Reid v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

• Citation: 440 F. Supp. 1182
• Decision Date: 23 November 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77-1035.,77-1035.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
• Parties: Lorraine REID, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.

440 F. Supp. 1182

Lorraine REID, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.

No. 77-1035.

United States District Court, S. D. Illinois, N. D.

November 23, 1977.

Joseph R. Napoli, Peoria, Ill., for plaintiff.

Stephen S. Buckley and Richard E. Quinn, Peoria, Ill., for defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ROBERT D. MORGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff is the widow of Bernard S. Reid and the beneficiary eligible to receive any accidental death benefits under a policy issued by defendant. That the policy was in effect when said Bernard S. Reid died is stipulated, and it is agreed that the only questions involved on cross-motions for summary judgment are the questions of law, under the stipulated circumstances, whether his fatal injury was "caused by violent, external and accidental means," and, if so, whether such injury was excluded from coverage as "caused or contributed to by, or as a consequence of, * * * medical or surgical treatment," even though the proximate or precipitating cause of loss is accidental bodily injury. If coverage is afforded by the policy, it is stipulated that plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum of $117,368 plus costs of suit.¹

The facts are that Bernard S. Reid, while normally recuperating from surgery performed for non-accidental ailments, was erroneously administered intravenously a drug known as succinylcholine, instead of a normal saline solution, as a carrier for an intended antibiotic known as keflin. After two injections of correct fluids, at 10:42 a. m. and 4:00 p. m., respectively, the error in ingredients was made by the nurse on the 9:40 p. m. dosage, shortly after which the patient went into respiratory arrest, from which he never fully recovered, and he died five days later. It is agreed that this erroneous injection of succinylcholine, a muscle relaxant, was the proximate cause of death.

Both sides concede that this drug was given in error and not intentionally. Plaintiff argues, however, that the erroneous drug administration was clearly violent, external and accidental, and was obviously not medical or surgical treatment, but the opposite thereof, which would establish liability. Defendant argues that there was clearly no violence, that the harm was done internally, that the "means" of treatment was as prescribed rather than accidental, the error being in the drug given, and that obviously the error occurred in the course of medical treatment, which clearly precludes liability. Both sides have provided scholarly briefs and strong arguments.

It is clear that under the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), the substantive law of Illinois controls on the matter of interpretation of an insurance policy, and Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, 312 Ill. 525, 144 N.E. 161 (1924), appears conclusive on the first issue in this case. There, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that a death from typhoid fever brought about by drinking of water containing typhoid bacilli, accidentally, because of lack of knowledge of the pollution, although the drinking of the water was intentional, was covered by a policy providing indemnity for death by "external, violent and accidental means." Defendant does not seek to distinguish this authority which seems almost precisely in point and controlling on this issue. It would appear that the instant policy must be held to cover the death of Bernard Reid, unless the exception involving medical and surgical treatment is effective to preclude such coverage.

On this score there is no such clear-cut Illinois authority, but it seems clear, on careful analysis of a similar type as that employed by the Illinois Supreme Court, to reach the conclusions above noted, that the medical exclusion does apply to what happened here and that coverage is precluded thereby.

There is no problem over the burden of proof, which is argued somewhat, because what happened is perfectly clear. There can really be no doubt that the death here involved was a direct consequence of medical treatment, i. e., the administration of keflin to control possible post-surgical infection, as prescribed by the physician. The accidental use of the killer drug as a carrier of the intended drug, in place of normal saline solution as such carrier, whether such use was negligence amounting to medical malpractice, or an unavoidable act of God, or something in between, though obviously not prescribed, would not have occurred but for the treatment, and thus was a consequence thereof. Even...