Columbus Board of Education v. Penick

Decision Date02 July 1979
Docket NumberNo. 78-610,78-610
Citation99 S.Ct. 2941,443 U.S. 449,61 L.Ed.2d 666
PartiesCOLUMBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Petitioners, v. Gary L. PENICK et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

This class action was brought in 1973 by students in the Columbus, Ohio, school system, charging that the Columbus Board of Education (Board) and its officials had pursued and were pursuing a course of conduct having the purpose and effect of causing and perpetuating racial segregation in the public schools, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was ultimately tried in April-June 1976, final arguments were heard in September 1976, and in March 1977 the District Court filed an opinion and order containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found (1) that in 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (Brown I), was decided, the Board was not operating a racially neutral unitary school system, but was conducting "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus" and that this was "the direct result of cognitive acts or omissions of those school board members and administrators who had originally intentionally caused and later perpetuated the racial isolation"; (2) that since the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (Brown II), the Board had been under a continuous constitutional obligation to disestablish its dual system and that it has failed to discharge this duty; and (3) that in the intervening years since 1954 there had been a series of Board actions and practices that could not "reasonably be explained without reference to racial concerns" and that "intentionally aggravated, rather than alleviated," racial separation in the schools. Ultimately concluding that at the time of trial the racial segregation in the Columbus school system "directly resulted from [the Board's] intentional segregative acts and omissions," in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court, accordingly, enjoined the defendants from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race in operating the public schools and ordered the submission of a systemwide desegregation plan. Subsequently, following the decision in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (Dayton I ), the District Court rejected the Board's argument that that decision required or permitted modification of the court's finding or judgment. Based on its examination of the record, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments against the defendants. Held:

1. On the record, there is no apparent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the District Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the Board's conduct at the time of trial and before not only was animated by an unconstitutional, segregative purpose, but also had current segregative impact that was sufficiently systemwide to warrant the remedy ordered by the District Court. Pp. 454-463.

(a) Proof of purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of separate black schools in a substantial part of the system is itself prima facie proof of a dual system and supports a finding to this effect absent sufficient contrary proof by the Board, which was not forthcoming in this case. Pp. 455-458.

(b) The Board's continuing affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system, mandated by Brown II, is beyond question, and there is nothing in the record to show that at the time of trial the dual school system in Columbus and its effects had been disestablished. Pp. 458-461.

2. There is no indication that the judgments below rested on any misapprehension of the controlling law. Pp. 463-468.

(a) Where it appears that the District Court, while recognizing that disparate impact and foreseeable consequences, without more, do not establish a constitutional violation, correctly noted that actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact of a forbidden purpose, the court stayed well within the requirements of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450, that a plaintiff seeking to make out an equal protection violation on the basis of racial discrimination must show purpose. Pp. 464-465.

(b) Where the District Court repeatedly emphasized that it had found purposefully segregative practices with current, systemwide impact, there was no failure to observe the requirements of Dayton I, that the remedy imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate with the violation ascertained. Pp. 465-467.

(c) Nor was there any misuse of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548, where it was held that purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a school system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of a systemwide discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted and that given the purpose to operate a dual school system one could infer a connection between such purpose and racial separation in other parts on the school system. Pp. 467-468.

6 Cir., 583 F.2d 787, affirmed.

Samuel H. Porter, Columbus, Ohio, for petitioners.

Thomas I. Atkins, Boston, Mass., for respondents.

Drew S. Days, III, Washington, D.C., for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

[Amicus Curiae intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The public schools of Columbus, Ohio, are highly segregated by race. In 1976, over 32% of the 96,000 students in the system were black. About 70% of all students attended schools that were at least 80% black or 80% white. 429 F.Supp. 229, 240 (SD Ohio 1977). Half of the 172 schools were 90% black or 90% white. 583 F.2d 787, 800 (CA6 1978). Fourteen named students in the Columbus school system brought this case on June 22, 1973, against the Columbus Board of Education, the State Board of Education, and the appropriate local and state officials.1 The second amended complaint, filed on October 22, 1974, charged that the Columbus defendants had pursued and were pursuing a course of conduct having the purpose and effect of causing and perpetuating segregation in the public schools, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. A declaratory judgment to this effect and appropriate injunctive relief were prayed. Trial of the case began more than a year later, consumed 36 trial days, produced a record containing over 600 exhibits and a transcript in excess of 6,600 pages, and was completed in June 1976. Final arguments were heard in September, and in March 1977 the District Court filed an opinion and order containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 429 F.Supp. 229.

The trial court summarized its findings:

"From the evidence adduced at trial, the Court has found earlier in this opinion that the Columbus Public Schools were openly and intentionally segregated on the basis of race when Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (Brown I )] was decided in 1954. The Court has found that the Columbus Board of Education never actively set out to dismantle this dual system. The Court has found that until legal action was initiated by the Columbus Area Civil Rights Council, the Columbus Board did not assign teachers and administrators to Columbus schools at random, without regard for the racial composition of the student enrollment at those schools. The Columbus Board even in very recent times . . . has approved optional attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas and boundary changes which have maintained and enhanced racial imbalance in the Columbus Public Schools. The Board, even in very recent times and after promising to do otherwise, has adjured [sic ] workable suggestions for improving the racial balance of city schools.

"Viewed in the context of segregative optional attendance zones, segregative faculty and administrative hiring and assignments, and the other such actions and decisions of the Columbus Board of Education in recent and remote history, it is fair and reasonable to draw an inference of segregative intent from the Board's actions and omissions discussed in this opinion." Id., at 260-261.

The District Court's ultimate conclusion was that at the time of trial the racial segregation in the Columbus school system "directly resulted from [the Board's] intentional segregative acts and omissions," id., at 259, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, judgment was entered against the local and state defendants enjoining them from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race in operating the Columbus public schools and ordering the submission of a systemwide desegregation plan.

Following decision by this Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (Dayton I ), in June 1977, and in response to a motion by the Columbus Board, the District Court rejected the argument that Dayton I required or permitted any modification of its findings or judgment. It reiterated its conclusion that the Board's " 'liability in this case concerns the Columbus School District as a whole,' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 94, quoting 429 F.Supp., at 266, asserting that although it had "no real interest in any remedy plan which is more sweeping than necessary to correct the constitutional wrongs plaintiffs have suffered," neither would it accept any plan "which fails to take into account the systemwide nature of the liability of the defendants." App. to Pet. for Cert. 95. The Board subsequently presented a plan that complied with the District Court's guidelines and that was embodied in a judgment entered on October 7. The plan was stayed pending appeal to the Court of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
267 cases
  • Moss v. Clark, Civ. A. No. 88-0361-AM.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • October 21, 1988
    ...classifications. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979). Not all government-made classifications are proscribed; nor are all government-made classifications reviewed u......
  • Crawford v. Board of Education
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 19, 1980
    ...or mixing' is therefore infirm as a matter of law." (p. 280, 97 S.Ct. p. 2757.) Most recently, in Columbus Board of Education v. Penick (1979) 443 U.S. 449, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 61 L.Ed.2d 666, the court again observed that the conduct prohibited to school boards is intentional segregation. Plain......
  • Coalition to Save Our Children v. BD. OF EDUC., Civ. A. No. 1816-1822 MMS.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • February 1, 1991
    ...of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 440-41, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1695-96, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 488, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 2992, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979). The Red Clay CHOICE plan combines two voluntary desegregation techniques — magnet schools and stu......
  • Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., No. CIV.A. MJG-95-309.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • January 6, 2005
    ...anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose." Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979). Sometimes a "clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race emerges from the effect of the st......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 books & journal articles
  • The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 97-3, March 2012
    • March 1, 2012
    ...United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) Harris......
  • The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 97-3, March 2012
    • March 1, 2012
    ...United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) Harris......
  • Addressing the problem: the judicial branches
    • United States
    • Environmental justice: legal theory and practice - second edition
    • May 23, 2012
    ...actions . . . could not ‘reasonably be explained without reference to racial concerns.’” Id. (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick , 443 U.S. 449, 461 (1979)). To establish discriminatory intent does not require proof that discrimination is the sole purpose behind each failure to equaliz......
  • Addressing the Problem: The Judicial Branches
    • United States
    • Environmental justice: legal theory and practice. 3rd Edition
    • November 20, 2014
    ...actions . . . could not ‘reasonably be explained without reference to racial concerns.’” Id. (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick , 443 U.S. 449, 461 (1979)). To establish discriminatory intent does not require proof that discrimination is the sole purpose behind each failure to equaliz......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT