44 P.3d 1157 (Idaho 2002), 26540, Young v. City of Ketchum

Docket Nº:26540.
Citation:44 P.3d 1157, 137 Idaho 102
Opinion Judge:TROUT, Chief Justice.
Party Name:Baxter C. YOUNG, John D. Jacoby, Fred White, Judy White, Tom Bartlett, and Frank Suhadolnik, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF KETCHUM, an Idaho Municipal Corporation; Guy Coles, Mayor; Randy Hall, David Hutchinson, Maurice Charlatt and Christine Potters, Council Members, City of Ketchum, Defendants-Respondents.
Attorney:[137 Idaho 103] E. Lee Schlender, Chtd., Hailey, for appellants. E. Lee Schlender argued. Margaret J. Simms, City Attorney, Ketchum; for respondents. Margaret J. Simms argued. Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP, Ketchum, appeared as Amicus Curiae for the City of Sun Valley in support of the res...
Judge Panel:Justice KIDWELL, Dissenting.
Case Date:March 26, 2002
Court:Supreme Court of Idaho
 
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Page 1157

44 P.3d 1157 (Idaho 2002)

137 Idaho 102

Baxter C. YOUNG, John D. Jacoby, Fred White, Judy White, Tom Bartlett, and Frank Suhadolnik, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF KETCHUM, an Idaho Municipal Corporation; Guy Coles, Mayor; Randy Hall, David Hutchinson, Maurice Charlatt and Christine Potters, Council Members, City of Ketchum, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 26540.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls.

March 26, 2002.

Page 1158

[137 Idaho 103] E. Lee Schlender, Chtd., Hailey, for appellants. E. Lee Schlender argued.

Margaret J. Simms, City Attorney, Ketchum; for respondents. Margaret J. Simms argued.

Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP, Ketchum, appeared as Amicus Curiae for the City of Sun Valley in support of the respondent City of Ketchum, but did not participate in the oral argument.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

Baxter Young et. al. ("Plaintiffs") brought a suit against the City of Ketchum ("the City") alleging that the City's involvement in a professional services contract and a related lease with the Sun Valley-Ketchum Chamber of Commerce ("the Chamber") violates I.C. § 50-1043 et seq., Article 8 § 2, 3, 4 and Article 12 § 4 of the Idaho Constitution. Plaintiffs appeal the district judge's decision granting the City's Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing and denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Prohibition.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Baxter Young filed a pro se complaint against the City for declaratory relief and petition for writ of prohibition, alleging that the payment of proceeds from a local option tax by the City to the Chamber violates I.C. § 50-1043et. seq. and Article 8 § 2, 3, 4 and Article 12 § 4 of the Idaho Constitution. Several property owners in Ketchum filed a separate complaint, containing essentially the same arguments. The district judge consolidated the two cases. The collective group of Plaintiffs consists of concerned citizens who reside in and pay property taxes to the City.

The crux of this case relates to the validity of a professional services contract between the City and the Chamber. The contract requires the Chamber "to provide distribution of tourist information to the general public and to provide professional marketing services to promote the Ketchum Sun Valley area." The marketing services required by the contract include providing the City with a visitor information center, and to promote and market the area and local special events. In consideration for these services, the City is required to pay the Chamber money, which is raised via the local option tax. The local option tax is authorized by I.C. § 50-1044, granting Idaho resort cities the authorization to implement local option nonproperty taxes by a majority vote of the city's citizens. 1 The City is designated a resort city under I.C. § 50-1044. The City also executed a one-year lease agreement with the Chamber related to the personal services contract whereby the Chamber rents office space and the tourist information center from the City for $31,000.

The City filed a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The district judge granted the City's motion to dismiss with prejudice on the grounds Plaintiffs lacked standing.

Page 1159

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district judge stated the standard for reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion is the same as that applicable to motions for summary judgment. This is true insofar as the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor. However, once such inferences are drawn, the motions are treated differently. A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated. A motion for summary judgment looks to the evidence to see if there are any issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

I.R.C.P. 12(b) states:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56....

While the district judge made reference to the summary judgment standard, it does not appear that he took any other evidence outside of the pleadings into consideration, treating the...

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