United States v. Gelbard, 71-1263

Decision Date23 June 1971
Docket Number71-1264.,No. 71-1263,71-1263
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David GELBARD, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sidney PARNAS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Adrian Marshall (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant, Parnas.

Burton Marks (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant Gilbard.

Alfred N. King (argued), Atty., for Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Robert L. Meyer, U.S. Atty., Dennis E. Kinnaird, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KOELSCH, CARTER and TRASK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated appeals involve persons who proved recalcitrant when they appeared as witnesses before a federal grand jury and who were each committed to custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), after being adjudged guilty of civil contempt. In order to meet the rigorous statutory time limit imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) it was necessary to, and this court did, immediately following oral argument, render decision. We affirmed the judgment of the court below and stated an opinion would follow. This is that opinion.

Both Gelbard, the appellant in No. 71-1263, and Parnas, the appellant in No. 71-1264, refused to answer any questions based upon information gained by the government from wiretapping authorized by the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which is a part of Title III of the Omnibus Criminal Control Act and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 218. When cited for contempt in the district court, each attacked the constitutional validity of Section 2518, and additionally urged that he should not be required to testify until and unless first allowed to inspect all applications, orders, tapes and transcripts relating to such electronic surveillance and afforded an opportunity to suppress the use before the grand jury of any evidence so secured. The court rejected their contentions and held the statute valid.

We find it unnecessary to consider the district court's finding that Section 2518 is constitutionally valid. A witness before a grand jury lacks standing to challenge a statute on constitutional grounds unless the statute directly bears upon his privilege against self-incrimination. Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384, 386-387 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 2253, 26 L.Ed.2d 807 (1970). Section 2518 is not in that category.

It appears to be settled that a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) and Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958). Finally, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dudley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1140, 1141 (5th Cir.1970) "that nothing in the Omnibus Act, particularly § 2518(10) (a) created a statutory exception which would permit a pre-indictment motion to suppress evidence that might be presented to the grand jury. * * * The legislative history of the Act supports this conclusion. See Senate Report No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968) at p. 2195."1

1 The report contains this statement:

"Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself. Normally, there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented...

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    ...has been acknowledged and followed by at least two circuits United States v. Friedland, 444 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971) and this Court is not prepared to reject VI. WHETHER THE USE OF THE "PEN REGISTER" CONSTITUTED A GENERAL SEARCH IN VIO......
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    ...or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. . . ." 6 United States v. Gelbard (9th Cir. 1971) 443 F.2d 837. 7 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (Egan) (3d Cir. 1971) 450 F.2d 199; In re Grand Jury Proceedin......
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