441 U.S. 380 (1979), 77-6431, Caban v. Mohammed
|Citation:||441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297|
|Party Name:||Caban v. Mohammed|
|Case Date:||April 24, 1979|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued November 6, 1978
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Appellant and appellee Maria Mohammed lived together out of wedlock for several years in New York City, during which time two children were born. Appellant, who was identified as the father on the birth certificates, contributed to the children's support. After the couple separated, Maria took the children and married her present husband (also an appellee). During the next two years, appellant frequently saw or otherwise maintained contact with the children. Appellees subsequently petitioned for adoption of the children, and appellant filed a cross-petition. The Surrogate granted appellees' petition under § 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, which permits an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their child simply by withholding her consent. Rejecting appellant's contention that § 111 is unconstitutional, the state appellate courts affirmed on the basis of In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486. In that case, the New York Court of Appeals held that § 111 furthered the interests of illegitimate children, for whom adoption is often the best course, reasoning that people wishing to adopt a child born out of wedlock would be discouraged if the natural father could prevent adoption merely by withholding his consent. Moreover, the court suggested that, if the consent of the natural father were required, adoptions would be jeopardized because of his unavailability.
1. Contrary to appellees' contention, it is clear that § 111 treats unmarried parents differently according to their sex. The section's consent requirement is no mere formality, since the New York courts have held that the question of whether consent is required is entirely separate from the consideration of the best interests of the child. In this very case, the Surrogate held that adoption by appellant was impermissible absent Maria's consent, whereas adoption by Maria and her husband could be prevented by appellant only if he could show that such adoption would not be in the children's best interests. Pp. 387-388.
2. The sex-based distinction in § 111 between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it bears no substantial relation to any important state interest. Pp. 388-394.
(a) Maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance. Even if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn infants, the generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less acceptable to support legislative distinctions as the child's age increased. P. 389.
(b) Unwed fathers are no more likely to oppose adoption of their children than are unwed mothers. Pp. 391-392.
(c) Even if special difficulties in locating and identifying unwed fathers at birth warranted a legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of newborns, such difficulties need not persist past infancy; and in those instances where, unlike the present case, the father has not participated in the rearing of the child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child. Pp. 392-393.
43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 394. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 401.
POWELL, J., lead opinion
[99 S.Ct. 1763] MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant, Abdiel Caban, challenges the constitutionality of § 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law (McKinney
1977), under which two of his natural children were adopted by their natural mother and stepfather without his consent. We find the statute to be unconstitutional, as the distinction it invariably makes between the rights of unmarried mothers and the rights of unmarried fathers has not been shown to be substantially related to an important state interest.
Abdiel Caban and appellee Maria Mohammed lived together in New York City from September, 1968, until the end of 1973. During this time, Caban and Mohammed represented themselves as being husband and wife, although they never legally married. Indeed, until 1974, Caban was married to another woman, from whom he was separated. While living with the appellant, Mohammed gave birth to two children: David Andrew Caban, born July 16 1969, and Denise Caban, born March 12, 1971. Abdiel Caban was identified as the father on each child's birth certificate, and lived with the children as their father until the end of 1973. Together with Mohammed, he contributed to the support of the family.
In December, 1973, Mohammed took the two children and left the appellant to take up residence with appellee Kazin Mohammed, whom she married on January 30, 1974. For the next nine months, she took David and Denise each weekend to visit her mother, Delores Gonzales, who lived one floor above Caban. Because of his friendship with Gonzales, Caban was able to see the children each week when they came to visit their grandmother.
In September, 1974, Gonzales left New York to take up residence in her native Puerto Rico. At the Mohammeds' request, the grandmother took David and Denise with her. According to appellees, they planned to join the children in Puerto Rico as soon as they had saved enough money to start a business there. During the children's stay with their grandmother, Mrs. Mohammed kept in touch with David and
Denise by mail; Caban communicated with the children through his parents, who also resided in Puerto Rico. In November, 1975, he went to Puerto Rico, where Gonzales willingly surrendered the children to Caban with the understanding that they would be returned after a few days. Caban, however, returned to New York with the children. When Mrs. Mohammed learned that the children were in Caban's custody, she attempted to retrieve them with the aid of a police officer. After this attempt failed, the appellees instituted custody proceedings in the New York Family Court, which placed the children in the temporary custody of the Mohammeds and gave Caban and his new wife, Nina, visiting rights.
In January, 1976, appellees filed a petition under § 110 of the New York Domestic Relations Law to adopt David and Denise.1 In March, the Cabans cross-petitioned for adoption. After the Family Court stayed the custody suit pending the outcome of the adoption proceedings, a hearing was held on the petition and cross-petition before a Law Assistant to a New York Surrogate in Kings County, N.Y. At this hearing, both the Mohammeds and the Cabans were represented by counsel and were permitted to present and cross-examine witnesses.
The Surrogate granted the Mohammeds' petition to adopt the children, thereby cutting off all of appellant's parental
rights and obligations.2 In his opinion, the Surrogate noted the limited right under New York law of unwed fathers in adoption proceedings:
Although a putative father's consent to such an adoption is not a legal necessity, he is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the proposed stepfather adoption.
Moreover, the court stated that the appellant was foreclosed from adopting David and Denise, as the natural mother had withheld her consent. Thus, the court considered the evidence presented by the Cabans only insofar as it reflected upon the Mohammeds' qualifications as prospective parents. The Surrogate found them well qualified, and granted their adoption petition.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. It stated that appellant's constitutional challenge to § 111 was foreclosed by the New York Court of Appeals' decision in In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486 (1975), appeal dism'd for want of substantial federal question sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976). In re David Andrew C., 56 App.Div.2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977). The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in a
memorandum decision based on In re Malpica-Orsini, supra. In re David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42 (1977).
On appeal to this Court, appellant presses two claims. First, he argues that the distinction drawn under New York law between the adoption rights of an unwed father and those of other parents violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, appellant contends that this Court's decision in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relationship with their children, absent a finding that they are unfit as parents.3
Section 111 of the N.Y.Dom.Rel.Law (McKinney 1977) provides in part that
consent to adoption shall be required as follows: . . . (b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock. . . .
The statute makes parental consent unnecessary, however, in certain cases, including those where the parent has abandoned or relinquished his or her rights in the child or has been adjudicated incompetent to care for the child.4 Absent one of
these circumstances, [99 S.Ct. 1765] an unwed mother has the authority under New York law to block the adoption of her child simply by withholding consent. The unwed father has no similar control
over the fate of his child, even when his parental relationship is substantial -- as in this case. He may prevent the termination of his...
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