Mercer v. Raine

Decision Date28 July 1983
Docket NumberNo. 61963,61963
PartiesLeonard J. MERCER, Jr., etc., Petitioner, v. J.D. RAINE, Sr., et al., Respondents.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Joel L. Kirschbaum of Esler & Kirschbaum, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.

Douglas K. Silvis and Robert A. Ware, of English, McCaughan & O'Bryan, Fort Lauderale, for respondents.

ADKINS, Justice.

This cause is before us on petition to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Mercer v. Raine, 410 So.2d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The decision conflicts with Santuoso v. McGrath & Associates, Inc., 385 So.2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

Petitioner, defendant below, seeks review of the district court's decision which affirmed the trial court's order granting sanctions against the defendant for violations of discovery rules. We also affirm.

The plaintiffs below filed their complaint against the defendant on September 14, 1979, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract for the sale of a hotel. Plaintiffs initiated discovery by including a request for admissions and a request to produce in their service upon the defendant along with the complaint. On September 24, 1979, plaintiffs sent their first set of interrogatories to the defendant. Defendant responded to their discovery by: 1) filing a motion to dismiss on September 26, 1979; 2) filing a motion for extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' requests to produce and for admissions on September 27, 1979; and 3) filing an objection to the interrogatories on October 2, 1979, on the ground that the defendant should not have to respond until after a hearing on the motion to dismiss.

On November 27, 1979, the trial court entered an order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and requiring the defendant to respond to all pending discovery within twenty days. A few days later the defendant filed his answer. He failed, however, to comply with the order as to discovery, to request an extension of time, or to communicate with the court concerning any mitigating circumstances within the twenty days granted by the court.

On December 26, 1979, plaintiffs filed a motion to strike affirmative defenses and followed that with a motion for sanctions on January 14, 1980. On January 11, the defendant's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing as grounds, in addition to nonpayment, other conduct by his client rendering representation unreasonably difficult, including the defendant's failure to assist counsel in responding to discovery. Plaintiff's pending motions and the motion to withdraw were all heard on February 7, 1979. The court granted the defendant's lawyer leave to withdraw from the case and also granted the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. The trial court, in granting plaintiffs' motion, struck the defendant's answer, entered a default judgment against the defendant, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs and fees occasioned by his refusal to comply with the court's order.

There is no question that the defendant failed to timely comply with the requirements of the trial court's order. The defendant does not contend that the trial court was without authority to enter some sanction against him for his failure to timely comply with plaintiff's discovery requests and the court's order. However, the defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in entering the particular sanctions it did without affording the defendant an opportunity to cure the violation by compliance and in the absence of a finding by the court that the noncompliance was willful or that plaintiffs suffered any undue prejudice due to the defendant's noncompliance.

We cannot agree with defendant's contentions. The brief per curiam opinion of the district court affirmed the trial court based upon a rule of law announced by this Court in 1972 in Farish v. Lum's, Inc., 267 So.2d 325 (Fla.1972). In Farish, the trial court had granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant's answers to a request for admissions were not properly filed. On appeal the district court reversed and remanded the cause to permit the filing of properly executed answers. We reversed the district court of appeal on writ of certiorari. In Farish, this Court stated:

The exercise of discretion by a trial judge who sees the parties first-hand and is more fully informed of the situation, is essential to the just and proper application of procedural rules. In the absence of facts showing an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision excusing, or refusing to excuse, noncompliance with rules ... must be affirmed.... It is the duty of the trial court, and not the appellate courts, to make that determination.

Id. at 327-28. This same rule of law has been stated and followed by the United States Supreme Court. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). Thus, to justify reversal, it would have to be shown on appeal that the trial court clearly erred in its interpretation of the facts and the use of its judgment and not merely that the court, or another fact-finder, might have made a different factual determination.

This Court has spoken of the scope of this discretionary power granted to the trial court. In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), we stated:

In reviewing a true discretionary act, the appellate court must fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and should apply the "reasonableness" test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed only when his decision fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness.

Id. at...

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264 cases
  • Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • September 29, 2005
    ...of discretion" standard that governs appellate review of a trial court's decision regarding sanctions. See, e.g., Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944, 945-46 (Fla.1983) (holding that a trial court's order granting sanctions should be reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard). That rational......
  • Valcin v. Public Health Trust of Dade County
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 1984
    ...turned over upon request, a judgment on liability against the offending party has been held to be an appropriate remedy. Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944 (Fla.1983) (within the trial court's discretion to enter default against defendant for willful noncompliance with discovery order); Agencia......
  • Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, Case No. SC01-1830 (FL 7/7/2005)
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 7, 2005
    ...of discretion" standard that governs appellate review of a trial court's decision regarding sanctions. See, e.g., Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 945-46 (Fla. 1983) (holding that a trial court's order granting sanctions should be reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard). That ration......
  • Bryant v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 28, 2005
    ...striking pleadings and dismissing with prejudice are considered severe sanctions that require a strong justification. In Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944, 946 (Fla.1983), this Court We agree that the striking of pleadings... is the most severe of all sanctions which should be employed only in......
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8 books & journal articles
  • Discovery and use of experts
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Family Law and Practice - Volume 1
    • April 30, 2022
    ...compelling discovery is the most severe of all sanctions which should be employed only in extreme circumstances (citing Mercer v. Raine , 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983); and dismissal or default based on a discovery violation is a per se abuse of discretion if the trial court fails to make......
  • Appellate standards of review.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 73 No. 11, December - December 1999
    • December 1, 1999
    ...exercised in the trial court's discretion; here, appellate courts will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. See Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. The test for whether discretion has been abused is one of reasonableness--that is "[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety......
  • Fraud on the court as a basis for dismissal with prejudice or default: an old remedy has new teeth.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 78 No. 2, February 2004
    • February 1, 2004
    ...1st DCA 2000): We review a trial court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983); Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 82-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). As the Mercer court explained: "[T]o justify reversal, it would h......
  • Review of orders dismissing or defaulting for discovery violations: the evolution of the abuse of discretion standard.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 83 No. 5, May 2009
    • May 1, 2009
    ...before an order of dismissal or default will be upheld on appeal. The seminal case first expanding Rule 1.380 is Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983), in which the Florida Supreme Court held that the mere failure to comply with a discovery order is, by itself, insufficient to justify......
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