Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd.
| Citation | 443 So.2d 296 |
| Decision Date | 27 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-510,83-510 |
| Parties | Alan GREENSTEIN and Cindy Greenstein, Appellants, v. GREENBROOK, LTD., Jack A. Winston, Ira Grabow, Florida Housing Capital Corporation and Housing Capital Corporation, Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
George, Hartz, Burt & Lundeen and Charles George, Miami, for appellants.
Goldberg, Semet, Lickstein & Morgenstern, Coral Gables, and Alan R. Stone, Miami, for appellees.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and BASKIN, JJ.
The Greensteins' suit for specific performance against the seller, Greenbrook, Ltd., and the alleged titleholder, Florida Housing Capital Corporation, of the home they contracted to purchase ended in a judgment for the defendants which was affirmed in Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 413 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The plaintiffs then instituted the present action seeking damages sustained in that transaction based upon theories of breach of contract as against Greenbrook, and interference with the Greenstein-Greenbrook contractual relationship as against Florida Housing and three additional defendants, Jack Weinstein, Ira Grabow and Housing Capital Corporation. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice and the Greensteins again appeal.
We affirm the dismissal of the defendants Greenbrook and Florida Housing upon the application of that aspect of the doctrine of res judicata which forbids "splitting" a cause of action. When the plaintiffs initially sued those defendants, it was incumbent upon them then to raise all available claims or demands for relief arising out of the alleged breach. Their failure to do so precludes subjecting those defendants to another successive action based on the same conduct. Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793, 10 So.2d 432 (1942); Beck v. Pennsylvania National Mut. Casualty Co., 279 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); 1 Fla.Jur.2d Actions §§ 56, 59 (1977).
This ground, however, obviously has no application to the three defendants, Weinstein, Grabow, and Housing Capital Corporation, who were not joined in the first case. Since we find that the complaint states a cause of action against them for tortious interference with a contractual or business relation, e.g., Nitzberg v. Zalesky, 370 So.2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the dismissal of the complaint against them is reversed for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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...case that appears to have merged a transactional res judicata test into a splitting cause of action analysis is Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 443 So.2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). There the court held that a plaintiff had improperly split claims for breach of contract and tortious interferenc......
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...action and which "precludes subjecting ... defendants to another successive action based on this same conduct." Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 443 So.2d 296 (Fla.3d DCA 1983) (purchaser's failure to raise breach of contract claim in first action precluded second action for breach of contra......
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Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 86-1023
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Legal theories & defenses
...to do so precludes subjecting those defendants to another successive action based on the same conduct. Source Greenstein v. Greenbrook , 443 So.2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). §18:250.1.4 Elements — 4th DCA The law does not permit an owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indiv......