Byrum v. United States

• Decision Date: 08 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. 20526.,20526.
• Parties: Marian A. BYRUM, Executrix under the Last Will and Testament of Milliken C. Byrum, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

440 F.2d 949 (1971)

Marian A. BYRUM, Executrix under the Last Will and Testament of Milliken C. Byrum, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20526.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 8, 1971.

Kenneth L. Gross, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellant; Johnnie M. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Loring W. Post, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., on brief; William W. Milligan, U. S. Atty., Alvin J. McKenna, Asst. U. S. Atty., Columbus, Ohio, of counsel.

Larry H. Snyder, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee; Chamblin, Snyder & Henry, Columbus, Ohio, on brief.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, BROOKS, Circuit Judge, and O'SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

BROOKS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the United States from an adverse ruling of the District Court, 311 F.Supp. 892, on the issue of whether certain assets transferred into an irrevocable trust could be included in decedent-grantor's estate by operation of 26 U.S.C. § 2036.¹ The action arose by a claim for refund of taxes paid and was decided on motions for summary judgment with a stipulated set of facts. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

That portion of the trust agreement² that the Government contends made the assets transferred into trust includable in the grantor's estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2036 relates to the grantor's retained powers to: 1) vote the shares of unlisted stock in the trust corpus; 2) veto the transfer by the trustee of any of these shares of stock; and 3) to remove and appoint a successor corporate trustee at will. It should be noted that the shares of unlisted stock transferred into trust were those of a closed corporation, and the grantor's retaining of the right to vote the stock in trust combined with the stock he personally retained kept him in voting control of the corporation.

The Government's principal argument is that the powers retained by grantor made the value of the shares of stock transferred into trust includable in his estate because the grantor retained for his life "the possession or enjoyment of * * * the property * * *." 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (1). The District Court properly concluded that the retaining of the power to veto the sale of these shares of stock by the trustee did not, under present interpretation of the statute, make the value of the shares transferred includable in the grantor's estate, see Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U.S. 339, 49 S.Ct. 123, 73 L.Ed. 410 (1929); Michigan Trust Company v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1960); Hays' Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1950); Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir. 1947); Estate of Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967); Cf., State Street Trust Company v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). Nor, for that matter, did the grantor's retaining of the power to replace the trustee by another corporate trustee make the value of the shares includable. See Estate of Budd, supra and cf. Rev.Reg. 20.2036-1 (b) (3) with n. 2 Trust Agreement, Article VIII.

The only power retained by the grantor which may possibly have made the transferred assets includable in his estate was the power to vote the unlisted shares of stock. The District Court concluded that this did not make the assets includable and we agree. Several cases have considered this aspect of retained control and have concluded that it is not sufficient to make the value of shares transferred in trust includable in the grantor's estate. See Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962); Yeasel v. Coyle, 2 CCH Fed.Estate and Gift Tax Rep. (68-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) ¶ 12,524. The Government's attempt to distinguish these cases is without substance. In addition, the Government's reliance on United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 86 S.Ct. 1123, 16 L.Ed.2d 145 (1966) and Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1968) is inappropriate under the facts of the present case. In O'Malley the crucial factor making the value of the transferred assets includable in the grantor's estate was that the grantor retained the power to regulate or allocate the distribution of income. Similarly, in Joy v. United States, supra, it was the grantor's retained power to accumulate and distribute income which proved fatal. This was not the situation under the present trust agreement. See n. 2 Trust Agreement, Pars. 5.13, 5.15, 6.02, 9.02. The Government contends that since the grantor remained in voting control of the corporation he could, by electing the Board of Directors, determine dividend policies and thus the grantor could indirectly regulate or control who enjoyed the income from the property. However, the grantor by retaining the voting right of the stock only controlled who could serve as directors of the corporation. These individual directors would then be under a fiduciary obligation to exercise sound business judgment in declaring dividends and could not act in bad faith to the injury of the beneficial owners of the stock. This obligation is governed by an ascertainable standard and is analogous to the situation which exists in cases where the grantor retains broad managerial control of a trust, see Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, supra; Jennings v. Smith, supra; Estate of Budd, supra, and does not result in making these assets includable in the grantor's estate.

While Revenue Ruling 67-54, 1967-1 Cum.Bull. 269, strictly construed is distinguishable from the facts in this case, it does tend to support the position advanced by the Government on this appeal. Rulings, however, do not have the force of law and are at most merely persuasive. Lincoln Savings and Loan Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 422 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1970), U.S.App.Pndg.; 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 3.20. Insofar as such Ruling might be applied to the facts of this case, it is in conflict with the law as interpreted by the courts and should be disregarded. United States Truck Sales Company v. United States, 229 F.2d 693, 696 (6th Cir. 1956); First Kentucky Company v. Gray, 190 F.Supp. 824, 825 (W.D.Ky., 1960), affirmed 309 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1962).

The judgment is affirmed.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

Mr. Byrum, the decedent, transferred to the trust some of his shares of stock in three closely-held corporations of which he was the controlling stockholder. He reserved the right to vote the shares which he transferred to the trust. He also continued to have the right to vote the shares owned by him individually which were not transferred to the trust. His right to vote the transferred shares, combined with his right to vote the shares which he held himself and did not transfer in trust, kept him in control of all three corporations throughout his life-time.

The record ownership of shares of stock in the three corporations as of the time of Mr. Byrum's death on September 5, 1964, was as follows:

                                                      Stock
                Corporation          Trust  Settlor  Outstanding
                Byrum Lithographing  165     855       1440
                Graphic Realty       276     202        574
                Bychrome             308     287        678
                

As I interpret the trust instrument, Mr. Byrum's control of the three corporations was the same after the creation of the trust as it was before. After the transfers, as before, the settlor remained in a position to dictate the dividend policies of the corporation. He had the power to control the distribution of income to the trust. He could determine when and whether the corporation would distribute earnings as dividends and thus when and whether the trust would receive income from the stock which would be available for distribution to the beneficiaries of the trust.

In addition to reserving the right to vote the stock, he retained the power to veto any sale of the stock by the trustee and the right to remove the trustee and appoint a new trustee.

It is not determinative, in my opinion, that any one of these retained rights, standing alone in a different factual situation, might not have subjected the stock to the federal estate tax as a part of the taxable estate of the decedent. I would hold that the retained powers in the aggregate, under the facts and circumstances of this case, operated to reserve to the settlor the enjoyment of the shares and the right to designate the persons who would enjoy the income from them, within the meaning of § 2036(a) (1) and (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

I agree with the Government's interpretation of the trust instrument: that through his control of the corporations the settlor retained the power to determine whether the beneficiaries of the trust would receive income from the shares during his lifetime. When the trust instrument is thus construed, the settlor possessed the right to designate the persons who would enjoy the income from the shares within the meaning of § 2036(a) (2). United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 86 S.Ct. 1123, 16 L.Ed. 2d 145; Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir.).

Since Mr. Byrum guaranteed to himself the right to control the corporations for his lifetime through rights retained under the trust instrument, the retained rights were of substantial present economic benefit to him. He was assured a position as a salaried officer of the corporations for as long as he desired. He could increase his salary or fringe benefits. He could control all corporate decisions affecting him financially. I would hold that he retained for his life the enjoyment of the transferred stock within the intendment of § 2036(a) (1). See, Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 644-646, 69 S.Ct. 322, 93 L.Ed. 288.

I further disagree with the majority opinion with respect to Revenue Ruling 67-54, 1967-1 Cum.Bull. 269. A copy of this ruling is made an appendix to this dissenting opinion. I...