Garvin's Adm'r v. Williams
| Decision Date | 31 October 1869 |
| Citation | 44 Mo. 465 |
| Parties | GARVIN'S ADM'R et al., Appellants, v. JOHN P. WILLIAMS et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.
Glover & Shepley, with whom were Harris, and Crews, North & Laurie, for appellants.
Whenever any one standing in a fiduciary relation receives a benefit from his dependent, the law looks on the act with suspicion, and either holds it void or so far condemned as to require from the donee proof that no undue influence or fraud induced the transaction. But the court below decided that the fiduciary relation of guardian and ward attached no suspicion to, and raised no presumption against, the will; and further, that all the facts mentioned in plaintiff's second instruction did not fix on defendants the onus of disproving undue influence. Appellants contend as follows:
I. The settlements made of the guardian's accounts, September 13, 1860, were invalid.
II. The fiduciary relations subsisting at the execution of the will raised a presumption that it was procured by the undue influence of the guardian. .) The extraordinary value of this donation is of itself a ground of suspicion. The general course of authority applies the doctrine of fiduciary relation to wills as well as deeds. In 3 White & Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity, 127, it is said that “the general rule is, a deed or will in favor of one who stands in the position of confidential adviser will be set aside unless the transaction is shown or appears to be perfectly fair and regular, without any admixture of improper or undue influence.” On this point vide 34 Conn. 451; Meek et al. v. Perry and Wife, 36 Miss. 256; Morris v. Stokes, 21 Ga. 575; Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick. 117; Marsh v. Tyrrell, 2 Hagg. 84; Ingraham v. Wyatt, 3 Hagg. 466; Gaither v. Gaither, 20 Ga. 721; 1 Paige, 176; Middleton v. Sherburn, 4 Young & Colly, 358; Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 397; Lake v. Ranney, 33 Barb. 68; Newhouse v. Goodwin, 17 Barb. 258; Darley v. Darley, 3 Bradf. 507; Tyler v. Gardner, 35 N. Y. 559; Lee v. Dill, 11 Abb. Pr. 218; 3 Cow. 576. A careful reading of the cases above cited will show that in some of them the instruments in question have been void absolutely because of the fiduciary relation. In every one of them the presence of the relation has raised a presumption against the validity of the act, no matter what it was--will, deed, release, settlement, or bond.
Sharp & Broadhead, and Knox, for respondents.
I. The instructions requested by appellants, and refused, were properly refused, because the existence or recent termination of the relationship of guardian and ward does not raise a legal presumption of the invalidity of the will of the ward, but is a fact to be considered and duly weighed, in connection with all other facts in the case, in determining the question of undue influence. . .)
II. In proceedings to set aside a probated will, the presumption is in favor of the validity of the will (Farrell v. Brennan et al. 32 Mo. 323 et seq.;McClintock v. Curd, 32 Mo. 411; 8 Dana, 315); and it would be error and lead to confusion to instruct the jury that a certain state of facts raised a contrary presumption. It would at best but assert a presumption against a presumption, amounting to nothing, and only calculated to confuse. (Beacher v. Marsh, 15 Ohio St. 103; Copeland v. Copeland, 32 Ala. 512.)
This was a proceeding instituted in the Circuit Court of Chariton county, and taken, by a change of venue, to St. Louis county by the appellants, who are heirs at law and personal representatives of W. D. Peticrew, to set aside the probate of his will. The respondents are beneficiaries under the will.
It appears that the deceased, Peticrew, was left an orphan when a mere child, inheriting a large estate, and that he had neither brothers nor sisters. The respondent John P. Williams was appointed guardian of his person and curator of his estate; and from the time of such appointment Peticrew resided in the family of Williams till the time of his death, except when he was absent at school. During all this time Williams had the exclusive management and control of the estate, and Peticrew seems to have given him his unreserved confidence.
Before Peticrew became of age he was attacked with consumption, and the record shows that it was painfully evident that he could not long survive. He was born September 12, 1839, and therefore arrived at age on the 11th day of September, 1860. Two days prior to his becoming of age an attorney was employed to examine the accounts between him and his guardian, and on the 13th of the same month a settlement was made in the County Court--Peticrew receiving the note of his guardian for the amount due him, and entering a release of record discharging him and his securities. On the next day, the 14th of September, Peticrew, still being at Williams' house, made and executed his will, giving the whole of his large estate to Williams and his family, with two exceptions, and totally disinheriting all his kindred or relations. In the succeeding month of December he died.
From the view we have taken of the case, as now presented, it will be unnecessary to comment upon or bestow any particular attention on the great mass of testimony embodied in the bill of exceptions. We must first examine whether the court below tried the case upon a correct theory.
Upon the trial the plaintiffs offered an instruction reciting all the facts in the case, and asked the court to declare, as a conclusion of law thereon, that the alleged will was presumptively procured by undue influence. The concluding paragraphs of the instruction are in these words: This instruction the court refused to give.
There is no subject in the whole range of equity jurisprudence where its salutary principles have been more often invoked than in those cases where donations have been obtained by persons standing in some confidential, fiduciary, or other relation toward the donor, and where they may have exercised dominion over him. Transactions of this kind taking place between attorney and client, spiritual adviser and advisee, trustee and cestui...
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