443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971), 71-1263, United States v. Gelbard

Docket Nº:71-1263, 71-1264.
Citation:443 F.2d 837
Party Name:UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David GELBARD, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sidney PARNAS, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Date:June 08, 1971
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
 
FREE EXCERPT

Page 837

443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

David GELBARD, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Sidney PARNAS, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 71-1263, 71-1264.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

June 8, 1971

Rehearings Denied June 23, 1971.

Page 838

Adrian Marshall (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant, Parnas.

Burton Marks (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant Gilbard.

Alfred N. King (argued), Atty., for Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Robert L. Meyer, U.S. Atty., Dennis E. Kinnaird, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KOELSCH, CARTER and TRASK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated appeals involve persons who proved recalcitrant when they appeared as witnesses before a federal grand jury and who were each committed to custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), after being adjudged guilty of civil contempt. In order to meet the rigorous statutory time limit imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) it was necessary to, and this court did, immediately following oral argument, render decision. We affirmed the judgment of the court below and stated an opinion would follow. This is that opinion.

Both Gelbard, the appellant in No. 71-1263, and Parnas, the appellant in No. 71-1264, refused to answer any questions based upon information gained by the government from wiretapping authorized by the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which is a part of Title III of the Omnibus Criminal Control Act and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 218. When cited for contempt in the district court, each attacked the constitutional validity of Section 2518, and additionally urged that he should not be required to testify until and unless first allowed to inspect all applications, orders, tapes and transcripts relating to such electronic surveillance and afforded an opportunity to suppress the use before the grand jury of any evidence so secured. The court rejected their contentions and held the statute valid.

We find it unnecessary to consider the district court's finding that Section 2518 is constitutionally valid. A witness before a grand jury lacks standing to challenge a statute on constitutional grounds unless the statute directly bears upon his privilege against...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP