Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co.

• Citation: 258 Wis. 1,44 N.W.2d 547
• Parties: , 27 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2091, 19 Lab.Cas. P 66,041 WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, v. MILWAUKEE GAS LIGHT CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 08 November 1950
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 547

44 N.W.2d 547

258 Wis. 1, 27 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2091,

19 Lab.Cas. P 66,041

WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, v. MILWAUKEE GAS LIGHT CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Nov. 8, 1950.

Max Raskin, Milwaukee, William F. Quick, Milwaukee, of counsel, of appellant.

Thomas E. Fairchild, Atty. Gen., Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Atty. Gen., Malcolm L. Riley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miller, Mack & Fairchild, J. G. Hardgrove, Milwaukee, for respondents.

MARTIN, Justice.

Prior to October 5, 1949, the membership of the Union had authorized the negotiating committee to call a strike and on October 4, 1949, the negotiating committee, consisting of defendants, Arthur St. John, Thomas Lansing, and Alvin C. Fuhrman, ordered the strike to commence at 6:00 a. m., October 5, 1949.

At. 11:00 a. m., the public was advised to curtail consumption of gas and an appeal to consumers of gas was made to shut off the service; the steam pressure dropped to zero in the boiler room and no further pumping could be done with the main pumping facilities; the fires had to be pulled from the boilers reducing the steam pressure, and all facilities had to be stopped; a minimum pressure in the distribution system was kept in order that the air would not get into the mains so as to prevent any explosions due to the mixture of gas and air in the distribution system; the sendouts dropped to twenty-five per cent of what they had been previously. Low pressure in the system created a dangerous condition fraught with the possibility of infinite injury to the public. The public was advised by radio broadcasts and through the newspapers to shut off appliances and to shut off the service at the meter. The service was not resumed until October 6, 1949.

The restraining order was signed by the court at 12:55 p. m., and was served by the deputy sheriff upon the Union, by serving its president, Arthur St. John, and upon him personally, and upon Chester Walczak, international representative, at a meeting of a large group of the members of the Union at Bohemian hall, at about 2:00 p. m., October 5th. Chester Walczak and Arthur St. John told the meeting the papers served were an order to go back to work, but no statement was made calling the men back to work.

A picket line was maintained at the premises of the Coke Company from 2:00 or 3:00 p. m. and continued there until about 9:30 p. m., on Wednesday, October 5, 1949.

The Coke Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Gas Company. In October, 1949, the Coke Company supplied about fifty-five to sixty per cent of the gas distributed by the Gas Company. Because of the relationship between the Coke Company and the Gas Company, the Coke Company is a public utility employer and the public utility anti-strike law applies to it.

The present proceeding does not relate back to the action of the Union voting the strike, or to the act of the negotiating committee calling the strike. It relates to matters occurring subsequent to the signing of the order and the service of same at about 2:00 p. m., on October 5th.

The order required the Union, St. John, Walczak, and Lansing to 'take immediate steps to notify all employees called out on strike to resume service forthwith.' Because of the seriousness of the situation already referred to resulting from the partial or complete stoppage of the essential service of furnishing gas to the public, the order required immediate compliance.

On Arthur St. John, president of the Union, a member of the executive board and of the negotiating committee, Thomas Lansing, a member of the executive board and the negotiating committee, and Alvin C. Fuhrman, vice-president of the Union and a member of the executive board and negotiating committee, was placed the responsibility by vote of the Union to call the strike and upon them rested the responsibility, after the service of the restraining order, to revoke the call and comply with the order of the court.

An all-night conference between Union and Gas Company officials, in which the mayor of Milwaukee and the judge of the United States district court of the eastern district of Wisconsin participated, was held on October 5th and an agreement was reached. The strike ended at 8:00 a. m., October 6th. The defendants contend that a call to the members of the Union to return to work would have been ineffectual; that they knew beyond any reasonable doubt that any order, request, or recommendation of theirs would, under the circumstances then existing, have no effect whatever in getting the men back to work. They assert that there was no contumacious or wilful disobedience of the order because they immediately took action and arranged a conference in which the strike was settled, and there was only a few hours' delay in achieving the main objective of the order, which was to end the strike and get the production of gas and its distribution to consumers back to normal. These measures are not a justification for their failure to comply with the requirements of the court order.

It is true that within twenty hours the strike was settled by negotiations. However successful the negotiations may have been, it does not purge the defendants. The language of the court order is direct and unambiguous. It commanded something to be done--'take immediate steps to notify all employees called out on strike to resume service forthwith.' This the defendants ignored.

The acts complained of which violated the injunction constituted contempt of court and are held to have injured the Board. See Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers Workers' Union, 1946, 249 Wis. 590, 25 N.W.2d 425.

Defendant Chester Walczak at the time in question was a regional director of the international union, but he was not a member of the negotiating committee. The immediate duty to recall the strike did not rest upon him as it did upon the members of the negotiating committee. It does not appear that his failure to disassociate himself from the continuance of the strike was an act of wilful and contumacious civil contempt.

We have carefully reviewed the evidence relating to the other thirteen union members who were dismissed in this action. No useful purpose would be served in discussing each individually. They were either present at the meeting at the Bohemian hall or in the picket line at the Coke Company when the court order was served. The evidence does not so clearly and sufficiently establish their knowledge of the scope and requirements of this order so as to overrule the finding of the trial court. The members of the negotiating committee did not sufficiently inform them of the requirements. This finding by the trial court is a reasonable deduction from the testimony produced and must stand. The court's finding is of great weight. Its conclusion after seeing the witnesses and hearing their testimony cannot be disturbed.

The Union asserts that subch. III of ch. 111, Stats., conflicts with the Federal Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., and violates the state and federal constitutions.

The constitutionality of the public...