Sawyer v. State
| Citation | 442 So.2d 1136 |
| Decision Date | 28 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-KA-1566,81-KA-1566 |
| Parties | Robert SAWYER v. STATE of Louisiana. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Louisiana |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., William C. Credo, III, Phillip J. Reeves, Louise Korns, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Elizabeth W. Cole, New Orleans, Tulane Law School Clinic, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and subsequently sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in State v. Sawyer, 422 So.2d 95 (La.1982). Defendant applied for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, on the ground that evidence of another crime not considered a statutory aggravating circumstance was admitted at the sentencing, thereby injecting an arbitrary factor into the jury's decision making process. The Supreme Court, 463 U.S. 1223, 103 S.Ct. 3567, 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 remanded the case to this court for consideration in light of the holding in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).
The gruesome and depraved facts surrounding this case were given a thorough treatment in the court's previous opinion. See Sawyer, 422 So.2d 95 (La.1983). Therefore, we give only a brief recitation of the circumstances leading to defendant's conviction. On September 29, 1979, Fran Arwood was at the residence of defendant, where she was helping to care for the young children of defendant's live-in girlfriend. Defendant and a friend, Charles Lane, attacked Ms. Arwood, striking her repeatedly in the face. Thereafter, the two men proceeded to torture the victim by first dunking her body into scalding water, then beating her and ultimately, setting fire to the victim's genitalia with lighter fluid. The testimony of Ms. Shano at trial also indicated that, at some stage, the victim was raped. After this savage attack defendant and Lane left the mortally wounded victim on the floor of the house until relatives of Ms. Shano arrived later in the day.
Both defendant and Lane were indicted for first degree murder. Lane was tried separately and sentenced to life imprisonment. State v. Lane, 414 So.2d 1223 (La.1982). Defendant was convicted by a unanimous jury, which then proceeded to sentence defendant to death.
At the sentencing hearing, the State reoffered evidence presented in its case in chief to establish that defendant had murdered the victim while in the perpetration of aggravated arson and aggravated rape, and that defendant had murdered the victim in an unusually cruel manner. Additionally, the State called a deputy prosecutor from Arkansas, who introduced documentary evidence that defendant had pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter of a four-year old child, and had served one year in prison as a result. Afterwards, defendant testified about the guilty plea and his version of the event leading to the child's death. Both defendant and his sister offered mitigating testimony as to defendant's brutal childhood and one time institutionalization at a state mental health facility.
Upon hearing all the evidence, the jury announced its finding of three statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that defendant was engaged in the perpetration of aggravated arson; (2) that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious and cruel manner; (3) that defendant was previously convicted of an unrelated murder and sentenced defendant to death. On appeal, this court found that the last aggravating circumstance was not supported by the evidence, 422 So.2d at 101, but correctly observed that only one aggravating circumstance need be found in order to place defendant in the category of offenders capable of receiving the death penalty. Defendant, however, argued that introduction of testimony relating to the manslaughter plea was improper, since it was neither admissible as an aggravating circumstance in the guilt phase of the trial, nor as other crimes evidence in the sentencing phase where defendant had not previously placed his character at issue. In upholding the admission of the testimony, this court found that Louisiana C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 allowed the evidence to be considered to show defendant's bad character, reasoning that defendant's character is put at issue by the nature of the proceeding, regardless of whether he takes the witness stand on his own behalf and places his character at issue.
On remand, we are asked to consider our previous holding in light of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a Georgia sentencing statute, finding that the invalidity of several aggravating circumstances found by the jury did not impair the death sentence in the case. Based upon our reading of Zant, we frame the following issues for resolution: (1) Under the Louisiana statutory scheme, does the finding of an additional aggravating circumstance that is later found invalid have any affect on the jury's sentence determination, where evidence of the invalid circumstance was otherwise admissible? (2) Was evidence of the invalid aggravating circumstance admissible in the instant case to show defendant's character, where defendant had not first placed his character at issue? (3) If inadmissible, was the evidence so consequential that it injected an arbitrary factor in the jury's decision to sentence defendant to death?
Louisiana's capital sentencing procedure, La.C.Cr.P. arts. 905-905.9, is similar in many respects to the Georgia procedure examined in Zant. 1 As in Georgia, the trial of an individual charged with first degree murder is bifurcated; consisting of a guilt phase and a penalty phase. During the guilt phase of the trial, the jury must make the initial determination whether the defendant belongs in the class of offenders who may be exposed to the death penalty. La.R.S. 14:30 provides that in addition to specific intent to kill a human being, the offense must include one of four aggravating circumstances. 2 Once the defendant has been found guilty, the jury must then determine whether defendant will be given the death sentence.
The process of sentencing is explained in Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 905.3, which states:
A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists, and, after consideration of any mitigating circumstances, recommends that the sentence of death be imposed.
Clearly, then, the sentencing phase is itself broken down into two aspects. Initially, the jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstances before an offender can be sentenced to death. Because the aggravating circumstances listed in Article 905.4 include most of the aggravating circumstances listed in R.S. 14:30, the jury will usually have already found at least one aggravating circumstance before it reaches the penalty phase of the trial. Louisiana's scheme differs from Georgia's in this respect, for the class of offenders in Louisiana eligible for the death penalty is considerably narrower after the guilt phase of the trial. 3
Once a single aggravating circumstance is found, the jury may then consider all the evidence, both in aggravation and mitigation, in order to make the final determination that the offender should be put to death. The finding of additional aggravating circumstances are therefore unnecessary to advance the case to consideration of whether the death penalty will in fact be imposed. Nothing in the statutory scheme requires that the jury weigh two or more aggravating circumstances more heavily against the defendant than a single aggravating circumstance. Rather, the finding of statutory aggravating circumstances is simply a preliminary step before any balancing process can be undertaken. 4
While the failure of an aggravating circumstance may not of itself impair the sentence, the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence in support of the circumstance could inject an arbitrary factor in the sentencing process. Defendant maintains in the instant case that inadmissible evidence was put before the jury in the form of testimony of the involuntary manslaughter conviction.
Defendant's argument is based on the language of C.Cr.P. art. 905.2, which addresses the conduction of sentencing hearings. The article provides:
The sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender. The hearing shall be conducted according to the rules of evidence. Evidence relative to aggravating or mitigating circumstances shall be relevant irrespective of whether the defendant places his character at issue. Insofar as applicable, the procedure shall be the same as that provided for trial in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The jury may consider any evidence offered at the trial on the issue of guilt. The defendant may testify in his own behalf. In the event of retrial the defendant's testimony shall not be admissible except for purposes of impeachment.
Defendant contends that the second sentence of 905.2 precludes the introduction of other crimes evidence unless offered to show defendant's bad character, or to support a valid aggravating circumstance. 5 905.4(c) limits other crimes which may be considered aggravating circumstances to convictions of unrelated murders, aggravated rape, or aggravated kidnapping, or where the offender has a significant prior history of criminal activity. It does not include guilty pleas, or for that matter convictions of involuntary manslaughter. 6 Accordingly, defendant argues that he has not placed his character at issue by taking the stand, evidence of the guilty...
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