Lessee of Philip Hickey Et Al Plaintiff In Error v. James Stewart Et Al

Decision Date01 January 1845
PartiesLESSEE OF PHILIP HICKEY ET AL., PLAINTIFF IN ERROR v. JAMES A. STEWART ET AL
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the southern district of Mississippi.

It was an ejectment brought by Hickey's lessee against the defendants, as the heirs of Robert Starke, for two thousand acres of land in the state of Mississippi.

The facts in the case are fully set forth in the opinion of the court.

The question was, whether or not the court below erred, in permitting to be read in evidence, on the part of the defendants, the record of a former chancery suit between the same parties, in which the court had decreed that all the title of Hickey et al. should be conveyed to the heirs of Starke.

Coxe and Walker, for the plaintiff in error.

Henderson and Jones, for the defendants in error.

Coxe said that the condition of the country where the land in question was situated was described in 12 Wheat., 524. The distinction is important between an acquired country and that where a disputed boundary was settled. Different codes of laws prevail in the one and the other. 12 Wheat., 535, another case.

This being an adjusted boundary, there was no obligation to recognize Spanish grants. 12 Wheat., 535.

The United States derived all their proprietary title from Georgia, 1 Laws U. S., 488; and took it only upon certain conditions, 3 Id., 39, 380, 491, 546.

The act of 1803 provided that the decisions of the commissioners should be final. Under it, our claim was registered and confirmed, in 1804.

Our title is therefore complete. But the defendants set up the decree of a court of equity, and the first question is, can the courts of the United States recognize any power in a state court to divest us of our title? The judgment of the commissioners was made final; and as to the effect of this, see 4 Cranch, 269; 9 Id., 127; 3 Wheat., 246; 6 Id., 109; 9 Pet., 8; 10 Id., 449; 2 Bos. & P., 392.

Decisions may be impeached for fraud; but it must be fraud in obtaining the judgment, and not pre-existing. Story Confl. of Laws, 590, 591, 592; 2 Kent Com., 118.

The state of Mississippi could not have divested us of our title by an act of legislation. How then can one of its courts do it?

Again, it is a decree of a court of equity. The title of the plaintiff is a statutory title from the United States, whose authority no one doubts. Can equity interfere? The act of Congress says that the decision of the commissioners shall be final. The rule of law is positive, and equity cannot relieve against a positive law. 1 Story Eq., §§ 10, 11, 64.

An action at law cannot be maintained upon a decree in equity. 8 Wheat., 697; 3 Barn. & Ad., 52.

If the party cannot maintain a suit, he cannot defend himself in ejectment. Lewin Trusts, 247, 482.

(Coxe then objected to the decree in many points of form.)

Henderson, for defendants.

Of the second and third instructions refused to the plaintiffs, we justify the court's refusal in the language of the decree itself:

'That the title of the defendant was obtained by fraud and force and violence, against the equity of complainant's ancestor, * * * it is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the title of defendants to said tract of land be, and the same is hereby declared to be fraudulent and void as against complainants.'

The legal title of the plaintiffs herein does not, therefore, 'remain unaffected at law by said decree,' * * * and the decree does not limit its cancellation of title to equity merely; but it finds and adjudges the title 'fraudulent and void,' as against our grantors and title. And so, too, we defend the court below in refusing the fourth instruction asked by plaintiffs below.

The decree is, that the defendants shall 'deliver to complainants the full, peaceable, and actual possession of said tract of land.'

The presumption of law must arise, therefore, that the facts found to subsist, in conformity with the decree, were brought about in conformity with its command, and possession so surrendered, and so taken, may assuredly be lawfully retained. It was so ordered to be given, that it might be retained.

And of the charges given by the court, at the instance of the defendants, they vindicate themselves on reading—self-evident propositions on their face.

Without further noting these particular criticisms, we pass to meet the substantial propositions from which they proceed, viz.:

1. Was the chancery record admissible in evidence for any purpose? and if so,

2. What was its legal effect?

It is objected, that these chancery proceedings do not purport to be record at all. But besides, that the defendants have denominated and regarded them as a record, and acted upon them as a final decree of the highest court of law and equity in the state, and should therefore be estopped in this objection, (see the case on their appeal, 1 Pet., 94;) it is manifest, on inspection, it possesses all the elements of a formal and complete record. It is between all proper parties, and consists of a bill, answer, plea, and replication.

Much testimony on the matter in controversy appears to have been taken, on which the court exercised their chancery discretion in directing an issue at law. This was duly tendered, joined in, and verdict thereupon rendered; exceptions taken, argued, and overruled and thence decree ordered, made out, and duly enrolled, and then thereafter appealed from to the Supreme Court of the United States. A judicial proceeding with these forms and contents, duly certified as it is, must be a record. 7 Cranch, 408.

It is assumed, too, that the Supreme Court, in treating the case as with plenary and original powers, transcended their jurisdiction. This conclusion is deduced from the assumption that, as the decree was not pronounced till 1824, the powers of the court were governed by the laws of 1822, found in Poindexter's Code; and that, by these laws, the Supreme Court, in such a case, could only certify its opinion to the inferior court to which the case had been referred; and the inferior court must adopt and execute a final decree in conformity with the opinion so certified.

We do not consider, if this record were to be tested by the acts of 1822, in Poindexter's Code, the conclusions of the appellants would follow, or that the final jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court in this case would be rendered doubtful. See sect. 30, p. 91; sect. 8, p. 150; sect. 21, p. 154, of Poindexter's Code.

But, it is to be observed, this bill in chancery was filed in the 'superior court of law and equity,' in Adams county, as early as 1815. The date of filing the bill does not appear in the record, but the plea of one of the defendants is sworn to 14th of October, 1815. The controversy continued a lis-pendens till final decree at December term, 1824.

The territorial act of 22d December, 1809, (Turner Dig., p. 178, sect. 116,) gave the jurisdiction under which this suit was instituted.

A further act of the territory, of 20th January, 1814, (Turner Dig., p. 201, sect. 203,) gave the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by which they took cognisance of the cause on reference, and which expressly authorized them 'to grant judgment thereon according to the right of the matter, and award execution.'

In the year 1817, the territory became a state, and the laws generally were soon afterward, in 1822, revised by Poindexter, to conform to the modified system of jurisprudence appointed by the new constitution. By this constitution, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court was not specified, but left to the legislature to prescribe. See Constitution, title 'Judicial Department,' p. 550, Poindexter's Code.

The act of 1822 (sect. 5, pp. 149, 150, Poin. Code,) established this jurisdiction. The Poindexter Code was adopted and operative in 1823, and while this chancery case was yet pending. But the code expressly saved from its operation all such cases as were pending, by providing, per sect. 7, p. 8, of the Code,

'That all remedies, which shall have been commenced under former laws, shall be and remain as though the said code had never been adopted.'

This decree is therefore in conformity to the laws in Turner's Digest, and this exception of the appellants is manifestly groundless. And full to this point, see Blanchard's Adm. v. Buckbolt's Adm., Walk. (Miss.), 64.

It is further objected to this record and decree, that the Chancery Court of Mississippi had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, on the ground that the title of the patentee was fixed by the government or sovereign power: 1st, by the decision of the Spanish Governor; 2d, by the 1st article of the compact of cession from Georgia to the United States, of 1802; and 3dly, by the ascertainment of those entitled to confirmation under said article by the board of commissioners, as per section 6 of act of Congress of 3d March, 1803.

To this we answer, 1st, that no title, emanating from this or any other government, for lands now within the United States, can claim immunity from investigation and adjudication in the courts. And if the wilful wrong or mistake of the ministerial officers of government, or the fraud and misrepresentation of the donee or grantee, has induced the issuance of a patent to one who, by the laws and policy of the government, was not equitably entitled to receive it, the court may, as they perpetually do, redress the wrong. And 2dly, as to the claim under the act of cession, the appellants cannot be heard to invoke any protection to their title from that article, to the prejudice of the court's jurisdiction, as they did not show themselves within the provision of that article on that occasion. See the case on appeal, 1 Pet., 94. And showing it now, could in no degree impair the jurisdiction then exercised. The patentee did not, in the chancery suit, prove himself a settler on 27th October, 1795. But had it been...

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