Richardson v. Communications Workers of America

• Decision Date: 04 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 20326,20329 and 20330.,20326
• Parties: Dale C. RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Appellees. Dale C. RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Appellants. Dale C. RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, Inc., Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

443 F.2d 974 (1971)

Dale C. RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Appellees.

Dale C. RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Appellants.

Dale C. RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, Inc., Appellant.

Nos. 20326, 20329 and 20330.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 4, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edith D. Hakola, Arlington, Va., Dan J. Whiteside, Omaha, Neb., for Dale C. Richardson.

Robert E. O'Connor, Omaha, Neb., for Communications Workers of America and others.

Hird Stryker, Jr., of Fraser, Stryker, Marshall & Veach, Omaha, Neb., for Western Electric Co., Inc.

Before LAY, HEANEY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

This case brings to us issues of both liability and damages under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).¹ A jury returned a verdict of $20,000 in favor of Dale C. Richardson against both his former employer Western Electric Company, Inc., and the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, its District 7 and its Local 7495 (hereafter Union) for breach of the existing collective bargaining agreement by reason of discrimination and wrongful discharge from employment. The complaint basically alleged violation of the collective bargaining contract wherein both the employer and the Union covenanted not to "discriminate, coerce or interfere with employees because of membership or nonmembership in the Union."² The trial court reduced the verdict to $1,500 as the maximum recoverable due to the fact that the bargaining agreement "could have" terminated on March 20, 1967, some six and one-half months after the plaintiff's discharge.³ On appeal the plaintiff alleges error in the trial court's (1) limitation of the damages to the life of the collective bargaining contract, and (2) refusal to allow evidence of mental anguish or to submit it to the jury as an element of damage. Defendant Western Electric cross-appeals from the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Union contends on cross-appeal that the plaintiff's action should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust contractual remedies.

The plaintiff, Richardson, was originally employed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, by Western Electric on July 2, 1957. After transferring to Omaha, Nebraska, in 1962 he maintained his previous membership in the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. At the time of his discharge on September 1, 1966, he had reached the highest grade which an hourly employee could hold (Grade 5) and was second in seniority among the 164 hourly rated shop and warehouse employees in the Omaha plant. In 1965, Richardson became concerned over possible misuse of union funds and, getting no satisfactory explanation, he and two others withdrew from union membership in January of 1966. The withdrawal of the three left 161 employees as members of the Local. The evidence is that thereafter Richardson and the other two continuously received harassment and abuse both within the plant and outside it. Demonstrations against Richardson occurred daily in which the entire employee force took part. The record shows that obscenities were repeatedly directed at Richardson and the other two men by officers, stewards, and members of the Union. On September 1, 1966, Richardson and another employee got into an altercation. Richardson was discharged for violation of company rules.⁴ The evidence disclosed that, at a meeting with management, the Union had urged Richardson's discharge.

The court submitted special interrogatories to the jury which it answered as follows:

"Question Number One

"Do You Find from a Preponderance of the Evidence Regarding the Union\'s Conduct Toward the Plaintiff, from the Time He Discontinued His Union Membership, that the Union Would Have Failed to Fairly and in Good Faith Represent the Plaintiff in His Grievance Through the Steps of the Grievance Procedure, Including Arbitration, if Plaintiff had Requested the Union to do so?

"Yes v No

"If your answer to question number one is no, you need not proceed further

"Question Number Two

"Do You Find from a Preponderance of the Evidence that Section 25 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement which Provides that, `Neither the Company Nor the Union Nor any of its Agents Shall in any Manner Discriminate, Coerce, or Interfere with Employees Because of * * * Nonmembership in the Union * * * Neither the Union, Nor the Members, Representatives or Agents Thereof Shall Intimidate or Coerce any Employee into Membership or Continuing Membership Therein\' was Breached in Regard to the Plaintiff by:

A Western Electric Company, Incorporated

"Yes No v

B Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO International Labor Organization

"Yes v No

C Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO Local 7495

"Yes v No

"Question Number Three

"Do You Find from a Preponderance of the Evidence that the Plaintiff was Wrongfully Discharged in Breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the Defendant, Western Electric Company, Incorporated?

"Yes v No

"Question Number Four

"If so, do You Find from a Preponderance of the Evidence that the Wrongful Discharge was Proximately Caused by Actions of:

A Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO an International Labor Organization

"Yes v No

B Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO Local 7495

"Yes v No"

We pass first on plaintiff's claim against Western Electric.

It is now settled that an individual employee may, pursuant to § 301(a), litigate a claim for relief in federal court against an employer for wrongful discharge under a collective bargaining agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962). Cf. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). Although the trial court recognized this right, it limited plaintiff's damages to the period of time from the date of discharge to the termination date of the collective bargaining agreement. Western Electric justifies such limitation in reliance, inter alia, on Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 506, 253 N.W. 694, 700 (1934), which reads: "The contract between the union and the railroad company was limited to just one year, and therefore expired at the end of a year, and plaintiff could only recover for that period * * *." Federal law, however controls substantive relief under § 301. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S. at 456-457, 77 S.Ct. 912. In International Union, United Auto, etc., Workers of America v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), the Supreme Court, discussing the applicable statute of limitations under Indiana law,⁵ made it clear that a § 301 suit involves consideration of both the collective bargaining agreement and the hiring contract between the employee and employer. The Supreme Court observed:

"Proof of the breach and of the measure of damages, however, both depend upon proof of the existence and duration of separate employment contracts between the employer and each of the aggrieved employees. Hence, this § 301 suit may fairly be characterized as one not exclusively based upon a written contract." Id. at 706, 86 S.Ct. at 1114.

Although the claim for wrongful discharge against the employer arises out of the bargaining agreement, it is equally clear that the terms of the agreement do not create the job and that no specific obligation to hire flows from it. As has been often recognized, the collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract but rather, in a sense, agglomerates a variety of rights and methodology relating to the employer, the union, and the employees. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-581, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-335, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762 (1944). The employment relationships which arise under it do not exist separate from it in a vacuum totally void of other relevant circumstances. The expiration date of a bargaining contract does not place the employee in jeopardy of losing his job at the termination of the agreement. In fact one of the very incentives to union representation is job security. The employee, the union which represents him, the company which employs him, each contemplate a "subsisting" contractual relationship for an indefinite period of time. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Mich.L.Rev. 1 (1958). Note, 61 Column. L.Rev. 1363 (1961). This is particularly true in established industries where continual dealings with a recognized union foster renewals and renegotiations. Furthermore, the employee, the union and the company are placed on notice that even after the bargaining agreement terminates the rights and obligations of the parties continue under the umbrage of the National Labor Relations Act. The obligation of the parties to bargain for new contracts is written into law. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (5). The company cannot exercise unilateral action detrimental to fair bargaining. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962). Certain rights flowing from seniority status may not be unilaterally changed without affording the union the opportunity to bargain. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Detroit & T. S. L. R.R., 421 F.2d 660 (6 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 1817, 26 L.Ed.2d 90; NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595 (4 Cir. 1967); Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, sub nom Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 375 U.S. 984, 84 S.Ct. 516, 11 L.Ed.2d 472 (1964). The collective bargaining agreement in addition...