in order to deter their own and other inmates' serious misconduct in the Commonwealth's prisons. See id. Consequently, the Unit is a restrictive environment. See id. While prisoners can earn certain privileges, such as telephone calls, social visits, and television, for good behavior, they do

Page 402

not have canteen privileges, except to buy postage stamps. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 4.

On April 23, 1998, Denson sent a letter to Marshall seeking special food arrangements in order to observe three religious fast days per month. See Pl. Mem., Ex. A. These fasts typically occur in the middle of the month and require observers to abstain from food and drink between sunrise and sunset. See Rahim Aff. at ¶ 6. Because Denson cannot purchase food at the canteen, he asked Marshall to replace his regular meals on fast days with the caloric equivalent of cereal, milk, bread, peanut butter and jelly that he can eat before and after daylight hours. See Pl. Mem., Ex. A. On May 19, 1998, Powers informed Denson that his request had been denied. See id. at Ex. B. Denson filed suit on June 8, 1998.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

IV. Discussion

A. RFRA

The Supreme Court recently held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state governments. See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). Denson's claim under RFRA is therefore no longer actionable. See Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir.1998). Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Marshall and Powers' motion for summary judgment and DENIES Denson's motion for summary judgment as to the RFRA count of Denson's complaint.

B. Free Exercise

Prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections simply by virtue of their incarceration. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The Supreme Court has specifically held that inmates retain some First Amendment protections, see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495...