Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization Gonzalez v. Young

• Citation: 60 L.Ed.2d 508,99 S.Ct. 1905,441 U.S. 600
• Decision Date: 14 May 1979
• Docket Number: Nos. 77-719,77-5324,s. 77-719
• Parties: Jerome D. CHAPMAN, Commissioner of Texas Department of Human Resources, et al., Petitioners, v. HOUSTON WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION et al. * Julia GONZALEZ, Etc., Petitioner, v. James F. YOUNG, Director, Hudson County Welfare Board, et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

441 U.S. 600

99 S.Ct. 1905

60 L.Ed.2d 508

Jerome D. CHAPMAN, Commissioner of Texas Department of Human Resources, et al., Petitioners,

v HOUSTON WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION et al.^* Julia GONZALEZ, Etc., Petitioner, v. James F. YOUNG, Director, Hudson County Welfare Board, et al.

Nos. 77-719, 77-5324.

Argued Oct. 2, 1978.

Decided May 14, 1979.

Syllabus

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions 'authorized by law' claiming a deprivation, under color of state law, of rights 'secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights,' and under § 1343(4) have jurisdiction over such actions seeking relief under 'any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.' Petitioner in No. 77-5324 brought suit in Federal District Court claiming that New Jersey officials, by denying her emergency assistance funds because she was not 'in a state of homelessness' as required by the relevent state regulations, had deprived her of a right to such assistance 'necessary to avoid destitution' within the meaning of § 406(e)(1) of the federal Social Security Act. The District Court held, inter alia, that the complaint stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which provides that every person who, under color of any state statute or regulation subjects another to the deprivation of any rights 'secured by the Constitution and laws' shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law or suit in equity) and that it had jurisdiction under §§ 1343(3) and (4). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court should have dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction; that a constitutional claim must involve more a contention that the Supremacy Clause requires that a federal statute be given effect over conflicting state law; that the Social Security Act is not an Act of Congress securing either 'equal rights' or 'civil rights' as those terms are used in § 1343; and that those terms limit the grant of federal jurisdiction under § 1343 even if § 1983 creates a remedy for a broader category of statutory claims. Respondents in No. 77-719 brought a class action in Federal District Court claiming that Texas

regulations requiring that Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits be reduced if the recipient shares a household with a nondependent person violate § 402(a)(7) of the Social Security Act and implementing regulations. The District Court's judgment upholding the Texas regulations was reversed by the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court held that the District Court had jurisdiction under § 1343(4) since § 1983 is an Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights within the meaning of the jurisdictional grant. Held: Federal district courts' jurisdiction under §§ 1343(3) and (4) does not encompass claims, such as those involved here, that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security Act, and hence the District Court in neither case had jurisdiction. Pp. 607-623.

(a) To give meaning to § 1343, it must be concluded that an allegation of incompatibility between federal and state statutes and regulations does not, in itself, give rise to claim 'secured by the Constitution' within the meaning of § 1343(3). The entire reference in § 1343(3) to rights secured by an Act of Congress would be unnecessary if the earlier reference to constitutional claims embraced those resting solely on the Supremacy Clause, and, more importantly, the additional language describing a limited category of Acts of Congress—those 'providing for equal rights' plainly negates the notion that jurisdiction over all statutory claims had already been conferred by the preceding reference to constitutional claims. Pp. 612-615.

(b) Section 1983 is not a statute that secures 'equal rights' or 'civil rights' within the meaning of § 1343. One cannot go into court and claim 'a violation of § 1983,' for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything, but simply provides a remedy. While § 1983, when properly invoked, satisfies the first requirement of § 1343(3) that the civil action be 'authorized by law,' it cannot satisfy the second requirement that the action be one to redress the deprivation of rights 'secured by the Constitution of the United States or by an Act of Congress providing for equal rights.' Since § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all, it is not a statute 'providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote' within the meaning of § 1343(4), and, moreover, to construe § 1343(4) as encompassing all federal statutory suits would be plainly inconsistent with the congressional intent in passing that statute ensure federal-court jurisdiction over authorized suits by the Attorney General against conspiracies to deprive individuals of certain enumerated rights. Pp. 615-620.

(c) Section 1343 does not confer federal jurisdiction over claims based on the Social Security Act, since that Act is not a statute securing

'equal rights' within § 1343(3) or 'civil rights' within § 1343(4). While the provisions of the Act at issue here, to the extent that they prescribe a minimum level of subsistence for all individuals, might be regarded as securing either 'equal rights' or 'civil rights,' these terms have a more restrictive meaning as used in § 1343. Pp. 620-623.

No. 77-5324, 560 F.2d 160, affirmed; No. 77-719, 555 F.2d 1219, reversed and remanded.

David H. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Tex., Austin, Tex., argued, for petitioners in No. 77-719; with him on the brief were John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., David M. Kendall, Jr., First Asst. Atty. Gen., and Steve Bickerstaff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex.

Theodore A. Gardner, Jersey City, N. J., argued and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 77-5324.

Jeffrey J. Skarda, Houston, Tex., argued, for respondents in No. 77-719; with him on the briefs were Henry A. Freedman, New York City, Michael B. Trister, and John C. Williamson, Washington, D. C.

Stephen Skillman, Asst. Atty. Gen. of N. J., Trenton, N. J., argued, for respondents in No. 77-5324; with him on the brief were John J. Degnan, Atty. Gen., and Richard M. Hluchan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Trenton, N. J.

Mr. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States District Courts have jurisdiction over civil actions claiming a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States or by Acts of Congress pro-

viding for equal rights or for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. ¹ The question presented by these cases is whether that jurisdiction encompasses a claim that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security Act. We conclude that it does not.

In the Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress authorized partial federal funding of approved state programs providing emergency assistance for certain needy persons.² In February 1976, Julia Gonzalez, the petitioner in No. 77-5324, requested the Hudson County, N. J., Welfare Board to pay her $163 in emergency assistance funds to cover her rent and utility bills.³ The Board denied her request because

petitioner and her children were not 'in a state of homelessness' as required by the relevant New Jersey regulations.⁴

Petitioner brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that the emergency payment was 'necessary to avoid destitution' within the meaning of § 406(e)(1) of the federal Social Security Act,⁵ and she was therefore entitled to the payment notwithstanding the more stringent New Jersey regulation. In her federal complaint she sought damages of $163 and an injunction

commanding the New Jersey Welfare Director to conform his administration of the State's emergency assistance program to federal statutory standards. In essence, petitioner claimed that the New Jersey officials had deprived her of a right to emergency assistance protected by § 406(e)(1) of the Social Security Act.

The District Court held that the complaint stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁶ Without deciding whether the 'secured by the constitution' language in § 1343(3) should be construed to include Supremacy Clause claims,⁷ the District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction under both subparagraphs (3) and (4) of § 1343. But in doing so, the court did not explain whether it was § 1983 or § 406(e)(1) of the Social Security Act that it viewed as the Act of Congress securing 'equal rights' or 'civil rights.' On the merits, the District Court found no conflict between the state regulation and the federal statute and entered summary judgment for respondents.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not address the merits because it concluded that the District Court should have dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction.⁸ In

reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals first noted that § 1983 'is not a jurisdictional statute; it only fashions a remedy.' 560 F.2d 160, 164 (1977). Nor could jurisdiction be founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331,⁹ the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, since the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000. The court recognized that when a constitutional claim is of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction, a district court has power to consider other claims which might not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.¹⁰ But it concluded that the constitutional claim must involve more than a contention that the Supremacy Clause requires that a federal statute be given effect over conflicting state law. It then went on to hold that the Social Security Act is not an Act of Congress securing either 'equal rights' or 'civil rights' as those terms are used in § 1343. And those terms, the court concluded, limit the grant of federal jurisdiction conferred by § 1343 even if § 1983 creates a remedy for a broader...