United States v. Knight
Decision Date | 27 May 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 20719.,20719. |
Citation | 443 F.2d 174 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arville B. KNIGHT, Carney Morgan, Jr. and John Ewing Taylor, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Joe B. Campbell, Bowling Green, Ky., Court appointed, Bell, Orr, Ayers & Moore, Bowling Green, Ky., for defendants-appellants, on brief.
George J. Long, U. S. Atty., W. Waverley Townes, Asst. U. S. Atty., Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellee, on brief.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and BROOKS and KENT, Circuit Judges.
This joint appeal is from the conviction of the three appellants for violating the moonshine whiskey laws in contravention of 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a) (1), (4) and (7). Two issues are presented: (1) Whether appellants were allowed a reasonable time to employ counsel and prepare for trial; and (2) whether the evidence supported the jury's verdict.1
We hold that on the facts of this case the appellants were denied the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel and reverse their convictions. We find it unnecessary to reach the second issue raised by appellants.
The appellants were arrested on September 26, 1969, by agents of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the United States Treasury Department on charges of operating a moonshine still. A preliminary hearing was held on October 15, 1969, before a United States Commissioner. The appellants were represented at the hearing by retained counsel, Mr. Dale Quillen of Nashville, Tennessee. The Commissioner found that the complaint filed by the ATF agents was based on probable cause and held the case to the November term of the District Court. The appellants were released on bond and subsequently were indicted by the grand jury.
All additional facts pertinent to the issue of whether the appellants were denied the right to counsel are contained in excerpts from the trial record.
The appellants' case was called by the District Court on November 10, 1969, and the following colloquy occurred:
Late the same day, the case was called again and the following colloquy occurred:
The next day, November 11, 1969, when the case was called the following colloquy occurred:
Mr. Dixie Satterfield, the attorney sent from Mr. Milliken's office, arrived shortly thereafter and immediately moved for a continuance on the ground that his clients "have just retained this attorney and that the attorney needs an opportunity to prepare the case." The motion was denied by the District Court. The attorney then said: The request was refused, but a recess of thirty minutes was granted to give Mr. Satterfield an opporunity to discuss the case with the appellants. The trial began following the recess and was completed the following day, resulting in the conviction of each appellant on all three counts of the indictment. Each appellant was sentenced to a term of three years on each count, such terms to run concurrently.
In denying the motion for a continuance the District Court ruled that it was the appellants' "fault that they didn't make arrangements" for securing counsel in time to prepare for trial. The appellants' "fault," if any, must be inferred from the facts set forth above.
On November 10, 1969, when their case was called, each appellant stated that he was represented by counsel, Mr. Quillen, who had agreed to be present on that date for trial. Mr. Quillen had represented the appellants at the preliminary hearing. Knight stated that when he last talked to Mr. Quillen on "Last Tuesday, a week ago" that Mr. Quillen said "he would be here today."
When Mr. Quillen did not appear to represent the appellants, the District Court reaffirmed their right to employ counsel of their choice. However, the appellants were given only until the following day, November 11, 1969, at 1 p. m., to retain counsel and return to court.
In United States v. Balk, 318 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), the defendant was informed by his retained counsel shortly before the trial date that he could not represent the defendant at trial. The defendant was forced to go to trial as scheduled with counsel not of his own selection. This court held in Balk that:
Id. at 291.
Balk is not dispositive of the present appeal since the appellants were successful in retaining counsel within the allotted time. They were able to retain counsel shortly before the 1 p. m. deadline, but first spoke directly with their attorney after 1 p. m. We consider the circumstances under which counsel was retained only as one factor bearing on the determinative issue of whether the appellants were denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial with the assistance of counsel.
In Townsend v. Bomar, 351 F.2d 499 (6th Cir.), this court set aside the defendants' state court conviction on the ground that the time allowed for preparation for trial was not sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. In Townsend the defendants were informed of their indictment, given separate appointed counsel, and were arraigned and tried all on the same day. The defendants later testified that they conferred with their counsel only fifteen minutes before going to trial. The appointed attorneys testified that they conferred with the defendants prior to trial for 45 minutes to two hours. No request for a continuance to prepare for trial was made. This court held in Townsend:
In Callahan v. Russell, 423 F.2d 450 (6th Cir.), a case involving a negotiated plea, this court commented on the Townsend holding as follows:
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