United States v. Montgomery

• Decision Date: 02 March 2020
• Docket Number: 2:14-cr-00205
• Citation: 442 F.Supp.3d 875
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Price MONTGOMERY and James Perrin, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

442 F.Supp.3d 875

UNITED STATES of America

v.Price MONTGOMERY and James Perrin, Defendants.

2:14-cr-00205

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed March 2, 2020

Amended March 4, 2020

Gregory J. Nescott, Rebecca Ross Haywood, Shaun E. Sweeney, Troy Rivetti, Ross E. Lenhardt, Lee J. Karl, Heidi M. Grogan, United States Attorney's Office, Pittsburgh, PA, for United States of America.

Douglas Sughrue, Sughrue Law, Pittsburgh, PA, Jay T. McCamic, McCamic Law Firm, PLLC, Wheeling, WV, for Defendant Price Montgomery.

Michael J. DeRiso, DeRiso & DeRiso, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant James Perrin USMS 35370068.

AMENDED OPINION ^*

Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge

In November 2018, a jury found Price Montgomery and James Perrin guilty of all charges alleged against them in a Second Superseding Indictment. For both Montgomery and Perrin, those charges included unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After the jury's verdict, but before the Court could sentence Montgomery and Perrin, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019). Rehaif interpreted § 922(g) to include a new element—that the defendant knew he belonged to a class of people who could not lawfully possess a firearm. Since that was not the law at the time of Montgomery and Perrin's trial, the Court had not instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that both men knew their prohibited status. To the contrary, the Court affirmatively instructed the jury that it did not need to find that Montgomery and Perrin knew their prohibited status to convict under § 922(g)(1).

Both now move for a new trial on their § 922(g)(1) counts based on Rehaif . To uphold Montgomery and Perrin's conviction, this Court would need to look at evidence the jury never saw and then apply that evidence to an element the jury never considered. That is something the Court cannot do. For the reasons that follow, a new trial on the § 922(g)(1) counts is necessary. Montgomery and Perrin's Motions (ECF Nos. 737 and 745), are GRANTED.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2016, a federal grand jury returned a Second Superseding Indictment against Price Montgomery, James Perrin, and two (2) other co-defendants. (ECF No. 153.) The top line charges were among some of the most serious criminal offenses the United States can bring. The United States alleged that Montgomery and Perrin orchestrated a multi-state heroin distribution conspiracy. And even more serious, the United States alleged that Montgomery murdered Tina Crawford, a federal witness, as she left her Pittsburgh home to meet with federal prosecutors about that drug conspiracy. (Id. at 12–14.)

Also among Montgomery and Perrin's alleged offenses were unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) —Count III against Perrin and Count IV against Montgomery. (Id. at 3–5.) The United States alleged that both Montgomery and Perrin fell into § 922(g)(1)'s category of individuals who could not lawfully possess a firearm, because both had prior felony convictions. (Id. ) Only the § 922(g)(1) charges—Counts III and IV—are at issue today, so the Court's recitation of the facts relates only to those counts.

The case against Montgomery and Perrin went to trial, with each represented by his own counsel. Shortly before the trial began, Montgomery, Perrin, and the United States filed their joint stipulations. (Joint Stipulation, ECF No. 472.) Two (2) of the joint stipulations related to Montgomery and Perrin's § 922(g)(1) charges. (Id. at 1.) In short, the parties stipulated that all the firearms referenced in Counts III and IV were manufactured outside of Pennsylvania; that both defendants had prior felony convictions; and that neither had his right to possess a firearm restored before the date alleged in the Second Superseding Indictment. (Id. ) The effect of the stipulation was to prevent the United States from introducing any evidence about Montgomery and Perrin's past convictions beyond what was mentioned in the stipulation. For the § 922(g)(1) counts, then, the brunt of the United States' evidence at trial would relate to whether Montgomery and Perrin knowingly possessed the firearms.

At trial, the United States did just that, introducing evidence that it believed proved that both Perrin and Montgomery knowingly possessed the firearms alleged in the Second Superseding Indictment. The United States did not, however, offer any evidence related to Montgomery and Perrin's past convictions. Instead, as the parties agreed, the United States read the following stipulation to the jury during its case-in-chief:

The parties stipulate and agree to the following facts and testimony:

One, the parties stipulate and agree that all 16 firearms charged in the felon-in-possession counts of the second superseding indictment, Counts 3 and 4, Joint Exhibits Nos. J17-1 through J17-16, were manufactured outside of Pennsylvania and, therefore, traveled across state lines prior to being present in Pennsylvania.

James Perrin, Price Montgomery, and the United States stipulate and agree that prior to June 8, 2014, James Perrin and Price Montgomery were each convicted of a crime which was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and at no time thereafter was either defendant's ability to lawfully possess a firearm restored.

(ECF No. 694, at 20:2–16.)

Neither Montgomery nor Perrin presented any evidence to rebut the United States' case-in-chief. Instead, both defendants made oral motions for judgment of acquittal on all counts, including the § 922(g)(1) charges. (Id. at 200:7–213:22.) The Court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the United States, denied both oral motions. (Id. at 213:23–219:21.) Montgomery then rested. (Id. at 227:9–18.) Followed by Perrin. (Id. at 227:21–23.)

After the parties rested, the Court went over the proposed final jury instructions with counsel. Neither defendant objected to the Court's proposed instructions as to Count III or IV. (Id. at 230:7–253:5.) The parties elected to have the Court instruct the jury before closing arguments. (ECF No. 695, at 21:17–22:15.) As to Counts III and IV, the Court instructed the jury as follows:

Count 3 of the indictment charges James Perrin with possessing a firearm on or about June 8, 2014, after he was convicted of committing a felony crime prior to that date, in violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Section 922(g)(1).

Count 4 charges Price Montgomery with possessing a firearm on or about June 8, 2014, after he was convicted of committing a felony crime prior to that date, in violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 922(g)(1).

To find a defendant guilty of possessing a firearm after a prior felony conviction, the prosecution must prove each of the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant was convicted of a felony, that is, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Second, that after that conviction, the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm as charged in the count of the indictment.

Third, that the defendant's possession was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

In order to find a defendant guilty of the offense at Counts 3 or 4, you must find that the prosecution proved that before the date the defendant is charged with possessing a firearm, the defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Now, in this case, the prosecution and defendant Montgomery have stipulated that prior to June 8, 2014, defendant Montgomery had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

The prosecution and defendant James Perrin have stipulated that prior to June 8, 2014, the defendant Perrin had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

Ladies and gentlemen, to satisfy the first element, you need only find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was, in fact, convicted of that crime and the conviction was prior to the date of the possession of the weapon as charged in the indictment. It is not necessary that the prosecution prove that the defendant knew that the crime was punishable by imprisonment for more than one year , nor is it necessary for the defendant to have been sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year.

You have heard evidence and/or a stipulation that a defendant was convicted prior to possessing a firearm of a felony crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. This prior conviction was brought to your attention only because it tends to establish one of the elements of the crime of felon in possession of a firearm as set out in the indictment.

You are not to speculate as to the nature of this conviction. You may not consider the prior conviction in deciding whether a defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm that he is charged with possessing which is a disputed issue in this case.

The fact that a defendant was found guilty of another crime on another occasion does not mean that he committed the felon in possession crime charged in the indictment and you must not use his guilt of the prior crime as proof of the felon in possession crime charged in the indictment except for the one element of that crime which I mentioned.

You may find the defendant guilty of the felon in possession crime only if the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of that crime.¹

(Id. at 68:7–71:1 (emphasis added).)

The parties then gave their closing arguments and the jury began its deliberations. On November 13, 2018, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts against Montgomery and Perrin, including the § 922(g)(1) charges at Counts III and IV.

A little over seven (7) months after the jury's verdict the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Rehaif which interpreted the elements in § 922(g). At...