GTE Sylvania Inc. v. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COM'N

• Decision Date: 08 December 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 75-104.
• Citation: 443 F. Supp. 1152
• Parties: GTE SYLVANIA INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

443 F. Supp. 1152

GTE SYLVANIA INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION et al., Defendants.^*

Civ. A. No. 75-104.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

December 8, 1977.

James M. Tunnell, Jr. and William H. Sudell, Jr. of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Del., and Harry L. Shniderman, James M. McHaney, Jr. and Eugene C. Holloway of Covington & Burling, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs GTE Sylvania Inc. and Aeronutronic Ford Corp. (C.A.No.75-104 and C.A.No.75-116).

Richard J. Abrams of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Del., and Stephen B. Clarkson of Sullivan, Beauregard, Clarkson, Moss & Brown, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff The Magnavox Co. (C.A.No.75-112).

Januar D. Bove, Jr. of Connolly, Bove & Lodge, Wilmington, Del., and Thomas J. Touhey of Sullivan, Beauregard, Clarkson, Moss & Brown, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff Zenith Radio Corp. (C.A.No.75-113).

Charles S. Crompton, Jr., of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiffs Motorola, Inc. (C.A.No.75-114), Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America (C.A.No. 75-150), Toshiba America, Inc. (C.A.No.75-152) and Sharp Electronics Corp. (C.A.No. 75-151).

Walter T. Kuhlmey of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Motorola, Inc. (C.A.No.75-114).

Nancy L. Buc of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York City, for plaintiff Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America (C.A.No.75-150).

David Fleischer of Battle, Fowler, Lidstone, Jaffin, Pierce & Kheel, New York City, for plaintiff Toshiba America, Inc. (C.A.No.75-152).

Peter A. Dankin of Wender, Murase & White, New York City, for plaintiff Sharp Electronics Corp. (C.A.No.75-151).

Andrew G. T. Moore, II of Connolly, Bove & Lodge, Wilmington, Del., and Charles C. Hileman, III, Ira P. Tiger, and Deena J. Schneider of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff RCA Corp. (C.A.No.75-108).

Howard M. Berg of Berg & Sawyer, P. A., Wilmington, Del., and Michael A. Stiegel of Arnstein, Gluck, Weitzenfeld & Minow, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Warwick Electronics, Inc. (C.A.No.75-115).

Henry N. Herndon, Jr. and Edward M. McNally of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Del., and H. Woodruff Turner of Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchison, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff Admiral Corp. (C.A.No.75-131).

H. James Conaway, Jr. and Frederick W. Iobst of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, Del., Robert W. Steele and Alan M. Grimaldi of Howrey & Simon, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff General Elec. Co. (C.A.No.75-136).

James W. Garvin, Jr., U. S. Atty. and John H. McDonald, Asst. U. S. Atty., Wilmington, Del., Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sandra Wien Simon and Bruce Titus, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Theodore J. Garrish, Gen. Counsel and Jeanette Wiltse and Edward J. Cull, Attys., Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

OPINION

LATCHUM, Chief Judge.

On October 23, 1975, this Court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law when it granted plaintiffs'¹ motions to enjoin preliminarily the Consumer Product Safety Commission (the "Commission") from disclosing certain "TV-related accident data" submitted by the plaintiffs and a computer printout summarizing that data to the public in response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 404 F.Supp. 352 (D.Del.1975). Because the prior opinion sets forth the factual background of this litigation in great detail, it will not be rehearsed here.

The Court based its decision to grant a preliminary injunction on the Commission's failure to comply with Section 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1). Section 6(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:

The Commission shall take reasonable steps to assure, prior to its public disclosure thereof, 1 that information from which the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler may be readily ascertained is accurate, and 2 that such disclosure is fair in the circumstances and 3 reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of the Act.

The Court found on the uncontested facts that the Commission had wholly failed to take reasonable steps to assure that any of the three prerequisites for public disclosure of the TV-related accident data were met. 404 F.Supp. at 370-73.

The consolidated cases are presently before the Court (1) on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment to make the preliminary injunction permanent² and (2) on the Commission's motions to vacate the outstanding preliminary injunction and for summary judgment.³

Despite the two-year passage of time, the undisputed facts upon which the Court based its earlier decision have not changed. Thus, the Court need not reconsider any of its earlier findings and conclusions in order to take account of any intervening changes in the factual situation. However, the Commission does contend that there have been intervening changes of law which should prompt this Court to reconsider its previous decision. To these arguments we now turn.

I. COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 6(b)

First, in opposing the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction, the Commission suggested that Section 6(b)(1) applies only to affirmative disclosures initiated by the agency, such as press releases and publications, and not to disclosures made in response to FOIA requests.⁴ The Court rejected such an interpretation of Section 6(b) because it contravened the legislative history of the section.⁵ Nevertheless, the Commission has renewed the argument, contending that two developments since the Court's previous decision support the Commission's position. The developments are: (1) the Commission formally endorsed the interpretation of Section 6(b)(1) which limits the section's applicability to "affirmative" disclosures initiated by the agency,⁶ and (2) Congress, in explaining a 1976 amendment to Section 29 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 2078), used language which arguably indicates acceptance of the Commission's interpretation. After considering both these developments, however, the Court remains convinced that Congress did not intend to make Section 6(b) inapplicable in the face of an FOIA request.

The Commission, relying on three Supreme Court cases,⁷ contends that its interpretation of Section 6(b) deserves great weight in this Court. Although the cases cited establish the principle that on matters of statutory construction a court should give deference "to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration,"⁸ they do not justify the application of that principle in this case. Two of them, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11-12, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) and Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965), involved long-established administrative interpretations which the respective agencies had applied consistently and frequently.⁹ In sharp contrast, the interpretation being advanced by the Commission here did not arise until after the present controversy began. The third case cited by the Commission, E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54, 97 S.Ct. 2229, 2234, 53 L.Ed.2d 100 (1977), is also distinguishable. There, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") as to the appropriate method for determining value in a merger involving a closed end investment company. The Court noted that the SEC had "long recognized" the method it used, and that it was, "as Congress contemplated, the product of the agency's long and intimate familiarity with the investment company industry." Id. at 55, 97 S.Ct. at 2234. This case, on the other hand, presents a narrow legal issue which is readily susceptible to judicial resolution and requires no special expertise of the Commission. In sum, because none of the factors which warrant deference to an agency's position exist in this case, the Court will accord no special weight to the Commission's interpretation of Section 6(b)(1).

The second development which the Commission contends supports its interpretation of Section 6(b)(1) is a statement in the legislative history of a 1976 amendment to Section 29 of the Act.¹⁰ Section 29, 15 U.S.C. § 2078, concerns cooperation between the Commission and other federal and state agencies. The 1976 amendment authorizes the Commission to provide nonconfidential portions of accident and investigation reports to such agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 2078(e). The amendment further provides:

No Federal agency or State or local agency or authority may disclose to the public any information contained in a report received by the agency or authority under this subsection unless with respect to such information the Commission has complied with the applicable requirements of section 6(b) of the Act. Id.

The explanation of the amendment to Section 29 contained in the Conference Report includes the following statement:

The requirement that the Commission comply with section 6(b) prior to another Federal agency's public disclosure of information obtained under the Act is not intended by the conferees to supersede or conflict with the requirements of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3) and (a)(6)). The former relates to public disclosure initiated by the Federal agency while the latter relates to disclosure initiated by a specific request from a member of the public under the FOIA.

H.R.Rep.No. 1022, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 1029 (emphasis supplied).

Although the statement of the Conference Committee appears consistent with the interpretation espoused by the Commission, it does not present a reliable basis for inferring that four years earlier, when Section 6(b) was enacted, Congress intended to make it inapplicable to disclosures made in response...