Commonwealth v. Mendes

Decision Date06 February 2004
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. JOHN GOMES MENDES.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, & SOSMAN, JJ.

Stephanie M. Glennon (Kevin J. Reddington with her) for the defendant.

Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

SPINA, J.

The defendant was convicted of the July 29, 1986, murder of his wife on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal he makes numerous assertions of error concerning the admission of evidence, prosecutorial misconduct in the opening statement and closing argument, jury instructions, and matters concerning the jury themselves. He also asks us to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the conviction or order a new trial. We affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our power under § 33E.

1. Background. On March 25, 1984, when she was sixteen years old, Susan Lawton lost both parents in an automobile accident. Until the estates were settled in late July, 1986, she received advances on her inheritance of $150,000. At the time her parents died, Susan was dating the defendant, who was then twenty years old. At the age of seventeen, she moved in with the defendant and became pregnant. At the age of eighteen, after giving birth to their son, Susan married the defendant. She became pregnant with their second child shortly thereafter. The defendant claimed that the second child was not his.

Susan was happy to have a family and to be carrying her second child. She wanted to buy a two-family house and furniture, but the defendant was not interested. The defendant preferred spending his wife's inheritance on cocaine and consorting with prostitutes, regular indulgences that were a subject of frequent arguments between them. He seldom worked and made very little money during the sporadic times that he was employed. His unemployment benefits were exhausted in April, 1986. Concerned that her inheritance was being depleted, Susan began to limit the defendant's access to her assets, causing further friction between them. He tried to assert control over her money several times, demanding access to her inheritance both from her and the attorney for her parents' estates. In early July, 1986, Susan said to the defendant, "My father worked too long and too hard for you to be doing all his hard earned money up your nose." In late July, Susan and the defendant argued about money on three occasions in the presence of others. Approximately one week before she was murdered, Susan confronted the defendant about his infidelity. He denied cheating on her. On July 28, 1986, Susan planned to visit a friend. The defendant told her he would take the baby and a friend to buy a carpet and would pick her up at her friend's house by 10 P.M. Instead, he and his friend used cocaine and drank liquor that the defendant purchased at a liquor store. Susan told her friend that, while she put up with much from the defendant, she could not tolerate his infidelity. Because the defendant did not pick her up until just before 2 A.M., Susan was extremely upset and the two argued immediately on his arrival. On returning home, Susan took the baby upstairs and remained there while the defendant left to take his friend home. She left a note on the kitchen table that said, "I'm going to move out tonight."

Sometime between 3 and 3:30 A.M., a neighbor heard a woman's muffled screams, immediately followed by a baby's cry. At 4 A.M. the defendant arrived at a friend's house in Brockton, appearing nervous and tense. At 5:30 A.M. he went to the home of Annette Eddy, a woman with whom he had been having a sexual relationship. He appeared wet and sweaty. He told Eddy that his wife had locked him out and that he needed a place to sleep. She did not allow him to sleep in her bed but said that he could sleep in the living room. He was gone when she awoke in the morning.

A neighbor who lived in the same building as Susan and the defendant noticed (on his way to and from work) the defendant's car parked on the street in front of the apartment building at 6:30 A.M. and at 12 P.M. on July 29. At about 2 P.M. another neighbor saw the defendant enter the house. About one minute later she heard screams. When the neighbor telephoned the defendant, he explained that his wife had been raped. The police arrived shortly thereafter, and the defendant told an officer that his wife was two months pregnant, that he had left the house at 12:30 A.M., stayed with friends, and came home to find his wife dead. While conducting the investigation of the scene, the police eliminated the possibility of a break-in. The defendant's explanation as to his whereabouts at the time of the murder could not be corroborated. The defendant telephoned Eddy and told her that, if anyone should ask, she should say that he spent the night at her house.

Based on the testimony of the Commonwealth's pathologist, Susan Mendes probably died between 3 and 4 A.M. on July 29, 1986, from asphyxiation by manual strangulation. There were no drugs or alcohol in her system and there was no evidence of sexual assault, although her naked body was found hanging off her bed. In addition to the injuries caused by strangulation, she sustained other injuries while still alive. Her lips were scraped by blunt force consistent with that of a hand being forced over her mouth. Her left eye showed signs of hemorrhaging due to blunt trauma caused by a hand or a smooth-edged object. There were two contusions near her temples and one on the top of her forehead, also caused by blunt injury. She had scratches behind her left ear. A depression in the wall in the bedroom sixty to sixty-three inches above the floor was consistent with an impression made by the head of a person of the victim's height. There was fresh plaster on the floor below the depression.

Within a few years of Susan's death, the defendant spent all of her inheritance, leaving him with no assets. He also paid little or no attention to his son, whom his mother was then raising, and he contributed no money to the support of the child.

The defendant was not indicted for Mendes's murder until thirteen years later, after two individuals came forward and told the police that the defendant admitted to the murder. One of the individuals, Mary Peters, explained that, while she had been dating the defendant a few months after Susan's death, he took her to a cemetery, pointed to a headstone, and told her to be good or "he would put [her] where he put his wife." He said he had killed his wife and could kill her, adding that he was involved in the "Cape Verdean mafia." Similarly, ten years after the murder, Vicki Harris, a neighbor, told the police that she had been confronted by the defendant who told her to "get the fuck away from his property because he'd take care of [her] like he did his first wife."

2. Evidentiary issues. The defendant copiously cites instances of what he characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct in the introduction of evidence. We note that generally a prosecutor cannot be criticized for the introduction and use of evidence that has been admitted, even if the judge's rulings on the admission of such evidence are ultimately determined to be erroneous. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 427 Mass. 169, 173 n.5 (1998). We will therefore address the defendant's allegations of "prosecutorial misconduct" as questions of judicial error, unless the question requires a different analysis.

The defendant's claims of error fall into several categories: the admission of evidence of (a) prior bad acts and bad character; (b) subsequent bad acts and bad character; (c) prejudicial evidence and invocations of sympathy; and (d) hearsay and state of mind evidence.

(a) Prior bad acts and bad character. The defendant asserts several errors in the admission of evidence involving his use of cocaine and his association with prostitutes. The defendant correctly recites that "the prosecution may not introduce evidence of a defendant's prior or subsequent bad acts for the purpose of demonstrating bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged." Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 793 (1994). However, such evidence may be admissible, if relevant, for other purposes, including proof of motive. Id. at 793-794, and cases cited.

The defendant's use of cocaine and association with prostitutes was not offered as improper propensity evidence, but to show that he had a motive to kill his wife. The defendant's drug use had escalated in the months before the murder, prompting him to demand more money from Susan's inheritance. Arguments over money escalated in frequency and intensity. In the weeks before the murder, when she refused to give the defendant any money, the defendant's dealer allowed him to purchase cocaine on credit. When the defendant failed to pay him, the dealer refused to sell him any more drugs. The only way the defendant, who was frequently unemployed, could sustain his lifestyle was to gain unfettered access to his wife's inheritance. The evidence concerning the defendant's lifestyle was relevant to his motive to kill Susan. "Evidence of motive is generally admissible." Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 145 (1999). "Without the challenged evidence [the murder] could have appeared to the jury as an essentially inexplicable act of violence." Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 (1982).

Evidence of the hostile relationship between the defendant and his wife was not offered as improper propensity evidence, as the defendant contends, but also as evidence of his motive to kill her. See Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 127 (2000). The defendant's friend, James Scott, testified to arguments he witnessed between Susan and the defendant about his excessive cocaine purchases. Similarly, one of the couple's neighbors overheard the defendant...

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    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • November 18, 2015
    ...also does not challenge the rulings on appeal, and we discern no abuse of discretion in them. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 470–472, 806 N.E.2d 393 (2004) ; Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 642–643, 760 N.E.2d 1201 (2002).10 In response to at least seven of the de......

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